MCFADDEN, C. J., MCMILLIAN, P. J., and SENIOR APPELLATE JUDGE
McFadden, Chief Judge.
himself pro se, Douglas Reed appeals from the trial
court's denial of his 2018 motion to vacate as void a
2016 sentence imposed on a judgment entered on his guilty
plea to numerous counts of possession of material depicting a
minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct. He argues that
his sentence was illegal in two respects: because it was a
hybrid sentence that was partially consecutive and partially
concurrent, and because it did not comply with the
split-sentence requirements of OCGA § 17-10-6.2
(2014). He also argues that the trial court should
have appointed him counsel in connection with his motion to
vacate his sentence. As detailed below, we disagree with
Reed's argument that his sentence was void because of its
hybrid nature. But we agree with him - and the state concedes
- that the sentence was void because it violated OCGA §
17-10-6.2 (2014). So we vacate the sentence and remand the
case for resentencing. Given this disposition, Reed's
claim regarding his entitlement to appointed counsel is moot.
court generally can modify a sentence only during the year
after its imposition or within 120 days after remittitur
following a direct appeal, whichever is later. See OCGA
§ 17-10-1 (f); Frazier v. State, 302 Ga.App.
346, 347-348 (691 S.E.2d 247) (2010). But "a sentencing
court retains jurisdiction to correct a void sentence at any
time." McCranie v. State, 335 Ga.App. 548, 554
(4) (782 S.E.2d 453) (2016) (citation and punctuation
omitted). So Reed can invoke the trial court's
jurisdiction to modify his sentence only by showing that the
sentence is void. See Brown v. State, 295 Ga.App.
66, 67 (760 S.E.2d 867) (2008). "A sentence is void if
the court imposes punishment that the law does not allow.
When the sentence imposed falls within the statutory range of
punishment, the sentence is not void . . . ." Jones
v. State, 278 Ga. 669, 670 (604 S.E.2d 483) (2004)
(citations and punctuation omitted).
was convicted of 15 counts of possessing material depicting a
minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct in violation of
OCGA § 16-12-100 (b) (8) (2014). At the time Reed
committed the acts, that Code section provided that a person
who commits that offense "shall be punished by
imprisonment for not less than five nor more than 20
years." OCGA § 16-12-100 (g) (1)
(2014). Moreover, a violation of OCGA §
16-12-100 (b) (8) is a sexual offense subject to the
sentencing requirements of OCGA § 17-10-6.2. See OCGA
§ 17-10-6.2 (a) (10) (2014). The version of OCGA §
17-10-6.2 applicable to Reed's sentence required the
imposition of a split sentence for each of the sexual offense
counts for which Reed was convicted - in other words, the
sentence on each count was required to include a mandatory
minimum term of imprisonment followed by an additional
probated sentence of at least one year. See OCGA §
17-10-6.2 (b) (2014); State v. Riggs, 301 Ga. 63,
64-65 (1) (799 S.E.2d 770) (2017). The trial court, however,
was authorized to "run a split sentence partially
consecutive and partially concurrent to another sentence,
such that the probationary component of a split sentence [was
to be] served concurrently with a period of confinement
imposed by the sentence on another count."
Riggs, supra at 74 (2) (b).
trial court imposed a hybrid sentence that was partially
consecutive and partially concurrent. Although Reed
challenges the legality of his sentence on this ground, the
above-cited authority makes clear that this aspect of the
sentence was within the trial court's authority and so
does not support Reed's argument that he received a void
the state concedes, the trial court did not impose a split
sentence on each count. The trial court violated OCGA §
17-10-6.2 (b) (2014) by failing to impose split sentences on
each of the offenses for which Reed was convicted, and so we
vacate Reed's sentence and remand the case for
resentencing. See Riggs, 301 Ga. at 63-64; Hood
v. State, 343 Ga.App. 230, 234 (1) (807 S.E.2d 10)
motion below seeking to vacate his sentence, Reed also asked
the trial court to "grant [him] counsel in this
proceeding, " apparently meaning his request that the
trial court vacate and modify his sentence. Given our
conclusion that the trial court must resentence Reed, this
claim of error is moot.
vacated and case remanded for resentencing.
McMillian, P.J., and Senior Appellate Judge Herbert E.
 We apply the version of OCGA §
17-10-6.2 in effect at the time the offenses were committed,
which the indictment alleged to be in 2014. See Searcy v.
State, 162 Ga.App. 695, 698 (2) (291 S.E.2d 557) ...