MELTON, CHIEF JUSTICE.
a jury trial, Gregory Adrian Rhynes appeals his conviction
for the malice murder of Michael Holmes, contending that the
trial court erred by partially denying his motion to suppress
all statements he made to police during an interview on
December 11, 2015. For the reasons set forth below, we
the light most favorable to the verdict, the record shows
that, at approximately 8:00 a.m. on December 9, 2015, David
Foreman was helping his cousin, Holmes, move out of his
apartment. As the two were packing Holmes's belongings
into Foreman's vehicle, Rhynes approached them from
around the side of an adjacent apartment building. Rhynes
asked, "What's up now, ni**er?" and began
shooting at Holmes. Foreman initially fled, but returned
shortly after the shooting ended. Holmes was shot eight
times, and later died from his wounds. Fifteen .40-caliber
shell casings were found at the scene. In addition, a digital
scale and a cell phone were found on the ground in the same
area between apartment buildings from which the shooter
initially emerged. A search of the phone's contents
produced both a photograph of Rhynes and a phone number
listed as "Mama." That phone number belonged to
Rhynes's mother, whom the recovered phone had been used
to call on the day that Holmes was shot. On the day following
the shooting, Foreman identified Rhynes as the shooter from a
photographic lineup. During a subsequent search of
Rhynes's residence, law enforcement discovered a pair of
sneakers with a blood stain on top of them. Subsequent
testing showed that Holmes's blood was on the sneakers.
Rhynes's DNA was also found inside the sneakers.
evidence was sufficient to enable the jurors to determine
beyond a reasonable doubt that Rhynes was guilty of malice
murder. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307
(99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560) (1979).
Before trial, Rhynes filed a motion to suppress all
statements he made in a video-recorded interview with police
on December 11, 2015, contending that his
Miranda rights had been violated during
questioning. Specifically, Rhynes argues that he was in
custody from the moment that the interview began and that he
should have been advised of his Miranda rights
immediately. We disagree.
"'In reviewing a ruling on the admissibility of a
defendant's statements where the facts are disputed, we
accept the trial court's factual findings and credibility
determinations unless they are clearly erroneous, but we
independently apply the law to the facts.'"
(Citation omitted.) Teasley v. State, 293 Ga. 758,
762 (3) (749 S.E.2d 710) (2013). . . . [In addition, ] the
reviewing court may "consider facts that definitively
can be ascertained exclusively by reference to evidence that
is uncontradicted and presents no questions of credibility,
such as facts indisputably discernible from a
videotape." (Punctuation and citation omitted.)
State v. Allen, 298 Ga. 1, 2 (1) (a) (779 S.E.2d
248) (2015). On the other hand, to the extent that legally
significant facts were proved by evidence other than the
video recording, the trial court as fact-finder was entitled
to determine the credibility and weight of that other
evidence. See State v. Chulpayev, 296 Ga. 764, 771
(2), n. 5 (770 S.E.2d 808) (2015).
State v. Abbott, 303 Ga. 297, 299 (1) (812 S.E.2d
Miranda warnings are required when a person is (1)
formally arrested or (2) restrained to the degree associated
with a formal arrest. Unless a reasonable person in the
suspect's situation would perceive that he was in
custody, Miranda warnings are not necessary.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Freeman v.
State, 295 Ga. 820, 822-823 (764 S.E.2d 390) (2014). The
decisive factor in this case is the point at which a
reasonable person in Rhynes's situation would have
perceived he was in custody.
regard to Rhynes's interview, the trial court found the
following pertinent facts based on evidence presented at a
Det. Baker testified that, after he contacted Deborah Grant,
[Rhynes's] mother, on December 10, 2015, he asked her for
[Rhynes's] phone number. Grant declined to give Det.
Baker her son's contact information, but said she would
give her son Det. Baker's phone number. A few minutes
later, [Rhynes] called police headquarters and spoke to Det.
Allison Nichols. Det. Nichols asked [Rhynes] to come to the
station to talk; at some point during the conversation,
[Rhynes] mentioned that he knew something about a shooting.
[Rhynes] arrived at police headquarters on December 11, 2015,
having driven himself to the station. He was greeted by Det.
Nichols and met Det. Baker in the interview room; both
detectives participated in the interview of [Rhynes]. For the
first two hours of the interview, the atmosphere was calm and
fairly relaxed, despite the fact that the officers repeatedly
noted the various inconsistencies in [Rhynes's]
statements regarding the status of his cell phone and his
activities on the morning of the shooting. [Rhynes] was not
handcuffed at this point, and notably, Det. Nichols told
[Rhynes] that he would be going home that day. However, at
approximately 3:55 pm, around two hours into the recording,
the atmosphere grew noticeably more tense as the detectives
made [Rhynes] aware of their belief that he was involved in
the murder. At 4:05 pm, Det. Nichols told [Rhynes] that,
unless he told them he had a reason to shoot the victim, such
as self defense, then she and Det. Baker were going to
"do what we've got to do." Det. Baker then
clarified that "do what we've got to do" meant
that [Rhynes] would go to jail. Despite these threats,
[Rhynes] was again told at 4:19 pm that he would be going
home. However, after the detectives consulted with other
officers, [Rhynes] was advised of his Miranda
rights, handcuffed, and formally placed under arrest.
on these findings, the trial court determined that, for
purposes of Miranda, Rhynes was not in custody until
4:05 p.m. and was in custody after that point, despite the
fact that he was subsequently told that he would be going
home that day. As a result, the trial court partially granted
Rhynes's motion to suppress, finding that all ...