United States District Court, S.D. Georgia, Augusta Division
KENDRICK R. MARTIN, Plaintiff,
EDWARD PHILBIN, Warden; TOMMY TREMBLE, Deputy Warden of Security; LARRY REDD, Assistant Deputy Warden of Security; CLIFFORD BROWN, Unit Manager over the 11-B area; ORBEY HARMON, Captain, Chief of Security; QUATERRIO MOSS, Prison Guard; FREDRICK PRYOR, Prison Guard; MS. HALL, Prison Guard; LATOYA STRAWBRIDGE, Prison Guard; MS. JACKSON, Lieutenant; REGINA JOHNSON, Prison Nurse; LARRY SIMS, Prison Doctor; MR. BEST, Prison Guard; MS. WISNER, Prison Guard; and MS. PLATT, Facility Investigator, Defendants.
MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND
E. WALTER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
an inmate at Valdosta State Prison, filed his complaint
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, concerning events alleged
to have occurred at Augusta State Medical Prison
(“ASMP”) in Grovetown, Georgia. He is proceeding
pro se and in forma pauperis
(“IFP”). Because he is proceeding IFP,
Plaintiff's amended complaint must be screened to protect
potential defendants. Phillips v. Mashburn, 746 F.2d
782, 785 (11th Cir. 1984); Al-Amin v. Donald, 165
Fed.Appx. 733, 736 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam).
SCREENING THE AMENDED COMPLAINT
names the following Defendants: (1) Edward Philbin, Warden;
(2) Tommy Tremble, Deputy Warden of Security; (3) Larry Redd,
Assistant Deputy Warden of Security; (4) Clifford Brown, Unit
Manager over 11-B area; (5) Orbey Harmon, Captain and Chief
of Security; (6) Quaterrio Moss, Guard; (7) Fredrick Pryor,
Guard; (8) Ms. Hall, Guard; (9) Latoya Strawbridge, Guard;
(10) Ms. Jackson, Lieutenant; (11) Regina Johnson, Nurse;
(12) Larry Sims, Doctor; (13) Mr. Best, Guard; (14) Ms.
Wisner, Guard; and, (15) Ms. Platt, Facility Investigator.
(Doc. no. 22, p. 2.) Taking all of Plaintiff's
allegations as true, as the Court must for purposes of the
present screening, the facts are as follows.
September 18, 2018, Plaintiff resided in Unit 11, B-Wing,
Dorm 1, cell 213. (Id. at 11.) Defendants Moss and
Pryor handcuffed Plaintiff behind his back in preparation for
exiting his cell and moving to the 11-B-lockdown recreation
yard. (Id. at 11-12.) Upon entering the yard, an
unknown inmate came out of his single man yard pen and began
stabbing Plaintiff in the head with a homemade knife, despite
a policy at ASMP to search inmates housed in segregation
prior to allowing them to leave their cells to ensure they
have no contraband. (Id. at 12.) During the assault,
Defendants Moss, Pryor, Hall, Strawbridge, and Jackson
“just stood there and allowed the unidentified inmate
to repeatedly stab Plaintiff Martin in the head.”
(Id. at 12-13.) None of these Defendants attempted
to protect Plaintiff or “restrain the attacker.”
(Id. at 13.) When Defendant Moss instructed the
attacker “that was enough, ” the attack
immediately stopped, and Defendants Moss and Pryor separated
Plaintiff and his attacker. (Id.)
was left bleeding in the yard pen for over thirty minutes
before Defendants Moss, Pryor, Strawbridge and Brown took
Plaintiff to a single man pen in a different area for another
thirty minutes. (Id. at 13-14.) Defendant Brown and
other individuals not named as Defendants then took Plaintiff
to the medical unit. (Id. at 14.) Defendant Johnson
examined Plaintiff and cleaned his wounds. (Id.) She
then informed Defendant Sims the wounds were superficial, and
after prescribing pain medicine and ice, Defendant Sims
cleared Plaintiff without further examination. (Id.
at 15.) Plaintiff returned to his same dorm, where his
attacker was also housed. (Id.) Plaintiff filed a
grievance on September 21, 2018, submitted affidavits
detailing his fear of being placed back in the same dormitory
as his attacker, and maintains Defendants Philbin, Tremble,
Redd, Harmon, Brown, and Platt thus knew that placing him
back in the same dormitory presented a safety risk to
October 3, 2018, Defendant Best cuffed Plaintiff prior to his
transport from the lockdown recreation yard back to his own
cell, a policy required at ASMP for moving inmates assigned
to the segregation unit. (Id. at 16.) Defendant Best
opened the cell door, and as Plaintiff entered the cell,
“he was immediately attacked by two unidentified
inmates who the officers had gave access to get in Plaintiff
Martin's cell without his acknowledgment.”
(Id.) Defendants Best and Wisner made no attempt to
protect Plaintiff while these two inmates stabbed and beat
Plaintiff, and they waited eight to ten minutes before
Defendant Best called in an inmate fight. (Id. at
17.) When additional officers answered the call for an inmate
fight, the attack stopped, and Plaintiff was taken to the
local hospital for treatment. (Id. at 17-18.) At
some later time, one of the attacking inmates in
Plaintiff's cell on October 3rd was identified as the
same inmate who attacked Plaintiff in the recreation yard on
September 18th. (Id. at 18.)
seeks a declaration his rights were violated, as well as
compensatory and punitive damages. (Id. at 21.)
Legal Standard for Screening
amended complaint or any portion thereof may be dismissed if
it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune to such relief. See
28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b). A claim is
frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis either in law
or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319, 325 (1989). “Failure to state a claim under §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same standard as
dismissal for failure to state a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(b)(6).” Wilkerson v. H & S, Inc., 366
Fed.Appx. 49, 51 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam)
(citing Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490
(11th Cir. 1997)).
avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, the allegations in the amended
complaint must “state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). That
is, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a
right to relief above the speculative level.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. While Rule 8(a) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does not require detailed
factual allegations, “it demands more than an
accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A
complaint is insufficient if it “offers ‘labels
and conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action, '” or if it
“tenders ‘naked assertions' devoid of
‘further factual enhancement.'” Id.
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557). In short,
the complaint must provide a “‘plain
statement' possess[ing] enough heft to ‘sho[w] that
the pleader is entitled to relief.'”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P.
the Court affords a liberal construction to a pro se
litigant's pleadings, holding them to a more lenient
standard than those drafted by an attorney. Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). However, this liberal
construction does not mean that the Court has a duty ...