United States District Court, S.D. Georgia, Savannah Division
KEVIN J. PAUL, SR. and GLORIA BYNES, Plaintiffs,
CHEDDAR'S SCRATCH KITCHEN and DARDEN RESTAURANT, INC., Defendants.
CHRISTOPHER L RAY, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
appearing pro se, have submitted a complaint
alleging discrimination under 42 U.S.C. §2000a. Doc. 1.
They seek to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). Doc.
2. Their joint application to proceed IFP, however, is
deficient and requires amendment and clarification.
application includes multiple inconsistencies and omissions.
As income, plaintiffs represent that they earn $778.00
bi-weekly, but do not identify their employers. Doc. 2 at 1.
Additionally, plaintiffs list as an expense “car
payment, ” but do not claim the associated vehicle as
property or the related loan as a debt. Id. at 2.
They also identify several categories of monthly expenses,
but only categorize costs related to dependents. Id.
Wary of indigency claims where information appears to have
been omitted, and cognizant of how easily one may consume a
public resource with no financial skin in the game,
this Court demands supplemental information from dubious IFP
movants. See, e.g., Kareem v. Home Source Rental,
986 F.Supp.2d 1345 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 9, 2013); Robbins v.
Universal Music Grp., 2013 WL 1146865 at *1 (S.D. Ga.
Mar. 19, 2013).
end, it tolerates no lies. Ross v. Fogam, 2011 WL
2516221 at *1 (S.D. Ga. June 23, 2011) (“Ross, a
convicted criminal, chose to burden this Court with
falsehoods, not honesty. The Court thus rejects Ross's
show cause explanation, as it is clear that he purposefully
chose to disguise his filing history and financial
status.”); Johnson v. Chisolm, 2011 WL 3319872
at *1 n. 3 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 1, 2011) (“This Court does
not hesitate to invoke dismissal and other sanctions against
inmates who lie to or otherwise deceive this Court.”);
see also Moss v. Premiere Credit of North America,
LLC, 2013 WL 842515 (11th Cir. Mar. 6, 2013)
(“Moss's [IFP on appeal] motion is denied because
her allegation of poverty appears to be untrue in light of
her financial affidavit and filings in the district
court.”). As plaintiffs' application for IFP
status is not sufficiently clear, they are
DIRECTED to amend their application to
disclose the following information within 14 days
from the date of this Order:
(1) The identities of plaintiffs' current employer or
employers or, if not currently employed, the source of any
income reflected in the IFP application;
(2) Any assets or property owned (e.g., vehicles, jewelry, or
(3) An itemization of monthly expenses; and
(4) Any debts or other financial obligations (e.g. car
parties may jointly bring an action arising from a common
“transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or
occurrences” or involving a common “question of
law or fact, ” the court must be satisfied that each
individual seeking IPF status qualifies. Fed. R. Civ. Pro.
20(a)(1). Though the application to proceed IFP is signed by
both plaintiffs, it is unclear whether the information listed
relates to both or only one litigant. Plaintiffs are
DIRECTED to file separate applications to
proceed IFP reflecting their respective finances or, if
plaintiffs comingle their finances-shared assets, expenses,
debts and bank accounts-to clarify their relationship.
this information will better illuminate Plaintiffs' true
financial condition. In that regard, they must again declare
the facts they plead to be true and sign their respective
names to their declarations- under penalty of perjury. If
they do not use a preprinted IFP form to respond, they must
insert the following language above their signature: “I
declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United
States of America that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed on (date).” 28 U.S.C. § 1746(1). The
Clerk is DIRECTED to serve with this Order
two blank IFP forms for Plaintiffs' convenience. Failure
to comply with this directive will result in a recommendation
of dismissal on IFP-deficiency grounds alone. Kareem v.
Home Source Rental, 2014 WL 24347 at *1 (S.D. Ga. Jan.
 “[A] litigant whose filing fees
and court costs are assumed by the public . . . lacks an
economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous,
malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.” Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989). Courts thus deploy
appropriate scrutiny. See Hobby v. Beneficial Mortg. Co.
of Va., 2005 WL 5409003 at *7 (E.D. Va. June 3, 2005)
(debtor denied IFP status where, although she was unable to
find employment as a substitute teacher, she had not shown
she is unable to work and earn income in other ways); In
re Fromal, 151 B.R. 733, 735 (E.D. Va. 1993) (denying
IFP application where debtor was licensed attorney and
accountant and she offered no reason why she cannot find
employment), cited in In re Zow, 2013 WL 1405533 at
*2 (Bkrtcy. S.D. Ga. Mar. 4, 2013) (denying IFP to
“highly educated” bankruptcy debtor who, inter
alia, had “not shown he is physically unable to work or
earn income in other ways.”); Nixon v. United
Parcel Service, 2013 WL 1364107 at *1-2 (M.D. Ga. ...