MCFADDEN, C. J., MCMILLIAN, P. J., and SENIOR APPELLATE JUDGE
McFadden, Chief Judge.
jury trial, Jonathan Quentin Irving was convicted of armed
robbery, of multiple counts of aggravated assault, of making
terroristic threats, of possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony, and of theft by taking of the firearm
used in the robbery. He argues on appeal that the trial court
erred in several evidentiary rulings, but we find no
reversible error. He argues that the trial court erred in not
excluding other evidence for purported discovery violations
by the state, but we find no such violations. He argues that
the trial court erred in denying his motion to remove a juror
for cause after the start of trial, but we find no abuse of
discretion. He argues that the trial court erred by applying
the wrong standard in denying his motion for new trial, but
the trial court's order does not reflect such error.
Finally, he argues that the trial court erred in failing to
merge his convictions for aggravated assault with his
convictions for armed robbery for sentencing purposes, and we
agree. So we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand the
case for resentencing.
Irving was tried jointly with a co-defendant, Christopher A.
Blackwell, and we set forth many of the facts relevant to
this appeal in our separate opinion deciding Blackwell's
appeal. Blackwell v. State, Ga.App. (S.E.2d) (Case
No. A19A0758, decided July 1, 2019). Viewed in the light most
favorable to the judgment, see Garza v. State, 347
Ga.App. 335 (1) (819 S.E.2d 497) (2018),
the trial evidence showed that [Irving], along with several
other people, planned and executed the robbery of a bank in
Carrollton during the afternoon of April 29, 2013. That day,
[Irving, Blackwell], Gibran Ezell, and one other man (who was
not named at trial) drove in two cars from Atlanta to
Carrollton. There, Ezell and the other man got into one car
and drove to the bank. Inside the bank, Ezell shot a gun into
the ceiling before pointing it at the numerous bank customers
and employees who were present. The other man jumped over the
teller counter and took approximately $14, 000 in cash.
During the robbery, the men demanded money, yelled
profanities, and threatened to shoot the people inside the
bank, frightening them. After leaving the bank, the men drove
to a nearby road, abandoned their car, rejoined [Irving] and
[Blackwell], and returned to Atlanta.
Blackwell, Ga.App. at (1).
after the bank robbery, Irving and another man, Chris
Snelson, were arrested after a high-speed chase. Irving and
Snelson had been traveling in a Dodge Charger, and when that
car crashed in the course of the chase they fled on foot and
were apprehended several hours later. The gun used in the
bank robbery was found in the Dodge Charger. The gun had been
stolen earlier that month.
investigation of the bank robbery led law enforcement to
arrest Ezell, who ultimately gave a statement implicating
Irving and, at trial, described Irving's involvement in
the robbery. Other trial evidence corroborated Ezell's
testimony. As stated above, the gun used in the robbery was
found in a car associated with Irving. When Irving and Ezell
were being held in the same jail, Irving wrote Ezell letters
alluding to the robbery and threatening Ezell not to admit
his involvement to law enforcement. And the former girlfriend
of Irving's co-defendant, Blackwell, testified to some of
the same details as Ezell regarding events that took place in
Atlanta on the morning of the bank robbery. She also
connected Blackwell to a Dodge Charger.
argues that the trial court erred in several of his
evidentiary rulings during trial. We review these rulings for
abuse of discretion. Williams v. State, 302 Ga. 474,
478 (807 S.E.2d 350) (2017). And in doing so, we follow our
Supreme Court's guidance in Almanza v. State,
304 Ga. 553, 556 (2) (820 S.E.2d 1) (2018), to determine the
appropriate body of law to apply. As detailed below, we find
no reversible error.
Admission of evidence of Irving's arrest after the
argues that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of
his "prior arrest," by which he apparently means
evidence of his arrest after the high-speed chase that
occurred the day after the bank robbery. He primarily asserts
that this evidence was improper character evidence in
violation of OCGA § 24-4-404 (b). We disagree.
§ 24-4-404 (b) provides that "[e]vidence of other
crimes, wrongs, or acts shall not be admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show conformity
therewith." But these limitations "do not apply to
'intrinsic' evidence. Evidence is intrinsic when it
is (1) an uncharged offense arising from the same transaction
or series of transactions as the charged offense; (2)
necessary to complete the story of the crime; or (3)
inextricably intertwined with the evidence regarding the
charged offense." Clark v. State, Ga., (4) (829
S.E.2d 306) (2019) (citations and punctuation omitted).
Stated another way, evidence is intrinsic if "it forms
an integral and natural part of the witness's accounts of
the circumstances ...