MCFADDEN, C. J., HODGES, J. and SENIOR APPELLATE JUDGE PHIPPS
Vaughn, III was convicted by a jury of seven counts of child
molestation and two counts of aggravated child molestation
against the daughters of his live-in girlfriend. The trial
court denied Vaughn's motion for new trial, and Vaughn
now appeals, contending that (1) the trial court erred in
improperly admitting evidence of his molestation of another
victim on the grounds that it was intrinsic evidence; and (2)
OCGA § 24-4-414 is unconstitutional because it
impermissibly shifted the burden to him to prove his
innocence on the separate pending allegations of molestation
against him. For the reasons that follow, we find no error
appeal from a criminal conviction, a defendant no longer
enjoys the presumption of innocence, and the evidence is
viewed in the light most favorable to the guilty
verdict." (Citation omitted.) Walker v. State,
349 Ga.App. 188 (825 S.E.2d 578) (2019).
viewed, the evidence shows that Vaughn had a romantic
relationship and moved in with a woman who had three underage
daughters. Vaughn abused the oldest of the three victims (the
"First Victim") in numerous ways. Vaughn threatened
the First Victim with harm to her family if she told anyone,
so she did not immediately report the abuse. She also
believed she was protecting her younger siblings from
Vaughn's abuse by going along with it.
to the First Victim, Vaughn was also abusing her younger
siblings (the "Second Victim" and the "Third
Victim") . These victims also did not immediately report
Vaughn's abuse. Eventually, the victims disclosed their
abuse to each other. All three girls told their mother about
the abuse, but the First Victim recanted because she was
scared of getting in trouble. The other two victims did not
recant, but their outcry was ignored. The victims tried to
protect each other from Vaughn by sleeping in the same room
or the same bed and locking doors, but Vaughn was not
abuse of all three girls continued, but eventually the First
Victim confided to a pastor who was a friend of the family.
On the advice of that pastor, the First Victim recorded a
conversation between herself and Vaughn wherein their
relationship was discussed as the First Victim informed
Vaughn that she no longer wanted the relationship to be
Vaughn and the mother of the victims engaged in a marriage
counseling conference call during which time the First Victim
got on the phone. She begged her mother not to be mad at her
and started vomiting. At that point, the Second Victim, who
was standing next to the First Victim, grabbed the phone and
disclosed the abuse again to her mother.
was indicted in Gwinnett County for the crimes committed
against the Second Victim and Third Victim. Specifically, he
was indicted for seven counts of child molestation and two
counts of aggravated child molestation. The State filed a
notice of intent to introduce evidence of the acts of
molestation committed against the First Victim. The trial
court permitted the introduction of such evidence on the
grounds that it was intrinsic evidence and that it was
admissible under OCGA § 24-4-414. Vaughn was tried by a
jury and convicted on all counts. He moved for a new trial,
which the trial court denied. Vaughn now appeals.
Vaughn alleges that the trial court erred in admitting
evidence related to the First Victim as intrinsic evidence.
We find this enumeration has been waived.
to the trial of this case, the State sought a ruling from the
trial court that the First Victim could testify on the
grounds that her testimony was admissible both as intrinsic
evidence and under OCGA § 24-4-414. In response,
Vaughn argued that the evidence was more prejudicial than it
was probative because the case for the crimes committed
against the First Victim was stronger than the cases for the
crimes committed against the other victims. Vaughn did not
respond to the State's contention that the testimony of
the First Victim was admissible as intrinsic evidence.
law is clear, however, that "in order to raise on appeal
an impropriety regarding the admissibility of evidence, the
specific ground of objection must be made at the time the
evidence is offered, and the failure to do so amounts to a
waiver of that specific ground." (Citation and
punctuation omitted.) Hurt v. State, 298 Ga. 51,
53-54 (2) (779 S.E.2d 313) (2015). Consequently, this issue
has been waived and presents nothing for our review. See
Williams v. State, 277 Ga.App. 106, 108 (2) (625
S.E.2d 509) (2005) ("We are a court for the correction
of errors of law committed by the trial court where proper
exception is taken, and we will not consider issues and
grounds for objection, even of a constitutional magnitude,
which were not raised and determined in the trial
court.") (citation omitted).
Vaughn also alleges that OCGA § 24-4-414 is
unconstitutional because it shifts the burden to him to prove
his innocence in separate pending allegations. This
enumeration provides nothing for us to review.
initially filed this appeal in the Supreme Court of Georgia.
See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. II (1).
However, our Supreme Court ...