P. J., COOMER and MARKLE, JJ.
of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, Robert
Kenzie Chambers appeals, contending that (1) the trial court
erred in denying his motion to suppress because his detention
was not justified by exigent circumstances, and (2) his trial
counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to request
a jury charge on simple possession. For the reasons that
follow, we affirm.
in the light most favorable to the verdict,  the evidence
shows that in January 2009, an agent with the Oconee Drug
Task Force received a tip from an unpaid confidential
informant. The agent had known the informant for five years,
the informant's previous tips had resulted in ten to
fifteen arrests, and the informant had never given the agent
false information. The agent contacted members of local law
enforcement and relayed the tip: Chambers was traveling to
his residence in a gold Ford Explorer driven by his
girlfriend and he would be carrying a large quantity of crack
cocaine. The agent asked an officer with the Helena Police
Department to be on the lookout for Chambers and to detain
him. The officer drove to Chambers's residence and
observed Chambers's girlfriend pull into the driveway in
a gold Explorer, with Chambers in the passenger seat.
officer approached the passenger side of the vehicle and told
Chambers and his girlfriend to put their hands on the dash.
Meanwhile, several teenagers gathered around the vehicle.
Chambers reached into his pants, pulled out a gray cloth bag,
threw the bag out the window of the vehicle to his son, and
told him to run. The officer asked for the bag, and
Chambers's son handed it to the officer. The bag
contained numerous pieces of suspected crack cocaine, three
bags of suspected powder cocaine, and numerous small baggies.
Subsequent testing showed the suspected narcotics to be 12.67
grams of cocaine.
to trial, Chambers filed a motion to suppress, arguing that
there was no probable cause for the stop. The motion was
denied from the bench following a hearing.
trial, the agent testified that the street value of the drugs
was approximately $1, 267 and, based on his experience,
Chambers did not possess the drugs for personal use. In his
defense, Chambers testified and denied owning the bag. He
further testified that he had given a ride to a man he knew,
who had left the bag in his car, and explained that he threw
the bag out of the window so that his son could throw it
convicted Chambers of possession with intent to distribute.
He timely filed a motion for new trial in 2010, which was not
denied until 2018. This appeal follows.
Chambers contends that the trial court erred in denying his
pretrial motion to suppress because, even if the officer had
probable cause to detain him, his detention was not justified
by exigent circumstances.
reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress,
this Court must construe the record in the light most
favorable to the trial court's factual findings and
judgment, and "all relevant evidence of record,
including evidence introduced at trial, as well as evidence
introduced at the motion to suppress hearing, may be
considered." Pittman v. State, 286 Ga.App. 415,
416 (650 S.E.2d 302) (2007) (punctuation omitted). The trial
judge sits as the trier of fact and its "findings based
upon conflicting evidence are analogous to the verdict of a
jury and should not be disturbed by a reviewing court if
there is any evidence to support them." Brown v.
State, 293 Ga. 787, 802-803 (3) (b) (2) (750 S.E.2d 148)
(2013) (punctuation omitted). "A trial court's
ruling on a motion to suppress will be upheld if it is right
for any reason." Burkes v. State, 347 Ga.App.
790, 791 (1) (821 S.E.2d 33) (2018).
the trial court found that the informant's tip was
reliable and corroborated by the officer's observations
on the scene, such that there was probable cause to arrest
Chambers. Without making any additional factual findings, the
court also found "exigent circumstances[.]"
the Fourth Amendment prohibits warrantless searches unless
"they fall within a well-established exception to the
warrant requirement, including searches conducted pursuant to
consent, the existence of exigent circumstances, and searches
incident to a lawful arrest." State v. Turner,
304 Ga. 356, 359 (1) (818 S.E.2d 589) (2018) (punctuation
omitted). However, Fourth Amendment rights are personal, and,
as such, "a defendant may move to suppress evidence
obtained through an illegal search and seizure only when his
own rights were violated." Jones v. State, 320
Ga.App. 681, 685 (2) (740 S.E.2d 655) (2013) (punctuation
case, the unpaid informant had a history of providing
reliable information to the agent, and the informant's
tip was corroborated by the officer's observation at the
scene that Chambers was traveling to his home in the
passenger seat of his gold Explorer driven by his girlfriend.
"When coupled with corroboration by the personal
observation of a police officer, a reliable informant's
tip is sufficient to establish probable cause for a
warrantless search." Wells v. State, 212
Ga.App. 60, 63 (2) (441 S.E.2d 460) (1994). Accordingly, the
officer had probable cause to detain Chambers. See id.
upon approaching the vehicle, the officer ordered Chambers to
place his hands on the dash, but instead Chambers threw the
bag out of the window. As our Supreme Court has explained,
"absent physical force," an encounter with a police
officer is not considered a seizure under the Fourth
Amendment, unless there is "submission to the assertion
of authority." State v. Walker, 295 Ga. 888,
891 (764 S.E.2d 804) (2014). Because Chambers did not comply
with the officer's command, his abandonment of the bag
was not the fruit of any seizure, and there was no need to
suppress the bag. See id.; Sims v. State, 258
Ga.App. 662, 663 ...