P. J., COOMER and MARKLE, JJ.
a minor, by and through Deanna Enlow, her parent and
guardian, ("Appellant") appeals the trial
court's denial of her motion for summary judgment on her
claim for fraudulent transfer under the Uniform Voidable
Transactions Act ("UVTA") against Glen Enlow
("Grandfather"). On appeal, Appellant contends that
the trial court erred in finding that the UVTA can never be
used to set aside the terms of a previously entered divorce
decree, and, more specifically, that no "transfer"
took place as defined by the UVTA. Appellant also contends
that the trial court erred in finding that she failed to
satisfy the "reasonably equivalent value" and
intent elements of her UVTA claim. For the reasons stated
below, we vacate and remand.
Court reviews de novo a grant or denial of summary judgment,
viewing the evidence and all reasonable conclusions and
inferences drawn from it in the light most favorable to the
nonmovant. Norton v. Cobb, 284 Ga.App. 303, 303-304
(643 S.E.2d 803) (2007). "Summary judgment is proper
when there is no genuine issue of material fact . . . and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Id. at 303 (citations omitted); see OCGA §
in this light, the record shows that in November 2015,
Grandfather molested his six-year-old granddaughter, M.
After he learned Grandfather had molested M. E., her father,
Michael Enlow ("Father"), threatened to sue the
Enlows. On June 4, 2016, Marilyn Enlow
("Grandmother") wrote an email to Father
acknowledging his threat of suit.
to June 16, 2016, Grandfather and Grandmother held five
parcels of real property in a trust, The Trust of Glen A.
& Marilyn R. Enlow ("Trust I"). On June 16,
2016, Grandfather and Grandmother, as trustees, executed
quitclaim deeds transferring these five parcels of real
property from Trust I to Grandmother as trustee of a trust in
Grandmother's name, The Marilyn R. Enlow Revocable Trust
("Trust II"). Grandmother and her daughter were
named as beneficiaries of Trust II. The quitclaim deeds
transferring the five parcels of real estate to Trust II were
filed on August 8, 2016.
and Grandmother signed a divorce settlement agreement dated
August 18, 2016. In the settlement agreement, Grandfather
agreed that all five parcels of real property were to be
awarded to Grandmother. After each paragraph awarding
Grandmother one of the parcels, the following language was
NOTE: at the time of this signing, [Grandfather] has executed
a quitclaim deed that was prepared as a part of estate
planning that is not a part of this action. In the event that
such quitclaim deed has not been properly executed, this
provision shall remain in full force and effect.
and Grandmother's final judgment and decree of divorce
incorporating the settlement agreement was entered on
November 18, 2016.
October 11, 2017, Appellant filed a civil action against
Grandfather asserting claims for negligence, assault,
battery, false imprisonment, negligent and intentional
infliction of emotional distress, fraud and fraudulent
conveyance under the UVTA, and attorney fees. Grandfather,
who is not represented by counsel, sent a pro se
correspondence dated November 16, 2017, that appears to be
his answer to the complaint. Appellant then filed a partial
motion for summary judgment on her claims for negligence,
assault and battery, false imprisonment, negligent and
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and fraud and
fraudulent conveyance under the UVTA. Grandfather submitted a
pro se response letter, maintaining that he did not transfer
any assets to protect them from any lawsuit.
trial court granted summary judgment on all of
Appellant's claims except on the UVTA claim. In denying
summary judgment on the UVTA claim, the trial court held that
the UVTA cannot be used to set aside the terms of a
previously entered divorce decree. The trial court stated
that it could not conclude that any "transfer" had
taken place within the meaning of the UVTA because
Grandfather never truly "parted" with any asset
because the property at issue was marital property subject to
equitable division upon the parties' divorce. The trial
court certified its decision for immediate review. Appellant
filed a timely application for interlocutory appeal, which we
granted. This appeal followed.
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in finding that
the UVTA can never be used to set aside the terms of a
previously entered divorce decree. We agree.
UVTA makes certain transfers of assets by a debtor voidable
as to a creditor. See OCGA § 18-2-70 et seq. ...