United States District Court, M.D. Georgia, Macon Division
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE
E. SELF, III, JUDGE
Educational Credit Management Corporation
(“ECMC”) has moved for judgment on the pleadings
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) against Plaintiff
Angeles Ford. See generally [Doc. 47]. Because the
Court finds below that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim
against ECMC, it GRANTS ECMC's motion.
amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Helms
Career Institute, an educational institution, forwarded
evidence of a defaulted student loan in Plaintiff's name
to the United States Department of Education for collection,
even though Plaintiff never attended Helms as a student.
[Doc. 16-1, ¶ 3]. According to Plaintiff, ECMC
guaranteed the fraudulent loan and allegedly violated the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12
U.S.C. §§ 5301, et seq.
(“Dodd-Frank”), [1" name=
"FN1" id="FN1">1] Department of Education
regulations, and the Higher Education Act, 20 U.S.C.
§§ 1001, et seq.
(“HEA”). [Id. at ¶ 4]. Additionally,
Plaintiff claims that all Defendants violated federal
criminal provisions including 18 U.S.C. §§ 1002
(possessing false papers to defraud the United States) and
1028 (fraud in connection with identification documents). As
a result of these actions, Plaintiff incurred a lien on her
2018 tax refund and has had to live with family and friends
due to the hardship. [Id. at ¶¶ 2, 6].
Accordingly, she seeks $75, 000 in damages. [Id. at
instant motion for judgment on the pleadings, ECMC argues
that Plaintiff has no private right of action to enforce
federal criminal statutes, the HEA, or Dodd-Frank, and that
Plaintiff has failed to state a fraud claim. Plaintiff did
not respond to ECMC's motion. Upon review, the Court
agrees with each of ECMC's arguments and grants its
Standard of Review
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[a]fter the
pleadings are closed-but early enough not to delay trial-a
party may move for judgment on the pleadings.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). “Judgment on the pleadings is
appropriate when there are no material facts in dispute and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Douglas Asphalt Co. v. Qore, Inc., 541
F.3d 1269, 1273 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Cannon
v. City of W. Palm Beach, 1299');">250 F.3d 1299, 1301 (11th
Cir. 2001)). “A motion for judgment on the pleadings is
subject to the same standard as is a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss.” Provident Mut. Life Ins. Co. of Phila. v.
City of Atlanta, 1274');">864 F.Supp. 1274, 1278 (N.D.Ga. 1994).
ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must accept the facts
set forth in the complaint as true. Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 572 (2007). A complaint survives
a motion to dismiss only if the plaintiff alleges sufficient
factual matter to state a claim for relief that is plausible
on its face, and he must state more than “unadorned,
McCullough v. Finley, 1324');">907 F.3d 1324, 1333 (11th Cir.
2018) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678-79 (2009)). He must also “plead more than labels
and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of
a cause of action, ” id., such that the
factual allegations contained in the complaint are
“enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level, ” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
assessing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,
the Court employs a two-step framework. McCullough,
907 F.3d at 1333. First, the Court identifies and disregards
allegations that are “no more than mere conclusions,
” since “[c]onclusory allegations are not
entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id.
(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). Second, the Court
“assume[s] any remaining factual allegations are true
and determine[s] whether those factual allegations
‘plausibly give rise to an entitlement to
relief.'” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 679).
Plaintiff's Claims under Criminal Statutes, the HEA, and
first argues that Plaintiff has no private right of action
under the stated provisions of the federal criminal code, the
HEA, or Dodd-Frank. The Court has already determined that the
HEA and the federal criminal code provide no private right of
Helms argues that the complaint states no basis for federal
question jurisdiction since there are no private rights of
action under the stated provisions of the federal criminal
code and the HEA. This is undoubtedly true. See Collins
v. Bates, No. 17-14559- G, 2018 WL 5090845, at *7 (11th
Cir. May 10, 2018) (explaining that federal criminal statutes
do not create a private right of civil action absent
“clear evidence” of Congress' intent for them
to do so) accord House v. Hastings, No. 91 Civ. 3780
(JSM), 1992 WL 44370, at *1 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 1992) (no
private right of action under 18 U.S.C. § 1002) and
Garay v. U.S. Bancorp, 303 F.Supp.2d 299, 302 (E.D.N.Y.
2004) (no private right of action under 18 U.S.C. §
1028). See also Cliff v. Payco Gen. Am. Credits,
Inc., 1113');">363 F.3d 1113, 1123 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he
HEA expressly empowers only the Secretary of ...