Melton, Chief Justice.
a jury trial, Appellant Frankie Jay Henry III appeals his
conviction for the stabbing death of Antonio Wiley,
contending that the evidence presented at trial was
insufficient to support his conviction and that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel.For the reasons set forth
below, we affirm.
Henry contends that the evidence presented at trial was not
sufficient for a jury to convict him of Wiley's murder.
When evaluating the sufficiency of evidence, "the
relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt." (Citation and emphasis
omitted.) Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319
(III) (B) (99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560) (1979). "This
Court does not reweigh evidence or resolve conflicts in
testimony; instead, evidence is reviewed in a light most
favorable to the verdict, with deference to the jury's
assessment of the weight and credibility of the
evidence." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Hayes
v. State, 292 Ga. 506, 506 (739 S.E.2d 313) (2013).
in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence
shows that on August 28, 2011, just days after he arrived at
Augusta State Medical Prison, Wiley was stabbed over 65
times. Inmate Dante Morris testified at trial that members of
the Atlanta Mob and the Gangster Disciples targeted Wiley
over a dispute about a cell phone battery. Morris identified
Henry's co-defendants, Frederick Dewberry and Michael
Ward, as members of the Gangster Disciples, and Henry as a
member of the Atlanta Mob. Moments before Wiley's
stabbing, members of the two prison gangs led Wiley out of
the dormitory into the yard and around a corner. When Wiley
sat down on a bench, a fellow inmate known as
"Rump" pulled out a shank and began stabbing Wiley.
Other inmates, including Henry, Dewberry, and Ward, joined
in. Wiley was eventually able to break away from his
attackers and run toward the dormitory, where he collapsed in
front of the door.
Latonia King responded to the medical emergency call and
arrived to find 75-100 rowdy inmates in the yard, several of
whom surrounded Wiley. Wiley lay with his eyes open, barely
breathing. The inmates were yelling threats at the handful of
guards on the scene. King ordered the inmates to return to
the dormitory. Although some inmates complied, many continued
to threaten the officers. Eventually, King and a nurse were
able to reach Wiley and transport him to the medical
facility. Despite this, Wiley died from loss of blood. The
GBI medical examiner testified that Wiley's cause of
death was exsanguination from no less than 65 stab wounds.
on the foregoing, we find that the evidence was sufficient to
enable the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Henry
was guilty of the crime for which he was convicted, as the
jury was entitled to accept Morris's testimony
identifying Henry as one of the individuals who joined in the
stabbing of Wiley. See OCGA § 24-14-8 ("The
testimony of a single witness is generally sufficient to
establish a fact."); OCGA § 16-2-20 (a)
("Every person concerned in the commission of a crime is
a party thereto and may be charged with and convicted of
commission of the crime.").
Henry contends that his trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance for: (a) failing to adequately prepare for trial
and (b) failing to adequately cross-examine a State's
witness, Dante Morris. We disagree.
In order to succeed on his claim of ineffective assistance,
[Henry] must prove both that his trial counsel's
performance was deficient and that there is a reasonable
probability that the trial result would have been different
if not for the deficient performance. Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d
674) (1984). If an appellant fails to meet his or her burden
of proving either prong of the Strickland test, the
reviewing court does not have to examine the other prong.
Id. at 697 (IV); Fuller v. State, 277 Ga.
505 (3) (591 S.E.2d 782) (2004). In reviewing the trial
court's decision, "'[w]e accept the trial
court's factual findings and credibility determinations
unless clearly erroneous, but we independently apply the
legal principles to the facts.' [Cit.]" Robinson
v. State, 277 Ga. 75, 76 (586 S.E.2d 313) (2003).
Wright v. State, 291 Ga. 869, 870 (2) (734 S.E.2d
Henry asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to adequately prepare for trial. Namely, Henry
alleges that his trial counsel's performance was
deficient because he met with Henry only once, just prior to
jury selection. This, Henry claims, deprived him of personal
access to recorded interviews (particularly Morris's two
interviews with the GBI) and the GBI report. However,
"'there exists no magic amount of time which counsel
must spend in actual conference with his client, and [Henry]
does not specifically describe how additional communications
with his lawyer would have enhanced his defense.'
[Cit.]" Morrison v. State, 303 Ga. 120, 125 (5)
(a) (810 S.E.2d 508) (2018). Although he met with Henry only
once in person, trial counsel testified at the motion for a
new trial hearing that he and Henry had communicated through
letters, phone conversations, and family members.
Additionally, Henry admitted at the hearing that he
communicated with trial counsel before meeting with him in
person. Trial counsel also testified that he discussed the
contents of the GBI file with Henry. Thus, Henry has not
shown that his trial counsel's performance was deficient.
Moreover, although Henry was not able to hear any of the
recorded GBI interviews, he has not shown how listening to
them would have enhanced his defense, thereby failing to
establish prejudice. Accordingly, Henry has failed to show
that he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel.
Henry also claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to adequately impeach Morris on cross-examination
with his prior felony convictions and his alleged prior
inconsistent statement to the GBI. Henry contends these
omissions were not strategic, but signs of inadequate
representation. He generally asserts that a proper
cross-examination of Morris would likely have changed the
outcome of his trial.
argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
introduce certified copies of Morris's prior convictions
at trial to impeach Morris's credibility. However,
Henry's cursory briefing on this issue does not identify
which of Morris's prior convictions should have been
introduced or how their introduction would have led to a
different result. "[I]t [is Henry's] burden to show
deficient performance and prejudice through competent
evidence, for a silent or ambiguous record is not sufficient
to overcome the strong presumption of reasonable
performance." (Citation and punctuation omitted.)
Thorpe v. State, 304 Ga. 266, 268 (2) (a) (818
S.E.2d 547) (2018).
trial counsel's alleged failure to impeach Morris with
what Henry argues is a prior inconsistent statement, this
claim also fails. Specifically, Henry alleges that trial
counsel should have questioned Morris regarding his first
custodial interview wherein he did not identify Henry as a
participant in Wiley's stabbing.However, Henry has failed to
show prejudice. On cross- examination, trial counsel
successfully elicited testimony from Morris that there were
as many as 11 participants in the stabbing, that they were
all "coming in and coming out" at the same time,
and that he was unable to identify all of the attackers.
Under such circumstances, we cannot say that Henry has