MILLER, P. J., RICKMAN and REESE, JJ.
MILLER, PRESIDING JUDGE.
a jury trial, Tamara Nicole Weaver was convicted of two
counts of second degree cruelty to children, three counts of
aggravated assault, two counts of first degree cruelty to
children, and three counts of aggravated battery. The trial
court imposed a 60-year prison sentence with the first 30
years to be served in prison.Weaver appeals from the denial of
her motion for new trial. On appeal, Weaver argues that (1)
the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions for
aggravated battery; (2) the circumstantial evidence presented
at trial was insufficient to support all of the charged
crimes; (3) the trial court erred by charging the jury with
the "short version" of the pattern instructions;
and (4) her trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance.
For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
in the light most favorable to the verdicts,  the record shows
that Weaver had two sons, an infant and a six-year-old.
Weaver stayed home with the baby for several weeks after he
was born and noticed that he cried a lot and that it was not
a "normal" cry. Weaver and her children moved in
with her boyfriend when the baby was less than two months
old. When Weaver returned to work, she asked her mother to
take care of the baby. Weaver's mother noticed that the
baby cried a lot and testified that Weaver was having
problems with the baby's diet and his crying. Weaver and
her boyfriend both worked from 6:00 p.m. to 4:30 a.m., and
after she returned to work, Weaver got very little sleep
because she took care of the baby when he cried so that her
boyfriend could sleep. Weaver's boyfriend only kept the
baby on a few occasions. Weaver, her boyfriend, and her
mother were the baby's only caregivers.
the baby was almost three months old, the crying got worse
and Weaver, her boyfriend, and her mom decided to take him to
Children's Healthcare of Atlanta (Scottish Rite
hospital). A child abuse pediatrician ordered x-rays of the
infant and the x-rays revealed numerous bone fractures, some
new and others older and in the healing
process. The doctor also ordered a CT scan, from
which he observed additional fractures to the infant's
body. The doctor testified that, in total, the infant had 16
bone fractures throughout his ribs, legs, and pelvis. The
doctor testified that some type of trauma to the body would
be required to break the bones and that, because the
fractures were of different ages, there were at least two
different traumatic events that caused the infant's
injuries. For the rib fractures, the most likely explanation
was a "squeezing force about the chest." The doctor
opined that the leg fractures were likely caused by a
yanking, jerking or flailing motion, which could not be
caused by the baby himself or by normal handling of the baby.
To cause the pelvic fracture, a direct trauma to the pelvis
would be required, and the injury could have been caused by a
person punching or stomping the baby or by a heavy fall
directly onto the pelvis. Tests on the infant ruled out the
possibility that genetic issues, such as brittle bone disease
or other medical disorders, could have contributed to the
fractures. The doctor also testified that the baby's
injuries were not visible from the exterior of the body and
that the types of fractures suffered by the infant would not
typically leave any bruises or other marks on the outside of
doctor spoke to Weaver, who told him that she had no idea how
this had happened and denied that anyone had caused any
trauma to her son. Weaver's mother said she was not aware
of the baby experiencing any falls or being dropped or
handled roughly. Weaver's boyfriend told the doctor that
Weaver was not getting much sleep and that the baby's
crying and fussiness were wearing her down, but he did not
mention any trauma to the baby.
doctor concluded that the injuries were most consistent with
physical abuse on at least two different occasions. The
doctor testified that it would only take a few seconds to
inflict these types of injuries and that the number one
trigger for abuse in infants from two to three months old is
a crying infant. The doctor also testified that it would be
highly unlikely that a six-year-old would have the ability to
inflict these types of injuries.
detective with the Griffin Police Department received a call
from the hospital about the infant's multiple fractures.
The detective interviewed Weaver, and that recorded interview
was played for the jury. In the interview, Weaver said that
she could not imagine that anyone in her family would hurt
her son. The detective also interviewed Weaver's
boyfriend, who said the baby cried a lot and that Weaver
"dealt with him." He had no explanation as to what
may have caused the baby's injuries. In an interview,
Weaver's older son did not disclose that he had been
abused or that he had seen anyone abuse his younger brother.
The detective also interviewed Weaver's mother. At trial,
the parties entered a stipulation, which was read to the
jury, stating that law enforcement had ruled out Weaver's
mother as a suspect. Weaver testified at trial that she did
not squeeze or shake her baby in any way and had no idea that
he had fractured bones. She further testified that she did
not think that anything had happened to him and that the
doctor may have made a mistake.
and her boyfriend were indicted on two counts of first degree
cruelty to children, two counts of second degree cruelty to
children, three counts of aggravated battery,  and three counts
of aggravated assault. Weaver and her boyfriend were tried
jointly, and the jury found Weaver guilty on all counts and
her boyfriend not guilty on all counts. The trial court
imposed a 60-year prison sentence with the first 30 years to
be served in prison. Weaver filed a motion for new trial,
which was denied by the trial court. This appeal followed.
her first enumeration of error, Weaver argues that the
evidence was insufficient to support her convictions for
aggravated battery. Specifically, Weaver argues that the
State failed to prove that the victim's injuries
constituted "serious disfigurement" under OCGA
§ 16-5-24 because they were not "visible." We
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the
evidence in the light most favorable to support the
jury's verdict and determine if a rational trier of fact
could find each essential element of the crimes charged
beyond a reasonable doubt. We do not weigh the evidence or
determine witness credibility. Conflicts in witness testimony
are matters of credibility for the jury to resolve. And as
long as there is some evidence, even though contradicted, to
support each fact necessary for the state's case, the
verdict will be upheld.
(Citation omitted.) Clemons v. State, 265 Ga.App.
825, 825-826 (1) (595 S.E.2d 530) (2004). Also,
"[b]ecause the circumstances of each aggravated battery
vary, whether disfigurement is serious is best resolved by
the factfinder on a case-by-case basis. Consequently, what
constitutes serious disfigurement is almost always a question
for the jury." Williams v. State, 248 Ga.App.
316, 318 (1) (546 S.E.2d 74) (2001).
In all interpretations of statutes, the courts shall look
diligently for the intention of the General Assembly. In so
doing, the ordinary signification shall be applied to all
words. Where the language of a statue is plain and
susceptible to only one natural and reasonable construction,
courts must construe the statute accordingly. In fact, where
the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, judicial
construction is not only unnecessary but forbidden.
(Citation omitted.) Jackson v. State, 309 Ga.App.
24, 26 (1) (a) (709 S.E.2d 44) (2011). Additionally,
"criminal statutes must be read according to the natural
and obvious import of their language, and their operation
should not be limited or extended by application of subtle
and forced interpretations." (Citation and punctuation
omitted.) Bradford v. State, 287 Ga.App. 50, 53 (1)
(651 S.E.2d 356) (2007). When a term is not defined by
statute, we look to the ordinary meaning of that word, so
long as it is not a word of art or a word connected with a
particular trade or subject matter. See OCGA § 1-3-1 (b)
(2012) ("In all interpretations of statutes, the
ordinary signification shall be applied to all words, except
words of art or words connected with a particular trade or
subject matter . . . .").
The statute at issue, OCGA § 16-5-24 (a), provides that
A person commits the offense of aggravated battery when he or
she maliciously causes bodily harm to another by depriving
him or her of a member of his or her body, by rendering a
member of his or her body useless, or by seriously
disfiguring his or her body or a member thereof.
term "seriously disfiguring" is not defined in the
statute, thus we look to the ordinary meaning of the word. In
an attempt to define disfigurement to support an aggravated
battery conviction, this Court has previously relied on
Black's Law Dictionary which defines disfigurement as
"[a]n impairment or injury to the appearance of a person
or thing," and also defines impairment as "a
condition in which a part of a person's mind or body is
damaged or does not work well . . . ." Black's Law
Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (emphasis supplied). Webster's
Dictionary defines "appearance" as an "outward