MELTON, CHIEF JUSTICE.
a jury trial, Betty Jacobs appeals her convictions for the
murder of her ex-husband, Davis Jacobs, and possession of a
handgun during the commission of a crime, contending that she
received ineffective assistance of trial
counsel. For the reasons set forth below, we
the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence at
trial shows that Betty and Davis divorced in May 2007 for the
second time after a long history of domestic difficulties,
including multiple occasions on which Betty either fired a
handgun at Davis or held one to his head and threatened to
shoot him. Around the time of the second divorce, Betty
habitually visited Davis's private office, where the two
would frequently argue about financial and personal matters,
including Davis's extramarital affairs. Witnesses
reported that Betty started the arguments, and, approximately
a week prior to shooting Davis, Betty raised her hand and
told Davis "to shut up or she would hit him." On
August 21, 2007, Betty found old photographs of Davis with
his former mistress, causing a fight between the two. Betty
threatened to shoot Davis, and struck him in the back as he
was leaving Betty's home. Davis then spent that evening
in his office, and the following evening at a hotel.
morning of the shooting, Betty requested that Davis meet her
in his private office at his place of business. Davis did so.
A short time later, witnesses heard multiple gunshots, after
which Davis exited the private office and collapsed. When
police arrived, they found Betty sitting calmly in the
private office, and Davis's body was in the adjacent
hallway with a hammer on the ground next to his head. Betty
claimed that Davis threatened her with the hammer, she shot
him in self-defense, and she placed the hammer by his body so
police would see it. At trial, Betty buttressed this defense
with the argument that she suffered from battered person
syndrome. Betty testified that Davis had physically abused
her throughout their marriage, and that he routinely
prescribed her addictive prescription drugs.
trial, however, numerous witnesses testified that Betty was
generally the aggressor during her arguments with Davis, and
that she previously threatened to kill him. Witnesses also
observed Betty physically assault Davis and use firearms to
intimidate him multiple times-including a prior incident in
Davis's private office when Betty fired a handgun,
causing a bullet to enter the wall above Davis's
shoulder. The couple's sons testified that Davis would
"always be the peacemaker."
evidence was sufficient to enable the jury to find beyond a
reasonable doubt that Betty was guilty of the crimes for
which she was convicted. Jackson v. Virginia, 443
U.S. 307 (99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560) (1979). See also,
Roper v. State, 281 Ga. 878 (1) (644 S.E.2d 120)
(2007) (witness credibility is for the jury to decide, as is
the question of justification; therefore, the jury is free to
reject a claim that the defendant acted in
Betty contends that her trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance by: (a) failing to convey a potential plea offer
to her for her consideration; (b) failing to object to
allegedly inadmissible hearsay testimony; and (c) failing to
present evidence and request a jury instruction regarding the
defense of involuntary intoxication. These contentions have
In order to succeed on [her] claim of ineffective assistance,
[Betty] must prove both that [her] trial counsel's
performance was deficient and that there is a reasonable
probability that the trial result would have been different
if not for the deficient performance. Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d
674) (1984). If an appellant fails to meet his or her burden
of proving either prong of the Strickland test, the
reviewing court does not have to examine the other prong.
Id. at 697 (IV); Fuller v. State, 277 Ga.
505 (3) (591 S.E.2d 782) (2004). In reviewing the trial
court's decision, "'[w]e accept the trial
court's factual findings and credibility determinations
unless clearly erroneous, but we independently apply the
legal principles to the facts.' [Cit.]" Robinson
v. State, 277 Ga. 75, 76 (586 S.E.2d 313) (2003).
Wright v. State, 291 Ga. 869, 870 (2) (734 S.E.2d
876) (2012). Furthermore, "reasonable trial strategy and
tactics do not amount to ineffective assistance of
counsel." (Citation omitted.) Johnson v.
State, 286 Ga. 787, 791 (2) (692 S.E.2d 575) (2010).
Betty first contends that trial counsel were ineffective for
failing to convey a potential plea offer to her for her
consideration and failing to advise her regarding the offer.
initial matter, it is undisputed that no formal written plea
offer was ever presented in this case. At the motion for new
trial hearing, the prosecutor recalled that, prior to trial,
he spoke to one of Betty's trial lawyers and asked
whether Betty might be interested in a plea deal, but no deal
was offered at that time because any such offer would first
have to be approved by Davis's family. The prosecutor
further testified that Betty's attorney indicated that
Betty would not be interested in the plea deal. Betty's
trial lawyer to whom the prosecutor spoke had a slightly
different recollection, however. Betty's trial lawyer
testified that the prosecutor mentioned the possibility of a
deal at an informal gathering, and the prosecutor stated
that, if the family was interested in any deal in the future,
he would send a written offer to Betty's counsel. No such
offer was ever sent, and Betty's trial lawyer did not
remember rejecting any and all potential deals outright.
Betty's trial lawyer did testify with certainty, however,
that he would have conveyed an offer to Betty if one had been
of the existence of any potential deal, we need not parse its
nature or the manner in which it was handled by trial
counsel, as Betty has not shown prejudice. Where a defendant
alleges that a plea offer was not disclosed to her, the
defendant "must show the outcome of the plea process
would have been different with competent advice."
Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 163 (II) (B) (132
S.Ct. 1376, 182 L.Ed.2d 398) (2012). Three criteria must be
met to satisfy the prejudice prong of the Strickland
test. The defendant must show:
 that but for the ineffective advice of counsel there is a
reasonable probability that the plea offer would have been
presented to the court (i.e., that the defendant would have
accepted the plea and the prosecution would not have
withdrawn it in light of intervening circumstances),  that
the court would have accepted its terms, and  that the
conviction or sentence, or both, under the offer's terms
would have been less severe than under the judgment and
sentence that in fact were imposed.
at 164. See also Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134 (132