United States District Court, M.D. Georgia, Valdosta Division
LAWSON, SENIOR JUDGE.
Katrina Williams brought this action against Defendants
Rainbow Pediatrics Associates, P.C. (“Rainbow
Pediatrics”), The Urology Institute and Continence
Center, P.C. (“Urology Institute”), Frank E.
Glover, J.R. (“Dr. Frank Glover), and Marsha D. Glover
(“Dr. Marsha Glover”) to recover unpaid overtime
wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act
(“FLSA”). See 29 U.S.C. § 201,
et seq. Before the Court is Defendants' Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment. (Doc. 27). After reviewing the
pleadings, briefs, and evidentiary materials presented, the
Court determines that there are genuine issues of material
fact that must be resolved by a jury. The Court accordingly
DENIES Defendants' motion.
case arises from Plaintiff's employment with Dr. Marsha
Glover at Rainbow Pediatrics and the work Plaintiff performed
at Dr. Frank Glover's practice, the Urology Institute.
(Doc. 1, Compl. p. 12-20). Dr. Marsha Glover is a licensed
medical doctor in Georgia, where she practiced pediatrics.
(Doc. 27-2, p. 2). Dr. Marsha Glover exclusively owns Rainbow
Pediatrics; she served as Rainbow Pediatrics' owner,
administrator, and physician at its two office locations in
Moultrie and Thomasville, Georgia. (Dr. Marsha Glover's
Dep. p. 10; Doc. 27-2, p. 2). These overlapping roles
required Dr. Marsha Glover to handle the offices'
billing, finances, and human resources responsibilities in
addition to treating patients. (Dr. Marsha Glover's Dep.
Marsha Glover is married to Dr. Frank Glover. (Dr. Marsha
Glover's Dep. p. 8). Dr. Frank Glover is also a licensed
physician; he specializes in urology. (Id. at 8).
Dr. Frank Glover is the sole owner of the Urology Institute
and its four office locations in Albany, Thomasville,
Valdosta, and Moultrie, Georgia. (Id. at 9; Doc.
27-1, p. 4). Dr. Marsha Glover works as the chief executive
officer (“CEO”) and administrator of the Urology
Institute. (Dr. Marsha Glover's Dep. p. 9). Her duties as
administrator include “billing, accounts payable,
accounts receivable, [h]uman [r]esources, and the handling of
regulatory matters.” (Doc. 27-2, p. 2; see Dr.
Marsha Glover Dep. p. 18-21). During the relevant period
between March 25, 2016 and January 5, 2018, Dr. Marsha Glover
worked as the CEO and administrator at Urology Institute as
well as the administrator and physician at Rainbow
Pediatrics. (Dr. Marsha Glover's Dep. p.
8-10). During the workweek, Dr. Marsha Glover
split time between the offices, treating her patients at
Rainbow and performing administrator duties at the Urology
Institute. (Id. at 21-22).
about March 25, 2016, Dr. Marsha Glover hired Plaintiff to
work at Rainbow Pediatrics as a receptionist. (Id.
at 28; Williams Aff. ¶ 5). Plaintiff traveled between
Rainbow Pediatrics' office locations in Thomasville and
Moultrie to assist Dr. Marsha Glover. (Dr. Marsha
Glover's Dep. p. 54). Dr. Marsha Glover did not mention
the Urology Institute during Plaintiff's interview.
(Williams Aff. ¶ 7; Doc. 16, Defs. Answer ¶ 21).
However, Plaintiff worked at the Urology Institute on various
occasions between May 2016 and January 2018. (Dr. Marsha
Glover Dep. p. 105). She performed receptionist duties,
gathered supplies, attended trainings, and trained new
employees at the Urology Institute. (Id. at 29-36).
At all times, Dr. Marsha Glover and Rainbow Pediatrics
employed Plaintiff. Rainbow Pediatrics exclusively paid her
wages, even for work performed at the Urology Institute;
Plaintiff never received a paycheck from Dr. Frank Glover or
the Urology Institute. (Id. at 54).
alleges Defendants did not pay her for her work at the
Urology Institute and that she was “only compensated
for work performed at Rainbow Pediatrics.” (Williams
Aff. ¶ 22-30). While the parties agree that Plaintiff
spent time at both clinics, the parties vigorously dispute
the extent of Plaintiff's work at the Urology Institute
and whether Rainbow Pediatrics adequately paid Plaintiff for
her time at the Urology Institute. Plaintiff alleges that her
work schedule split between Rainbow Pediatrics and the
Urology Institute required her to work in excess of forty
hours weekly, and Defendants violated the FLSA by not paying
her overtime wages. (Compl. ¶ 40-42). Defendants contend
that Plaintiff worked overtime between the clinics on only
two occasions, and Rainbow Pediatrics' payroll records
confirm Plaintiff was paid adequately for that overtime work.
(Dr. Marsha Glover's Dep. p. 48-51). Defendants deny all
other allegations of overtime work.
is that Plaintiff submitted a letter to Dr. Marsha Glover on
January 4, 2018, and Plaintiff's employment ended on
January 5, 2018. (Doc. 27-8, 27-9, 34-1 p. 75). Plaintiff and
Defendants dispute whether Plaintiff resigned from Rainbow
Pediatrics or Dr. Marsha Glover fired her-an issue dependent
upon how the parties characterize Plaintiff's letter.
Defendants contend the letter was Plaintiff's resignation
from all employment with Dr. Marsha Glover and Dr. Frank
Glover; Plaintiff characterizes the letter as a
“written complaint, ” intended to end her
employment with Dr. Frank Glover at the Urology Institute.
(Compl. ¶ 34; Williams Aff. ¶ 31; Dr. Marsha
Glover's Dep. p. 107-08). Plaintiff further alleges that
she first made numerous verbal complaints concerning
Defendants' failure to compensate her and that she
submitted her “written complaint” only after Dr.
Marsha Glover “disregarded” her verbal
complaints. (Williams Aff. ¶ 31). Defendants deny that
Plaintiff ever complained about her hours at the Urology
Institute or her compensation. (Dr. Marsha Glover's Dep.
p. 85; Doc. 27-1, p. 18).
second letter-which is an edited version of the first
letter-also appears in the evidentiary record. (Doc. 27-9).
The second letter includes more specific references to the
Urology Institute that are absent from Plaintiff's first
letter. Id. Plaintiff alleges that in response to
receiving her first letter, Dr. Marsha Glover
“assured” her that she could continue her
employment solely with Rainbow Pediatrics and then,
“instructed” Plaintiff to submit another letter
clarifying that she “would no longer provide services
at the Urology Institute.” (Williams Aff. ¶ 31).
Defendants deny this allegation. (Dr. Marsha Glover Dep. p.
108-09). Defendants contend that Dr. Marsha Glover received
only the first letter, and she never told Plaintiff to submit
a second letter. Id.
January 5, 2018, Dr. Marsha Glover gave Plaintiff a
corresponding letter; it reads as follows: “[Y]esterday
you presented your letter of resignation. I am accepting that
letter and wish you all the best in your future
endeavors.” (Doc. 29-1, p. 102). This ended
Plaintiff's employment with both Rainbow Pediatrics and
the Urology Institute. Defendants argue this correspondence
from Dr. Marsha Glover confirmed Plaintiff's resignation.
Plaintiff maintains that she never resigned; Dr. Marsha
Glover fired her and “attempted to disguise”
Plaintiff's termination by writing the letter purportedly
accepting Plaintiff's resignation. (Doc. 34; Doc. 1).
lawsuit followed on February 21, 2018, wherein Plaintiff
alleges that Defendants' failure to pay Plaintiff's
overtime wages and subsequent retaliation against her
violated the FLSA. (Doc. 1). Defendants now move for partial
summary judgment on Plaintiff's FLSA
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings, the
discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any
affidavits show there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as
a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A genuine
issue of material fact arises only when “the evidence
is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). When considering
a motion for summary judgment, the court must evaluate all of
the evidence, together with any logical inferences, in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. at
254- 55. However, the court may not make credibility
determinations or weigh the evidence. Id. at 255;
see also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc.,
530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000). Credibility determinations and
weighing of the evidence are functions solely of a
jury-“not those of a judge.” Anderson,
477 U.S. at 255.