United States District Court, S.D. Georgia, Waycross Division
ORDER AND MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND
BENJAMIN W. CHEESBRO UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Alfarez Taylor (“Taylor), who is housed at D. Ray James
Correctional Facility in Folkston, Georgia, filed a 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Doc. 1.
Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss, and Taylor filed a
Response. Docs. 8, 10. For the reasons which follow, I
RECOMMEND the Court DENY
Respondent's Motion to Dismiss.
filed his Petition on May 23, 2019. Doc. 1. In his Petition,
Taylor contends a non-Bureau of Prisons'
(“BOP”) staff member imposed sanctions against
him, in violation of his right to due process. Id.
at 6. Taylor also contends the disciplinary hearing
procedures relating to his rehearing on the charged
disciplinary offense violated his right to due process.
Id. at 7. Taylor requests the Court “reverse
all sanction and restore[ Taylor's] good conduct time
without any delay[.]” Id. at 8. After Taylor
paid the requisite filing fee, this Court directed service of
Taylor's Petition upon Respondent on June 26, 2018. Doc.
filed a Motion to Dismiss, claiming he has waived an
exhaustion of administrative remedies defense, and the BOP
has restored Taylor's good conduct time. Doc. 8 at 3. In
so doing, Respondent cites Taylor's imminent expected
release and the BOP's “inability to locate the
[Disciplinary Hearing Officer's] rehearing report.”
Id. The BOP recalculated Taylor's sentence, and
has calculated his projected release date to be July 19,
2019. Id. Thus, Respondent asserts Taylor's
Petition is moot and should be dismissed. Id. at 5.
III of the Constitution “extends the jurisdiction of
federal courts to only ‘Cases' and
‘Controversies.'” Strickland v.
Alexander, 772 F.3d 876, 882 (11th Cir. 2014). This
“case-or-controversy restriction imposes” what is
“generally referred to as ‘justiciability'
limitations.” Id. There are “three
strands of justiciability doctrine-standing, ripeness, and
mootness-that go to the heart of the Article III case or
controversy requirement.” Harrell v. The Fla.
Bar, 608 F.3d 1241, 1247 (11th Cir. 2010) (internal
quotation marks and alterations omitted). Regarding the
mootness strand, the United States Supreme Court has made
clear that “a federal court has no authority ‘to
give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions,
or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect
the matter in issue in the case before it.'”
Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506
U.S. 9, 12 (1992) (internal citation omitted). Accordingly,
“[a]n issue is moot when it no longer presents a live
controversy with respect to which the court can give
meaningful relief.” Friends of Everglades v. S.
Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 F.3d 1210, 1216 (11th Cir.
2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Questions of
justiciability are not answered “simply by looking to
the state of affairs at the time the suit was filed. Rather,
the Supreme Court has made clear that the controversy
‘must be extant at all stages of review, not merely at
the time the complaint is filed.'” Christian
Coal. of Fla., Inc. v. United States, 662 F.3d 1182,
1189-90 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Preiser v.
Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975)).
expunged the challenged incident report and restored
Taylor's lost good conduct time. Doc. 8-1 at 2. However,
Respondent offers no information as to how the BOP calculated
Taylor's sentence-with or without the lost good conduct
time, when Taylor was set to be released prior to crediting
him with the sanctioned lost good conduct time, or whether
the BOP credited all 41 days' lost good conduct time
against Taylor's sentence he contends he was sanctioned
with as a result of disciplinary proceedings. Id.;
see also Doc. 1-1 at 3 (noting sanction of 41 days
of lost good conduct time); Doc. 1-3 at 1 (same); Doc. 1-4 at
requests the Court “reverse all sanction and restore[
his] good conduct time without any delay.” Doc. 1 at 8.
In response to the Motion to Dismiss, Taylor contends his
original release date before sanctions were imposed was to be
October 6, 2019, and his release date with the imposed
sanctions was to be November 10, 2019. Doc. 10 at 2. Taylor
also contends his sentence was recalculated under the First
Step Act of 2018, which resulted in his release date being
August 10, 2019. Id. By Taylor's calculations,
he should have been released from the BOP's custody on
June 28, 2019 if he had been credited with all of his 41
days' lost good conduct time. Id. Taylor avers
the BOP did not correctly recalculate his
while the Court offers no opinion as to the merits of
Taylor's Petition and whether he is entitled to
additional relief in the form of an earlier release date than
what Respondent provides, it cannot determine with any
certainty that there is no longer a “live
controversy” over which the Court can give meaningful
relief. Friends of Everglades, 570 F.3d at 1216.
the Court should DENY Respondent's
Motion to Dismiss.
above-stated reasons, I RECOMMEND the Court
DENY Respondent's Motion to Dismiss.
Court ORDERS any party seeking to object to
this Report and Recommendation to file specific written
objections within 14 days of the date on which this Report
and Recommendation is entered. Any objections asserting that
the undersigned failed to address any contention raised in
the pleading must also be included. Failure to do so will bar
any later challenge or review of the factual findings or
legal conclusions herein. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C);
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985). A copy of the
objections must be served upon all other parties to the
action. Upon receipt of objections meeting the specificity
requirement set out above, a United States District Judge
will make a de novo determination of those portions of the
report, proposed findings, or recommendation to which
objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole
or in part, the findings or recommendations ...