over four years after the trial court denied his timely
motion to withdraw his guilty plea to murder and other
crimes, appellant John Blackwell filed a pro se motion for
out-of-time appeal. The trial court denied that motion
summarily and without holding a hearing. As the Attorney
General properly concedes, we must vacate the trial
court's order and remand the case for the trial court to
hold a hearing to determine whether Blackwell is entitled to
an out-of-time appeal due to the ineffective assistance of
his motion-to-withdraw counsel.
well settled that a defendant has the right to appeal the
denial of his motion to withdraw a guilty plea, as well as
"the right to the effective assistance of counsel as
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment for that appeal."
Ringold v. State, 304 Ga. 875, 878 (823 S.E.2d 342)
(2019). And it is true, as Blackwell notes, that we have held
that when a defendant's right to appeal from the denial
of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is frustrated either by
the trial court's failure to inform him of his right to
appeal or by counsel's ineffective assistance, he is
entitled to an out-of-time appeal. See Cobb v.
State, 284 Ga. 74, 74 (663 S.E.2d 262) (2008);
Carter v. Johnson, 278 Ga. 202, 205 (599 S.E.2d 170)
contends that he is entitled to an out-of-time appeal because
neither the trial court nor his motion-to-withdraw counsel
informed him of his right to appeal. As for the allegation of
trial court error, Blackwell has waived that claim because he
did not raise it in his motion for out-of-time appeal. See
Ringold, 304 Ga. At 877 (holding that Ringold's
claim that he was entitled to an out-of-time appeal because
the trial court failed to inform him of his right to appeal
was not properly before our Court because Ringold did not
first assert it in his motion for an out-of-time appeal).
With respect to Blackwell's claim that his right to
appeal was frustrated by the ineffectiveness of his
motion-to-withdraw counsel, however, we cannot determine
whether Blackwell's counsel performed deficiently in
failing to file a notice of appeal because the trial court
failed to hold an evidentiary hearing on the issue. In an
identical situation in Ringold, we held that the
trial court's order denying Ringold's motion for
out-of-time appeal had to be vacated and the case remanded
"for the trial court to determine whether Ringold's
motion-to-withdraw counsel was ineffective in failing to file
a timely notice of appeal." Id. at 875. We also
clarified in Ringold that this inquiry had to be
conducted consistently with the principles of Roe v.
Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (120 S.Ct. 1029, 145 L.Ed.2d
985) (2000), which we laid out in detail in Ringold,
304 Ga. at 878-882.
particular, with regard to the prejudice component of
Ringold's ineffective assistance claim, we emphasized
that he had to demonstrate not that he would have prevailed
in a timely appeal, but only that "there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's deficient failure to
consult with him about an appeal, he would have timely
appealed." We explained that the
U.S. Supreme Court has squarely rejected the argument that
the defendant must show that he would have actually prevailed
in a timely appeal, as well as "any requirement that the
would-be appellant specify the points he would raise were his
right to appeal reinstated," as "it is unfair to
require an indigent, perhaps pro se, defendant to demonstrate
that his hypothetical appeal might have had merit before any
advocate has ever reviewed the record in his case in search
of potentially meritorious grounds for appeal." . . .
Instead, "when counsel's constitutionally deficient
performance deprives a defendant of an appeal that he
otherwise would have taken," the defendant is entitled
to an appeal because he effectively has been deprived of an
appellate proceeding altogether.
Id. at 881 (quoting Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S.
at 483-486). We therefore vacate the trial court's
order denying Blackwell's motion for an out-of-time
appeal and remand the case to the trial court for proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
vacated and case remanded with direction. All the Justices
In Ringold, we signaled our
willingness to reexamine the parts of Cobb and
Carter that hold that a defendant is entitled to an
out-of-time appeal if a trial court does not advise him of
his right to appeal See Ringold, 304 Ga at 877 n2
(majority opinion) and 882-883 (Nahmias, PJ, concurring).
However, because Ringold waived that issue by not raising it
in his motion for out-of-time appeal, id. at 877, we did not
decide "whether this aspect of Carter and
Cobb should be reconsidered." Id. at
877 n.2. Similarly, we need not reconsider those cases here
because Blackwell also waived the issue.
 The U.S. Supreme Court recently
reaffirmed the principles of Flores-Ortega in
Garza v. Idaho, U.S. (139 S.Ct. 738, 744, 203
L.Ed.2d 77) (2019).
 In both the majority opinion in
Ringold, see 304 Ga. at 881 n.3, and in Presiding
Justice Nahmias's concurrence, id. at 883, we explained
that Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 484-486, sets forth
the proper prejudice analysis for cases in which a defendant
alleges that he has been deprived of his appeal entirely by
counsel's ineffectiveness in failing to file a timely
appeal and that we have wrongly required defendants who seek
out-of-time appeals from guilty pleas to show that they could
actually prevail in an appeal before allowing them an
out-of-time appeal. Ringold, however, did not
present an opportunity to overrule those cases because it,
like this case, involved "a motion for an out-of-time