MCFADDEN, C. J., MCMILLIAN, P. J., and SENIOR APPELLATE JUDGE
MCFADDEN, CHIEF JUDGE
appeals challenge orders validating revenue bonds authorized
for issuance by a county development authority. The appellant
claims that the petitions for validation did not comply with
a statutory requirement that the purpose of the bonds be set
forth; but a review of the petitions reveals that they did in
fact state the purpose of the bonds and thus complied with
the statutory requirement. The appellant also claims that the
court erred in validating the bonds under a statutory
"catchall" provision defining such bond projects;
but the various phases of the project meet the definition
provided by that provision. The appellant further contends
that the bond transaction improperly bound the county board
of tax assessors to a certain valuation of leasehold
interests in the project assets; but the transaction merely
provided a proper formula used by the board for such
valuations. The appellant also claims that the court erred in
refusing a continuance of the bond validation hearing; but
there is no showing of an abuse of discretion by the court.
Because the appellant has failed to show reversible error, we
Facts and procedural posture.
November 13, 2018, the Development Authority of Fulton County
adopted three resolutions authorizing the issuance of taxable
revenue bonds for a project at Phipps Plaza in Atlanta in the
principal amounts of $90, 200, 000 for the office portion of
the project, $63, 300, 000 for the hotel portion, and $60,
700, 000 for the retail portion. The development authority
sent notice of the bond resolutions to the Fulton County
District Attorney, who subsequently filed petitions in
superior court for validation of the bonds. On December 18,
2018, Erica Long moved to intervene and for a continuance of
the bond validation hearing scheduled for December 27, 2018.
The superior court granted Long's motion to intervene,
but denied her motion for a continuance. After the December
27 evidentiary hearing, the court entered final orders
validating the bonds for all three portions of the project.
appeals from the three final orders. Because the appeals
raise the same issues, they are consolidated for our
Purpose of the bonds.
contends that the court erred in validating the bonds because
the petitions filed by the district attorney failed to
satisfy the statutory requirement of setting forth the
purpose for which the bonds are to be issued. The contention
is without merit.
§ 36-82-75 provides, in part, that such a petition shall
set forth "the name of the governmental body seeking to
issue the bonds, the amount of bonds to be issued, [and]
for what purpose the bonds are to be issued. . .
." (Emphasis supplied.) Here, each of the petitions
stated that the bond proceeds "are to be used to
acquire, construct and equip land, improvements and related
building fixtures and building equipment (the
"Project") in Fulton County, Georgia, to be leased
to [the respective appellee company] for use as a mixed-use
commercial facility and an economic development project under
OCGA § 36-62-2 (6) (N)."
has cited no persuasive authority showing that this
description of the purpose of the bonds was deficient and did
not comply with OCGA § 36-82-75. On the contrary,
"[w]e agree with the trial court that the petition[s]
substantially complied with the statutory requirement in
[this] regard." Alexander v. Macon-Bibb
County Urban Dev. Auth., 257 Ga. 181, 184 (4)
(357 S.E.2d 62) (1987) (footnote omitted) (involving other
OCGA § 36-82-75 requirements about what must be set
forth in bond validation petitions). See generally
Cottrell v. Atlanta Dev. Auth., 297 Ga. 1 (770
S.E.2d 616) (2015) (where purpose of bonds was to fund a
portion of the cost of developing, constructing, and
operating a new stadium facility in Atlanta); Sherman v.
Dev. Auth. of Fulton County, 320 Ga.App. 689, 690 (740
S.E.2d 663) (2013) (noting that purpose of bonds was to
finance the development of a manufacturing facility that
would be leased to a certain company).
OCGA § 36-62-2 (6) (N).
contends that the trial court erred in validating the bonds
pursuant to OCGA § 36-62-2 (6) (N), arguing that the
definition of "projects" set forth in that code
section does not apply to these cases. We disagree.
§ 36-62-2 provides definitions of various terms for the
chapter of the code governing Development Authorities Law.
See OCGA § 36-62-1 et seq.
Subsection (6) [of OCGA § 36-62-2] identifies fifteen
kinds of "projects" that development authorities
can finance. Known as the "catchall provision" of
subsection (6), paragraph (6) (N) authorizes development
authorities to finance: "The acquisition, construction,
installation, modification, renovation, or rehabilitation of
land, interests in land, buildings, structures, facilities,
or other improvements and the acquisition, installation,
modification, renovation, rehabilitation, or furnishing of
fixtures, machinery, equipment, furniture, or other property
of any nature whatsoever used on, in, or in connection with
any such land, interest in land, building, structure,
facility, or other improvement, all for the essential public
purpose of the development of trade, commerce, industry, and
employment opportunities. A project may be for any
industrial, commercial, business, office, parking, public, or
other use, provided that a majority of the members of the
authority determines, by a duly adopted resolution, that the
project and such use thereof would further the public purpose
of this chapter." OCGA § 36-62-2 (6) (N).
Development Auth. of Cobb County v. State of Ga.,
___ Ga. ___ (1) (829 S.E.2d 160) (2019). "Under
paragraph (6) (N), a project is eligible for public financing
only to the extent that it promotes 'the development of
trade, commerce, industry, and ...