BARNES, P. J., MERCIER and BROWN, JJ.
a jury trial, Holden Nguyen was convicted of rape, statutory
rape, two counts of child molestation, false imprisonment,
and tampering with evidence. The trial court denied
Nguyen's motion for new trial, and he appeals,
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. He also argues
that the trial court made several evidentiary errors, that it
erred in refusing to strike a juror for cause, and that he
received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. For
reasons that follow, we affirm.
appeal from a criminal conviction, we construe the evidence
in the light most favorable to the verdict, and the defendant
no longer enjoys a presumption of innocence. See Cuzzort
v. State, 307 Ga.App. 52, 53 (1) (703 S.E.2d 713)
(2010). We do not weigh the evidence or resolve issues of
witness credibility, but merely determine whether the
evidence was sufficient for the jury to find the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See id.
viewed, the evidence shows that 12-year-old B. L. M. was
walking home from a neighborhood store on September 4, 2012,
when Nguyen drove by in a car. He waved at her, then asked
whether she wanted a ride. B. L. M. accepted his offer,
believing he would take her home, but he stated that he
wanted to "run by his house . . . to drop something off
and show [her] his cat." B. L. M. went inside the house
with Nguyen, who told her to come to his bedroom so that he
could photograph her. B. L. M. complied, and Nguyen took
several pictures of her, remarking on her beauty.
L. M. attempted to leave the room, Nguyen shoved her onto the
bed. B. L. M. explained that she needed to go home, but
Nguyen told her to "shut up" and began hitting her.
He tied her hands, pulled down her pants, raised her shirt,
and kissed her chest. Although she told him to stop, he hit
her again and rubbed between her legs with his hand, touching
her vagina. He then raped her.
the assault, Nguyen apologized, instructed her not to tell
anyone, and took her home. B. L. M. texted a friend whose
father was a police officer, indicating that she "was
almost raped by a guy" and needed to speak with the
friend's father. The father counseled B. L. M. to report
the incident to her mother. She told her mother generally
about the incident and stated that Nguyen attempted to rape
her, but did not disclose the actual rape because she was
afraid. B. L. M.'s mother called the police, and B. L. M.
told an officer that Nguyen had touched her sexually. She
also described in detail the events leading up to the
touching. Again, however, she did not report the rape.
searched Nguyen's home, discovering that B. L. M.'s
description of the house and its contents was accurate. The
officers did not find the camera referenced by B. L. M., but
they located a tri-pod and a camera bag in the living room.
The evidence shows that Nguyen had hidden the camera in his
dishwasher, and he later asked a friend to remove it from his
house. The police eventually located the camera in the
friend's home. Forensic analysis of the camera and
Nguyen's computer revealed that several photographs of B.
L. M. had been taken with the camera, uploaded onto the
computer, and subsequently deleted. During a recorded
interview with police, Nguyen denied sexually assaulting B.
L. M., but admitted that he picked her up in his car, drove
her to his house, and took pictures of her in his bedroom.
the incident, B. L. M. attempted suicide and was admitted to
a mental health treatment facility. During a therapy session
at the facility, she disclosed the rape to her therapist, and
the new allegation was reported to police. A detective
conducted a forensic interview of B. L. M., who confirmed the
allegation. Although B. L. M.'s mother took her for a
medical examination following the rape outcry, B. L. M.
refused to take part in the exam because she was frightened.
The doctor who tried to examine B. L. M. testified that she
was withdrawn, appeared "very disturbed," and
"was sitting almost in a fetal position[.]"
State offered similar transaction evidence from B. W., a
woman who testified that, in July or August 2012, she
befriended Nguyen while waiting in line at a store. Nguyen
began visiting her at her home, and on several occasions, he
pinned her down and forced her to perform oral sex on him.
According to B. W., she told Nguyen numerous times not to
return to her house, but "[h]e would not listen to
on the evidence presented, the jury found Nguyen guilty of
rape, statutory rape, two counts of child molestation, false
imprisonment, and tampering with evidence. Nguyen challenges
his convictions, arguing that the State offered insufficient
evidence to support the jury's verdict. We disagree.
to OCGA § 16-6-1 (a) (1), "[a] person commits the
offense of rape when he has carnal knowledge of . . . [a]
female forcibly and against her will[.]" The statute
defines the term "carnal knowledge" as "any
penetration of the female sex organ by the male sex
organ." OCGA § 16-6-1 (a). On appeal, Nguyen argues
that the evidence does not establish that he had carnal
knowledge of B. L. M. She testified, however, that Nguyen
pulled down her pants and "raped" her as she
screamed and tried to resist. Asked to explain what she meant
by the word "rape," B. L. M. stated: "He
forced his self [sic] on to me and, yeah. I don't really
know how to describe it. I don't want to sound nasty or
anything. But he put his self [sic] inside of me." B. L.
M. responded "I believe so" when asked on
cross-examination whether Nguyen "had an orgasm inside
[her]." She also reported to police that Nguyen
"had intercourse with her."
B. L. M. did not define rape in the same technical terms as
the statute, "witnesses are not required to describe the
acts constituting the commission of crimes in statutory or
technical language in order to prove the commission of such
acts." Smith v. State, 320 Ga.App. 408, 410-411
(1) (a) (740 S.E.2d 174) (2013) (punctuation omitted). The
language "used by witnesses to describe criminal acts
may be considered in context to provide meaning, and jurors
can be presumed to have some knowledge of slang expressions
in common parlance in the vernacular." Id.
(citation omitted). Given the testimony presented, the jury
was authorized to conclude that Nguyen had carnal knowledge
of B. L. M. forcibly and against her will, in violation of
OCGA § 16-6-1 (a) (1). See Richie v. State, 183
Ga.App. 248, 250 (1) (358 S.E.2d 648) (1987) ("[T]he
jury could reasonably infer that the ...