United States District Court, S.D. Georgia, Augusta Division
KENDRICK R. MARTIN, Plaintiff,
EDWARD PHILBIN, Warden; TOMMY TREMBLE, Deputy Warden of Security; LARRY REDD, Assistant Deputy Warden of Security; CLIFFORD BROWN, Unit Manager over the 11-B area; ORBEY HARMON, Captain, Chief of Security; QUATERRIO MOSS, Prison Guard; FREDRICK PRYOR, Prison Guard; MS. HALL, Prison Guard; LATOYA STRAWBRIDGE, Prison Guard; MS. JACKSON, Lieutenant; REGINA JOHNSON, Prison Nurse; LARRY SIMS, Prison Doctor; MR. BEST, Prison Guard; MS. WISER, Prison Guard; MS. PLATT, Prison Investigator; DONNA YOUNG, Mental Health Director; LISA MAYO, Mental Health Unit Manager; PATRICK WILLIAMS, Clinical Director; CALVIN BROWN, SMH TU Program Supervisor; JUDY HAMILTON, Mental Health Unit Manager; and RUTHIE SHELTON, Deputy Warden of Care and Treatment,  Defendants.
MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND
K. EPPS, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
incarcerated at Valdosta State Prison, is proceeding pro se
and in forma pauperis (“IFP”) in this case
brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, concerning events
alleged to have occurred at Augusta State Medical Prison
(“ASMP”) in Grovetown, Georgia. Because he is
proceeding IFP, Plaintiff's pleadings must be screened to
protect potential defendants. Phillips v. Mashburn,
746 F.2d 782, 785 (11th Cir. 1984); Al-Amin v.
Donald, 165 Fed.Appx. 733, 736 (11th Cir. 2006) (per
curiam). The Court screened the first amended complaint and
directed service of process to be effected on eight
Defendants based on claims of deliberate indifference to
Plaintiff's safety and medical deliberate indifference.
(See doc. no. 26.) Chief United States District Judge J.
Randal Hall dismissed seven other Defendants, as well as any
claims against Unit Manager Clifford Brown other than a
single medical deliberate indifference claim. (See doc. no.
Plaintiff filed a one-page motion to amend his amended
complaint without providing any details of his proposed new
claims, the Court explained Plaintiff may amend his amended
complaint, but not in a piecemeal fashion. (See doc. nos. 38,
42.) The Court further explained that if Plaintiff intended
to amend the controlling pleading, he must submit a complete
second amended complaint that would supersede and replace
entirely his original complaint. (Doc. no. 42, pp. 3-5.) The
Court also warned Plaintiff that because the Court would
screen any amended complaint, he risked having Defendants or
claims dismissed if he left out or changed information
contained in the first amended complaint. (Id. at
3-4.) Plaintiff complied with the Court's instructions
and has filed his second amended complaint, signed on
September 16, 2019. (Doc. no. 45.) As the Court previously
explained to Plaintiff, the amended complaint supersedes and
replaces in its entirety the previous pleading. See
Hoefling v. City of Miami, 811 F.3d 1271, 1277 (11th
Cir. 2016); Lowery v. Alabama Power Co., 483 F.3d
1184, 1219 (11th Cir. 2007).
Court affords a liberal construction to a pro se
litigant's pleadings, holding them to a more lenient
standard than those drafted by an attorney, Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), but the Court may
dismiss the complaint or any portion thereof if it is
frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune to such relief. See 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b). After a review of
Plaintiff's second amended complaint and prior history of
case filings, the Court REPORTS and RECOMMENDS this action be
DISMISSED without prejudice.
PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT (“PLRA”)
prisoner attempting to proceed IFP in a civil action in
federal court must comply with the mandates of the PLRA, Pub.
L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996).
28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) of the PLRA provides:
In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a
judgment in a civil action or proceeding under this section
if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while
incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action
or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed
on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the
prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.
provision of the PLRA, commonly known as the three strikes
provision, requires frequent filer prisoners to prepay the
entire filing fee before federal courts may consider their
lawsuits and appeals.” Rivera v. Allin, 144
F.3d 719, 723 (11th Cir. 1998) (internal citations omitted),
abrogated on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549
U.S. 199 (2007). The Eleventh Circuit has upheld the
constitutionality of § 1915(g) because it does not
violate an inmate's right to access the courts, the
doctrine of separation of powers, an inmate's right to
due process of law, or an inmate's right to equal
protection. Id. at 721-27.
end, the “Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights
(Prisoner Complaint)” requires that prisoner plaintiffs
disclose: (1) whether they have begun other lawsuits in state
or federal court dealing with the same facts involved in the
current action, (2) whether they have filed other lawsuits in
state or federal court otherwise relating to the conditions
of their imprisonment, and (3) the disposition of any such
lawsuits. (Doc. no. 45, pp. 23-24.) Under the question
concerning whether a prisoner plaintiff has brought any
lawsuits otherwise relating to the conditions of his
imprisonment, the prisoner plaintiff who has brought any such
lawsuits is specifically instructed to describe each lawsuit,
including the court hearing the case, and the date of filing
and disposition. (Id. at 24.) If there is more than
one such lawsuit, the additional lawsuits must be described
on another piece of paper. (Id.)
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, Plaintiff
certified he had not begun other lawsuits in state or federal
court dealing with the same facts involved in this action.
(Doc. no. 45, p. 23.) However, in the second amended
complaint, Plaintiff attempts to add a claim regarding his
alleged improper mental health categorization against prison
officials Edward Philbin, Ruthie Shelton, Donna Young, Lisa
Mayo, Patrick Williams, and Calvin Brown. (Id. at 10
¶ 46.) In Martin v. Philbin, the Court screened
Plaintiff's allegations concerning his placement in the
Mental Health Program and Specialized Mental Health Treatment
Unit Program at ASMP and determined he failed to state a
claim for relief against these very same prison officials. CV
118-128, doc. no. 12 (S.D. Ga. Nov. 16, 2018). Upon receiving
the Court's recommendation for dismissal in CV 118-128,
Plaintiff moved to voluntarily dismiss his claims prior to
any final action by the District Judge, thus preventing
Plaintiff from incurring a strike under § 1915(g). Now,
having filed a new lawsuit which made it past initial
screening, Plaintiff again attempts to raise claims about his
mental health category while affirmatively misrepresenting he
has not begun other lawsuits dealing with these same facts.
Rule of Civil Procedure 11(c) allows the Court to impose
sanctions, including dismissal, for “knowingly fil[ing]
a pleading that contains false contentions.” Redmon
v. Lake Cty. Sheriff's Office, 414 Fed.Appx. 221,
223, 225 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) Moreover, as has
previously been explained to Plaintiff in a case filed in
this District dismissed for providing dishonest information:
The inquiry concerning a prisoner's prior lawsuits is not
a matter of idle curiosity, nor is it an effort to raise
meaningless obstacles to a prisoner's access to the
courts. Rather, the existence of prior litigation initiated
by a prisoner is required in order for the Court to apply 28
U.S.C. § 1915(g) (the ...