a jury trial, Charles Lee Pennington and Jay Harlan Briele
were found guilty of possessing with intent to distribute
methamphetamine within 1, 000 feet of an elementary school,
in violation of OCGA § 16-13-32.4 (a). At trial,
Pennington and Briele requested that the jury be instructed
on an affirmative defense provided in the Georgia Controlled
Substances Act,  specifically, that the conduct prohibited
by OCGA § 16-13-32.4 (a) took place entirely within a
private residence, that no minors were present in the
residence at any time during the commission of the offense,
and that the prohibited conduct was not carried on for
financial gain. The trial court denied the request and, in
denying Pennington's motion for a new trial, explained
that the court refused to instruct the jury on the
affirmative defense because Pennington and Briele, neither of
whom testified at trial, did not admit doing the act charged,
that is, possessing with intent to distribute
methamphetamine, and because neither the State nor either
defendant presented any evidence that the "active meth
lab" in Pennington's residence was not
being used for financial gain. The Court of Appeals affirmed
Pennington's convictions, reasoning that, because he did
not admit that he possessed with intent to distribute
methamphetamine near a school, he was not entitled to the
affirmative defense he requested. Pennington v.
State, 346 Ga.App. 586, 591 (3) (816 S.E.2d 762) (2018).
petitioned for a writ of certiorari, and this Court granted
his petition to consider the following questions: "What,
if anything, must a criminal defendant admit in order to
raise an affirmative defense? Must the defendant make any
such admissions for all purposes or only for more limited
purposes?" This Court addressed these questions in
McClure v. State, Case No. S18G1599, which we also
decide today. In that case, we answer the questions as
A criminal defendant is not required to "admit"
anything, in the sense of acknowledging that any particular
facts are true, in order to raise an affirmative defense. To
the extent a defendant in raising an affirmative defense
accepts for the sake of argument that he committed the act
alleged in a charge, the defendant may do so only for the
limited purpose of raising the affirmative defense at issue.
op. at *3-4. As is the case generally, "[t]o authorize a
requested jury instruction, there need only be slight
evidence supporting the theory of the charge."
Id. at *15-16 (citation and punctuation omitted).
And the defendant need not present evidence to support the
theory of an affirmative defense, if the State's evidence
raises the issue. Id. at *16.
follows from our holdings in McClure that the Court
of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's denial of
Pennington's request for a jury instruction on the
affirmative defense set out in OCGA § 16-13-32.4 (g)
solely on the basis that Pennington did not admit that he
possessed with intent to distribute methamphetamine near a
school. McClure, slip op. at *17 (1). Accordingly,
we vacate the judgment and remand to the Court of Appeals for
consideration of whether the trial court erred in failing to
give the requested instruction, that is, whether the
instruction was supported by at least slight evidence, and,
if so, whether any such instructional error was harmful.
vacated and case remanded. All the Justices concur.
 OCGA § 16-13-32.4 (a)
It shall be unlawful for any person to manufacture,
distribute, dispense, or possess with intent to distribute a
controlled substance or marijuana in, on, or within 1, 000
feet of any real property owned by or leased to any public or
private elementary school, secondary school, or school board
used for elementary or secondary education.
Pennington was also found guilty of trafficking
methamphetamine. The Court of Appeals determined that the
evidence was sufficient as to his convictions. Pennington
v. State, 346 Ga.App. 586, 587-588 (1) (816 S.E.2d 762)
(2018). In his direct appeal, Pennington also unsuccessfully
challenged the striking of a prospective juror. Id.
at 588-591 (2). Neither of these holdings is before this
 OCGA § 16-13-20 et seq.
 OCGA § 16-13-32.4 (g)