MCFADDEN, C. J., MCMILLIAN, P. J., and SENIOR APPELLATE JUDGE
Phipps, Senior Appellate Judge.
a jury trial, Thomas Edward Birdsong was found guilty of
armed robbery (OCGA § 16-8-41). He appeals from the
denial of his amended motion for new trial, contending that
he abandoned his effort to commit the crime and, thus, that
the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction. For
the reasons that follow, we affirm.
review the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, under the standard set forth in Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (III) (B) (99 S.Ct. 2781, 61
L.Ed.2d 560) (1979), to discern whether any rational trier of
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt. We do not judge witness
credibility or weigh the evidence, nor do we resolve
evidentiary conflicts, as those matters are for the jury.
evidence adduced at trial shows that in late November or
early December 2012, Birdsong had lunch at the home of a
former co-worker, Jamar Terrell. Marcus Rutledge and another
friend of Birdsong's, who was not identified, were also
there. The four began talking about robbing a particular
Wells Fargo Bank branch. The unidentified fourth man decided not
to participate, but Birdsong offered to supply guns and
provided Terrell and Rutledge with a 9-millimeter handgun and
a shotgun to be used in the robbery. Birdsong also helped
plan the robbery. He was to be the getaway driver and keep a
lookout for police, honking the horn to alert the other men
if he saw law enforcement approaching. He developed the idea
to have Rutledge and Terrell enter the bank from separate
locations, and he set a nearby Citgo gas station as the
location where he would pick them up after the robbery. He
also came up with an idea to report the shotgun, which
belonged to his brother, as stolen after the robbery. All
three men met several times to travel to and scope out the
location of the robbery beforehand. The men agreed to split
the proceeds after the robbery, and Birdsong was to receive a
day of the robbery, the men drove in two cars, one belonging
to Birdsong and the other to Terrell. They parked
Terrell's car at the Citgo and traveled to a Wal-Mart in
Birdsong's car. All three men went into the Wal-Mart and
Rutledge stole ammunition for their guns. Birdsong then drove
them back toward the bank. He dropped Terrell off in front of
a pizza restaurant near the bank, and he dropped Rutledge off
on the drive-thru side, as they had planned. Birdsong was to
wait for the men back at Citgo, near Terrell's parked
and Terrell then walked into the bank wearing masks and
brandishing the guns. They demanded money from the teller and
forced everyone to lie on the floor and put their hands
behind their heads. A teller put money in bags, as directed.
Rutledge grabbed the bags, and he and Terrell fled with more
than $10, 400. Terrell testified that they ran "to the
Citgo where Thomas Birdsong would be waiting to drive us
away." When they got to the Citgo parking area where
they had planned to meet, Birdsong was not there. Rather, he
was sitting in his car at the Citgo gas pumps. They tried to
signal him, but he was looking away, so they instead got into
Terrell's car. As they drove away, they saw that Birdsong
was following them in his vehicle. The teller had slipped a
tracking device into a bag of cash and the police gave chase,
but Terrell and Rutledge abandoned their car and fled on
foot. Police recovered a shotgun, two bags of money, and a
mask in or near the abandoned vehicle. Police tracked Terrell
down using his car registration, and learned of Rutledge and
Birdsong through him. The police gave Birdsong's
photograph and car description to media outlets. Following
the broadcasts, Birdsong turned himself in to police.
police interview, a video of which was played for the jury,
Birdsong told police that he discussed the bank robbery with
the other men while they were all outside the bank, but he
denied knowing when the robbery would occur. He said the plan
was for him to be the getaway driver, and he told police
where he was supposed to wait. He said that the other men
"wanted me to be the watch out man," and that he
thought about it but begged off at the "last
movement" because he was afraid. He told police he
followed the men to a store next to the bank and that while
they entered the bank, he went into the store for snacks.
When he emerged, he saw police surrounding the bank, at which
point he "kn[e]w they did it." He said he then
drove away from the scene.
argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his
conviction because it shows that he abandoned his effort to
commit the crime. He cites OCGA § 16-4-5 (a), which
provides, in part, that "[w]hen a person's conduct
would otherwise constitute an attempt to commit a
crime under Code Section § 16-4-1, it is an
affirmative defense that he abandoned his effort to commit
the crime[, ] . . . manifesting a voluntary and complete
renunciation of his criminal purpose." (Emphasis
outlined above, although Birdsong told police that he begged
off "at the last movement[, ]" there also was
testimony that he was still waiting at the Citgo gas station
when the crime was complete and the other men ran from the
bank, even though he was not parked at the agreed-upon
getaway spot. Further, there was testimony that Birdsong
followed the other men in his car as they fled the scene.
Although Birdsong's evidence was in conflict with other
evidence, the weighing of evidence and the judging of witness
credibility are matters for the jury, not for this Court.
Rogers v. State, 350 Ga.App. 163, 163 (1) (828
S.E.2d 398) (2019).
the evidence presented, including that Birdsong provided the
guns used in the robbery, dropped the men off near the bank
so that they could rob it, waited at the Citgo knowing the
robbery was taking place, and then followed the men as they
fled after taking money, the jury was authorized to infer
that Birdsong did not abandon the crime prior to its
completion. "[A] person cannot abandon an already
completed crime." (Citation omitted.) Hubbard v.
State, 210 Ga.App. 141, 143 (1) (a) (435 S.E.2d 709)
(1993). See generally Spivey v. State, 243 Ga.App.
785, 786-788 (1) - (2) (534 S.E.2d 498) (2000) (finding no
error when trial court refused to charge jury on abandonment
where, despite defendant's own conflicting testimony,
some evidence showed that defendant was promised payment to
drive others to and from a planned robbery, but that after
parking the car, she refused to serve as getaway driver).
as the jury found, the evidence outlined above was sufficient
to enable a rational trier of fact to find each essential
element of the crime of armed robbery, and that Birdsong was
a party to that completed crime. See OCGA § 16-8-41 (a)
(A person commits armed robbery "when, with intent to
commit theft, he or she takes the property of another from
the person or the immediate presence of another by use of an
offensive weapon"); OCGA § 16-2-20 (b) (3), (4) (A
person is a party to the crime if he "[i]ntentionally
aids or abets in the commission of the crime; or . . .
[i]ntentionally advises, encourages, hires, counsels, or
procures another to commit the crime"). While there is
no argument on appeal that Birdsong entered the bank, pointed
a gun at a customer or teller, and demanded money, "[a]
participant to a crime may be convicted although he is not
the person who directly commits the crime. . . . Mere
presence at the scene is not sufficient to convict one of
being a party to a crime, but criminal intent may be inferred
from conduct, before, during, and after the commission of a
crime." (Footnote and emphasis omitted.) Jordan v.
State, 281 Ga.App. 419, 422 (1) (636 S.E.2d 151) (2006).
We find no error.
McFadden, C. J., and ...