MCFADDEN, C. J., MCMILLIAN, P. J., and SENIOR APPELLATE JUDGE
MCFADDEN, CHIEF JUDGE.
McKeever, Jr., acting pro se, brings this timely direct
appeal from the trial court's judgment of conviction
following McKeever's entry of an Alford plea.
See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (91 S.Ct.
160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162) (1970). McKeever's appellate
briefing is severely deficient, but as best we can discern,
pursuant to our obligations under Felix v. State,
271 Ga. 534 (523 S.E.2d 1) (1999), McKeever's claims of
error fall into three general categories. His challenge to
the voluntariness of his guilty plea cannot be resolved on
the record, so we must dismiss that portion of his appeal.
His challenge to the trial court's jurisdiction over him
has no merit. And he waived appellate review over his various
other claims of trial court error by virtue of his guilty
plea. So we affirm the judgment in part and dismiss the
appeal in part. See LaFette v. State, 285 Ga.App.
516 (646 S.E.2d 725) (2007).
Facts and procedural posture.
November 13, 2018, McKeever was indicted for, among other
things, violating the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act ("RICO"), OCGA § 16-14-4
(c), predicated on allegations that he engaged in acts of
insurance fraud, theft by deception, and identity fraud that
involved making false claims about car accidents. This was a
reindictment following the state's dismissal of a 2017
indictment of McKeever for the same offenses under a
different case number, and during the course of the
proceedings under the earlier indictment the trial court had
granted McKeever's request to represent himself.
trial court made a number of pre-trial rulings, including
denying McKeever's request to continue a January 14, 2019
trial date. On the day of trial, McKeeever again asked
for a continuance, arguing that he was not prepared to
proceed, and the trial court again denied the request,
informing McKeever that he could either proceed to trial or
enter a guilty plea. After engaging in a plea colloquy,
McKeever entered an Alford plea to the RICO count;
the remaining counts of the indictment were nolle prossed.
thereafter, McKeever filed a notice of appeal from the trial
court's entry of the judgment of conviction. It appears
from the record that he did not ask the trial court to
withdraw his guilty plea.
Challenges to voluntariness of guilty plea.
argues that he felt pressured to enter the guilty plea, which
we construe as a challenge to the voluntariness of the plea.
He argues that the trial court assumed a prosecutorial role
and threatened him, but the transcript of the plea hearing
does not support that claim. And we do not discern within
McKeever's appellate briefs any other
contention that, in accepting the guilty plea, the trial
court erroneously failed to follow the established procedure.
. . . Thus, the existing record, including the transcript of
the guilty plea hearing, is immaterial to [McKeever's]
appeal [as to his claims regarding voluntariness]. The issues
which he seeks to raise on appeal [regarding voluntariness]
can be developed only in the context of a post-plea hearing.
[McKeever] could have filed a motion to withdraw his guilty
plea and then his claims [regarding voluntariness] would have
been fully aired in a timely manner at the hearing on the
motion. If [McKeever] had done so and the trial court had
denied the motion, then he could have appealed from that
denial. However, in this case there was no such motion or
hearing and, thus, no appeal from an order denying the
motion. The issues which [McKeever] raises [regarding
voluntariness] cannot be resolved only by facts appearing in
the existing record.
Caine v. State, 266 Ga. 421, 422 (467 S.E.2d 570)
(1996). See Grantham v. State, 267 Ga. 635, 635-636
(481 S.E.2d 219) (1997) (defendant's argument that his
guilty plea was involuntary because "he was threatened
by the prosecutor and was under duress for having to proceed
to trial with an undesirable attorney" involved issues
that could be "developed only in the context of a
post-plea hearing"). "Accordingly, [the portion of
his appeal challenging the voluntariness of his plea] must,
therefore, be dismissed." Caine, supra. See
LaFette, 285 Ga.App. at 517 (2) (a) (dismissing
portion of defendant's direct appeal that challenged
voluntariness of guilty plea but deciding other claims on
that the law requiring dismissal of an appeal from a judgment
entered on a guilty plea unless the issue on appeal can be
resolved by facts appearing in the record, including
Caine v. State, supra, 266 Ga. 421, has been called
into question See Ringold v State, 304 Ga. 875,
883-886 (3) (823 S.E.2d 342) (2019) (Nahmias, J, concurring
specially). Nevertheless, until our Supreme Court overrules
this precedent, we are bound to apply it. See Cooper v.
State, 348 Ga.App. 649, 652-653 (4) (824 S.E.2d 571)
argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over him. We
may review this claim of error notwithstanding McKeever's
guilty plea, because it is "grounded upon the right not
to be haled into court at all[.]" Hooten v.
State,212 Ga.App. 770, 771 (1) (442 S.E.2d 836) (1994)
(citation and punctuation omitted). Accord Davis v.
State, 251 Ga.App. 436, 437 (554 S.E.2d 583) (2001). But
"[t]here is no merit to this contention, as the trial
court clearly had jurisdiction of the person and subject
matter." Duncan v. State, 291 Ga.App. 580, 581
(2) (662 S.E.2d ...