James Shubert appeals his convictions for malice murder and
concealing the death of another in connection with the 2013
death of Bonny Cooner. Shubert argues that the grand jury that
indicted him was not a fair cross-section of the community in
violation of the Sixth Amendment. We conclude that Shubert
has failed to carry his burden to succeed on such a claim.
in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the evidence at
trial shows that Cooner and Shubert had been dating and
living together. In 2012, Shubert was charged with domestic
violence for hurting Cooner. On January 28, 2013, Shubert
worked with Denard Canady most of the day in Shubert's
auto shop, which was located on Shubert's property. Later
that evening, Shubert went to his house, and he and Cooner,
who was draped in a Georgia Bulldogs blanket, returned to his
auto shop. Shortly after, Canady heard a noise, went to
investigate, and saw Shubert strangling Cooner with a cable.
Shubert dragged Cooner by her hair and lifted her into a
truck. Shubert threatened Canady and forced Canady to get
into the truck with him.
drove to a well on Canady's family property and dumped
Cooner into the well. Shubert then drove Canady home and
threatened to kill Canady and his family if he told anyone
about what he had seen. Shubert drove by Canady's home
several times that night to make sure Canady had not left.
eventually went to the police and told them what happened.
The police executed two search warrants in February 2013 and
gathered hair and blood samples from the workshop and truck,
as well as Cooner's Georgia Bulldogs blanket. They also
found Cooner's body in the well. The blood and hair
samples found in the shop matched Cooner's DNA. The
autopsy revealed that Cooner died of strangulation.
his arrest, Shubert approached two inmates, told one of them
that he killed Cooner, told both of them that he disposed of
her body, and offered both of them money to kill Canady to
keep him from testifying.
Although Shubert does not challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence, we have independently reviewed the record and
conclude that the evidence presented at trial was legally
sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find
beyond a reasonable doubt that he was guilty of the crimes
for which he was convicted. See Jackson v. Virginia,
443 U.S. 307, 319 (99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560) (1979).
Shubert argues that the grand jury was not a fair
cross-section of the community in violation of the Sixth
Amendment because there were too many duplicate juror names
on the grand jury list and those duplicates were
disproportionately white. Shubert's claim fails.
successfully make a Sixth Amendment fair cross-section claim,
a defendant must prove three things: (1) the allegedly
excluded group is distinctive; (2) representation of that
group in jury pools was not fair or reasonable in relation to
the number of persons in the community; and (3) that
underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the
group from the jury selection process. Duren v.
Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (99 S.Ct. 664, 58 L.Ed.2d
579) (1979); see also Ramirez v. State, 276 Ga. 158,
161 (1) (c) (575 S.E.2d 462) (2003); Morrow v.
State, 272 Ga. 691, 693 (1) (532 S.E.2d 78) (2000)
("The defendant has the burden of proving a prima facie
case of constitutional error in the composition of the jury
pool." (citation omitted)).
has failed to carry his burden because he presents
insufficient evidence to determine the racial composition of
the grand jury master list. Racial identification was
supplied for only 29 percent of those people on the list.
Although Shubert presents analysis of the data he does have,
it is simply not possible to prove a disparity between the
racial composition of the master jury list and that of the
population of Franklin County when the race of 71 percent of
those on the list has not been identified. Accordingly,
Shubert is unable to meet his burden to make even a prima
facie case for a fair cross-section claim.
affirmed. All the Justices concur.
 Shubert was indicted by a Franklin
County grand jury on March 1, 2013, for malice murder, felony
murder predicated on aggravated assault, and concealing the
death of another. The State filed notice of its intent to
seek the death penalty on May 29, 2013. Shubert filed a
motion to quash the indictment on the grounds of an illegal
grand jury venire on April 14, 2015. The State filed its
response to the motion to quash on May 7, 2015. A hearing was
held on the motion on July 6, 2015, and the trial court
denied the motion on July 31, 2015. Shubert and the State
then reached an agreement in which the State withdrew its
notice of intent to seek the death penalty and Shubert waived
his right to a jury trial. At a bench trial from November 30
to December 7, 2015, the trial court found Shubert guilty on
all counts. Shubert was sentenced to life without parole for
malice murder and ten years to run concurrently for
concealing the death of another. The trial court purported to
merge the felony murder count, but that count was in fact
vacated by operation of law. See Malcolm v. State,
263 Ga. 369, 371-372 (4) (434 S.E.2d 479) (1993). Shubert
filed a timely motion for new trial on December 14, 2015, and
amended it through new counsel ...