United States District Court, S.D. Georgia, Brunswick Division
MARGERY FREIDA MOCK; and ERIC SCOTT OGDEN, JR., Individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
GLYNN COUNTY GEORGIA; E. NEAL JUMP, Glynn County Sheriff; ALEX ATWOOD, Glynn County Chief Magistrate Judge; B. REID ZEH, III, Glynn County Misdemeanor Public Defender, Defendants.
STAN BAKER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
matter is before the Court on the parties' Joint
Stipulation of Dismissal. (Doc. 105.) On March 9, 2018,
Plaintiffs filed this putative class action alleging
entitlement to a remedy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc.
1.) Following a hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion for
Preliminary Injunction, (docs. 6, 90), the Court ordered a
Settlement Conference, which was held on December 6, 2018,
(docs. 98, 100). At the conference, the parties reached a
settlement agreement to release all claims and to dismiss
this case pursuant to the agreed upon terms. (Doc. 100.) As
agreed upon by the parties, the Court maintains jurisdiction
in this case to enforce the parties' Settlement Agreement
in the manner, and to the extent, set forth by that
Agreement. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of
Am., 511 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1994). Further, in accordance
with the Settlement Agreement, the Court sets forth the
following established legal principles which pertain to the
parties' settlement and the Court's continued
jurisdiction in this case:
pretrial context, it is accepted “that imprisonment
solely because of indigent status is invidious discrimination
and not constitutionally permissible.” Pugh v.
Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053, 1056 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc)
(citing Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971);
Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235
(1970)). “The demands of equal protection of
the laws and of due process prohibit depriving pre-trial
detainees of the rights of other citizens to a greater extent
than necessary to assure appearance at trial and security of
the jails.” Id. at 1057 (citation omitted).
“In our society liberty is the norm, and detention
prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited
exception.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S.
739, 750, 756 (1987) (characterizing right as
“fundamental” in nature). “The
incarceration of those who cannot [meet a bond schedule's
requirements], without meaningful consideration of other
possible alternatives, infringes on both due process and
equal protection requirements.” Pugh, 572 F.2d
process and equal protection principles converge in the
Court's analysis” of cases where criminal
defendants are treated differently by wealth. Bearden v.
Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 661 (1983) (citation omitted).
Heightened scrutiny applies where indigent arrestees who
cannot meet a bond schedule suffer an “absolute
deprivation” of their fundamental interest in pretrial
liberty, but a delay in release for an “appropriate
amount of time” is not an “absolute
deprivation” subject to heightened scrutiny. Walker
v. City of Calhoun, 901 F.3d 1245, 1261-62 (11th Cir.
2018) (citation omitted). In cases where pretrial detainees
are not totally deprived of an opportunity for
release because of their poverty, “courts should apply
something akin to a procedural due process mode of analysis,
” rather than heightened scrutiny. Id. at
1265. This due process mode of analysis ensures an
“‘opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time
and in a meaningful manner, '” but is
“‘flexible and ‘requires analysis of the
governmental and private interests that are
affected.'” Id. (quoting Matthews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333-34 (1976). “[F]ederal
courts should give States wide latitude to fashion procedures
for setting bail, ” and “there is no single
‘preferred approach.'” Id. at 1269
end, bail systems that make “indigency determinations
for purposes of setting bail” within forty-eight hours
of arrest “are presumptively constitutional.”
Id. at 1266 (citing County of Riverside v.
McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991); ODonnell v. Harris
County, 892 F.3d 147 (5th Cir. 2018)). A prompt
“judicial hearing with court-appointed counsel [to
determine indigency status and set bail] is well within the
range of constitutionally permissible options.”
Id. at 1269. “The ultimate inquiry in each
instance is what is necessary to reasonably assure [the]
defendant's presence at trial.” Pugh, 572
F.2d at 1057; see also O.C.G.A. § 17-6-1(b)(1);
Mullinax v. State, 515 S.E.2d 839, 840 (1999)
(“When fixing bail in Georgia, a trial judge's
foremost consideration is the probability that the accused,
if freed, will appear at trial and to a lesser extent
‘the accused's ability to pay, the seriousness of
the offense, and the accused's character and
reputation.'” (citations omitted)). “Bail set
at a figure higher than an amount reasonably calculated to
[assure the presence of the accused] is ‘excessive'
under the Eight Amendment.” Stack v. Boyle,
342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951) (citation omitted).
minimum, procedural due process requires notice of bail
hearings so that detainees have “an opportunity to
challenge the contemplated action and to understand the
nature of what is happening to him.” Vitek v.
Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 496 (1980) (citation omitted);
see also Matthews, 424 U.S. at 333, 348. Moreover,
due process generally requires the decision maker to
“state the reasons for his determination and indicate
the evidence he relied on, though his statement need not
amount to a full opinion or even formal findings of fact and
conclusions of law. And, of course, an impartial decision
maker is essential.” Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254, 271 (1970) (citations omitted); see also Holley
v. Seminole Cty. Sch. Dist., 755 F.2d 1492, 1499 (11th
to the parties' Joint Stipulation of Dismissal, (doc.
105), and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(ii), the
Court DISMISSES with prejudice all of
Plaintiffs' claims against Defendants and
DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to enter the
appropriate judgment of dismissal and to
CLOSE this case. However, the parties have
consented to the Court retaining jurisdiction over this case
for the purpose of enforcing their Settlement Agreement.
Pursuant to that consent, the Court RETAINS
jurisdiction for a period of up to five (5) years to
enforce the terms of the Settlement Agreement reached by the
parties in this case.
 In Bonner v. City of
Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en
banc), the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals adopted as
binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit
handed down prior to October 1, 1981.
 Though the Court retains jurisdiction
to enforce the parties' Settlement Agreement and
incorporates the parties' Agreement by reference, the
parties need not file their Settlement Agreement on the
record of this case. Counsel shall maintain the original of
the executed Agreement and copies thereof. Should the parties
seek to bring a motion to enforce the Settlement Agreement or
any other matter requesting the Court to take ...