MELTON, CHIEF JUSTICE.
a jury trial, Jerome Marquis Victoria appeals his convictions
for felony murder and possession of a firearm by a convicted
felon, contending only that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel regarding a potential plea deal
offer. For the reasons set forth below, we
the light most favorable to the verdict, the record shows
that, on October 14, 2006, Tosaki Voshon Forrest went looking
for Victoria at the home of an acquaintance. Forrest believed
that Victoria had stolen guns from him and wanted to talk to
Victoria about it. After learning that Victoria was in the
master bedroom of the home, Forrest, who was unarmed, went in
to speak to Victoria. From outside the bedroom, witnesses
heard Forrest state, "So that's how it is,"
and, "All right, Bootsie, all right, all
right." Gunshots followed, and Forrest ran out of
the home, only to collapse on the ground outside where he
died from a gunshot wound to the chest.
police responded soon thereafter, they saw Victoria running
from the residence and stopped him. Victoria stated that he
and Forrest had been robbed and attacked by unknown
perpetrators. A witness then approached and informed the
investigating officer that Victoria had fired a gun inside
the residence. The officer searched Victoria and located a
box of .22- caliber bullets in his left front pants pocket, a
pistol grip in his right front pants pocket, and an ID for a
person named Antonio Johnson. Victoria was then arrested and
transported to the jail.
investigation revealed that the shooting occurred in the
master bedroom, as evidenced by three bullet holes in the
wall and the discovery of two live .22-caliber rounds. The
police found a Lorcin .380 semiautomatic handgun and a Rohm
.22-caliber revolver at the edge of a neighbor's yard
across the street. The Lorcin did not contain any rounds;
however, the Rohm contained four shell casings and two live
rounds. The Lorcin appeared to be jammed and was missing a
grip like the one found in Victoria's pocket. Testing
showed that the .22-caliber bullet recovered from the
victim's body was fired from the Rohm revolver found at
evidence was sufficient to enable the jury to find beyond a
reasonable doubt that Victoria was guilty of the crimes for
which he was convicted. Jackson v. Virginia, 443
U.S. 307 (99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560) (1979).
his sole enumeration of error, Victoria contends that trial
counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to fully
inform him about the consequences of a pretrial offer for a
plea deal that he repeatedly rejected. Generally,
[i]n order to succeed on his claim of ineffective assistance,
[Victoria] must prove both that his trial counsel's
performance was deficient and that there is a reasonable
probability that the trial result would have been different
if not for the deficient performance. Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d
674) (1984). If an appellant fails to meet his or her burden
of proving either prong of the Strickland test, the
reviewing court does not have to examine the other prong.
Id. at 697 (IV); Fuller v. State, 277 Ga.
505 (3) (591 S.E.2d 782) (2004). In reviewing the trial
court's decision, "'[w]e accept the trial
court's factual findings and credibility determinations
unless clearly erroneous, but we independently apply the
legal principles to the facts.' [Cit.]" Robinson
v. State, 277 Ga. 75, 76 (586 S.E.2d 313) (2003).
Wright v. State, 291 Ga. 869, 870 (2) (734 S.E.2d
regard to the prejudice prong,
[i]n a case such as this one, involving the alleged
ineffective assistance of counsel in the context of a
rejected plea offer, the United States Supreme Court has held
that where the performance of a criminal defendant's
trial counsel was deficient, the defendant "must show
the outcome of the plea process would have been different
with competent advice." Lafler v. Cooper, 566
U.S. 156, 163 (II) (B) (132 S.Ct. 1376, 182 L.Ed.2d 398)
(2012). Three criteria must be met to satisfy the prejudice
prong of the Strickland test. The defendant must
 that but for the ineffective advice of counsel there is a
reasonable probability that the plea offer would have been
presented to the court (i.e., that the defendant would have
accepted the plea and the prosecution would not have
withdrawn it in light of intervening circumstances),  that
the court would have accepted its terms, and  that the
conviction or sentence, or both, under the offer's terms
would have been less severe than under the judgment and
sentence that in fact were imposed.
Id. at 164. See also Missouri v. Frye, 566
U.S. 134 (132 S.Ct. 1399, 182 L.Ed.2d ...