MCFADDEN, P. J., MCMILLIAN and GOSS, JJ.
McFadden, Presiding Judge
jury trial, Khalid Bashir was convicted of three counts of
aggravated assault with a deadly weapon (OCGA § 16-5-21
(a) (2)) and one count each of possession of a firearm during
the commission of a felony (OCGA § 16-11-106) and
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (OCGA §
16-11-131). On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence of assault, but the evidence met the standard of
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (99 S.Ct. 2781, 61
L.Ed.2d 560) (1979). He challenges the charge given to the
jury on assault, but he did not object to this charge at
trial and he has not shown plain error. And he challenges the
trial court's admission of his prior convictions as
impeachment evidence, but he has not shown that the trial
court abused her discretion. So we affirm.
Sufficiency of the evidence.
claims that there was insufficient evidence to support his
convictions for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon,
because the evidence did not show that he either intended to
commit a violent injury to the three victims named in the
indictment or that those persons were in reasonable
apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury. See
OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2) ("A person commits the
offense of aggravated assault when he or she assaults . . .
[w]ith a deadly weapon[.]"). See also OCGA §
16-5-20 (a) ("A person commits the offense of simple
assault when he or she either: (1) Attempts to commit a
violent injury to the person of another; or (2) Commits an
act which places another in reasonable apprehension of
immediately receiving a violent injury."). In
considering this claim, "the relevant question is
whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. at 319 (III) (B) (citation omitted;
emphasis in original). "As long as there is some
competent evidence, even though contradicted, to support each
fact necessary to make out the [s]tate's case, the
jury's verdict will be upheld." Miller v.
State, 273 Ga. 831, 832 (546 S.E.2d 524) (2001)
(citations and punctuation omitted).
viewed, the trial evidence showed that, after getting into
verbal and physical altercations with his live-in girlfriend
and her brother, Bashir fired several shots from a gun toward
a departing car carrying the three aggravated assault victims
named in the indictment - his girlfriend, her brother, and
her mother. A bullet struck the car near where one of the
victims was sitting. A jury could find from this evidence
that Bashir had intentionally fired the gun in the three
victims' direction. "(I)ntentionally firing a gun at
another, absent justification, is sufficient in and of itself
to support a conviction of [OCGA § 16-5-20] (a) (1)
aggravated assault." Chase v. State, 277 Ga.
636, 638 (1) (592 S.E.2d 656) (2004) (citation and
punctuation omitted). See also Howard v. State, 288
Ga. 741, 743 (1) (707 S.E.2d 80) (2011); Dukes v.
State, 264 Ga.App. 820, 823-824 (4) (592 S.E.2d 473)
(2003). So the evidence was sufficient to support
Bashir's convictions for aggravated assault.
argues that the trial court erred by failing, in her charge
to the jury, "to inform the jury of the definition of
simple assault even though that offense is an essential
element of aggravated assault." Howard, 288 Ga.
at 743 (2). Because he did not object to the charge at trial,
we review this claim only for plain error affecting the
substantial rights of the parties. OCGA § 17-8-58 (b).
Bashir has not shown plain error.
Supreme Court has explained, the plain-error analysis
contains four prongs:
First, there must be an error or defect - some sort of
deviation from a legal rule - that has not been intentionally
relinquished or abandoned, i.e., affirmatively waived, by the
appellant. Second, the legal error must be clear or obvious,
rather than subject to reasonable dispute. Third, the error
must have affected the appellant's substantial rights,
which in the ordinary case means he must demonstrate that it
affected the outcome of the trial court proceedings. Fourth
and finally, if the above three prongs are satisfied, the
appellate court has the discretion to remedy the error -
discretion which ought to be exercised only if the error
seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public
reputation of judicial proceedings.
Walker v. State, 301 Ga. 482, 485 (2) (801 S.E.2d
804) (2017) (citation omitted).
error asserted by Bashir in this case is the trial
court's failure to charge on simple assault. Bashir
argues that the trial court should have charged that, to find
Bahsir guilty of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon
under OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2), the jury must find that he
committed an assault by one of the methods set forth in the
simple assault statute, OCGA § 16-5-20 (a). Pertinently,
OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2) provides that a "person
commits the offense of aggravated assault when he or she
assaults . . . [w]ith a deadly weapon[, ]" and OCGA
§ 16-5-20 (a) provides that a "person commits the
offense of simple assault when he or she either: (1) Attempts
to commit a violent injury to the person of another; or (2)
Commits an act which places another in reasonable
apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury."
requested the pattern jury charge on aggravated assault,
which contains the above-quoted language from both the
aggravated assault statute and the simple assault statute.
See Suggested Pattern Jury Charges, Vol. II: Criminal Cases,
§ 2.20.21. But the trial court did not give the
requested charge. Instead, the trial court charged the
A person also commits the offense of aggravated assault with
a deadly weapon by shooting at, toward, and in the direction
of the alleged victim with a handgun, the same being a deadly
weapon. In this instance, to constitute such an assault,
actual injury to the alleged victim need not be shown. It is
only necessary that the evidence show beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant unlawfully committed an assault upon