United States District Court, S.D. Georgia, Augusta Division
RANDAL HALL JUDGE.
April 26, 2017, a jury convicted Defendant Robbie Lee Mouzon
of one count of conspiracy to commit robbery of a commercial
business; one count of conspiracy to use and carry a firearm
during crimes of violence; two counts of robbery of a
commercial business; two counts of carrying, using, and
brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence; and one
count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. He was
sentenced to a total term of imprisonment of 500 months. The
Eleventh Circuit affirmed his convictions and sentence on
August 29, 2018.
22, 2019, Defendant filed a motion to appoint counsel (doc.
149) to help him seek relief pursuant to a new rule of
constitutional law announced in United States v.
Davis, __U.S.__, 139 S.Ct. 2319 (Jun. 24, 2019).
Specifically, in Davis, the United States Supreme
Court found that the "residual clause" of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c) is unconstitutionally vague.
Clerk of Court also received a letter penned by Defendant to
the United States Magistrate Judge, in which he complains
about an alleged illegal search and ineffective assistance of
counsel. He asks that the Court appoint counsel to litigate
these "2255 issues." (Doc. 150, at 2.)
order to attack the legality of his sentence, which is what
Defendant is trying to do, Defendant must petition for habeas
corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 by filing a motion
to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence. The recently
filed pleadings do not qualify as a § 2255 petition.
Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has cautioned that
the district court may not simply recharacterize a pro
se pleading as a § 2255 motion without prior notice
to the litigant and an opportunity for that litigant to
either withdraw the motion or amend it so that it contains
all of the § 2255 claims the litigant believes he has.
See Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375 (2003).
consideration of Defendant's piecemeal filings and the
procedural posture of this case, the Court will not
recharacterize his pleadings as a § 2255 motion. Rather,
the CLERK is DIRECTED to
attach a copy of the standard form for § 2255 motions to
Defendant's service copy of this Order so that he may
properly file a § 2255 petition. Defendant is forewarned
that he must set forth all his § 2255 claims on the
attached form, including his Davis claim. Defendant
is also forewarned that his § 2255 claims may be subject
to the one-year statute of limitations of the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"),
see 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f), and all other
applicable standards governing § 2255 actions.
respect to Defendant's requests for the appointment of
counsel, a habeas petitioner has no absolute constitutional
right to appointed counsel. Henderson v. Campbell,
353 F.3d 880, 892 (11th Cir. 2003) (held in the context of a
habeas proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2254). Rather, a
court may appoint counsel only if the interests of justice so
require. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(g) (incorporating by reference
the standards of 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a) (2) (B) for the
appointment of counsel); see McCall v. Cook, 495
Fed.Appx. 29, 31 (11th Cir. 2012) (stating that civil
litigants, even prisoners, have no constitutional right to
counsel; rather, appointment of counsel in civil cases is
"a privilege that is justified only by exceptional
circumstances" (quoted source omitted)). Here, Defendant
has not shown that the interests of justice demand the
appointment of an attorney. Accordingly, he is not entitled
to the appointment of counsel.
the foregoing, Defendant's recently filed motions (docs.
14 9 & 150) are DENIED IN PART and
DENIED IN PART WITHOUT PREJUDICE. To the
extent the motions request the appointment of counsel, they
are denied. To the extent the motions set forth claims
challenging the legality of his convictions, the motions are
denied without prejudice.
 Section 924(c) imposes a mandatory
sentence for a defendant who uses or carries a firearm
"during and in relation to any crime of violence."
A "crime of violence" under that section is defined
For purposes of this subsection the term "crime
of violence" means an offense that is a felony
(A) has as an element the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against the person or
property of another [the "force" ...