United States District Court, S.D. Georgia, Brunswick Division
ANTHONY G. WORTHY, Plaintiff,
WOODY FOLSOM AUTOMOTIVES, Defendant.
LISA GODBEY WOOD, JUDGE.
the Court is Defendant Woody Folsom Automotive, Inc.'s
Motion to Dismiss, dkt. no. 21. The Motion is ripe for
review. For the reasons that follow, the Motion is
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a plaintiff's
complaint contain ``a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). When ruling on a motion to dismiss brought
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a district court must accept as
true the facts set forth in the complaint and draw all
reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.
Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 705 (11th Cir.
2010). Although a complaint need not contain detailed factual
allegations, it must contain ``enough facts to state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged." Ashcroft v. Igbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009). The Court accepts the allegations in the complaint as
true and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the
plaintiff. Ray v. Spirit Airlines, Inc., 836 F.3d
1340, 1347 (11th Cir. 2016). However, the Court does not
accept as true threadbare recitations of the elements of the
claim and disregards legal conclusions unsupported by factual
allegations. Igbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79. At a
minimum, a complaint should "contain either direct or
inferential allegations respecting all the material elements
necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal
theory." Fin. Sec. Assurance, Inc. v. Stephens,
Inc., 500 F.3d 1276, 1282-83 (11th Cir. 2007) (per
curiam) (quoting Roe v. Aware Woman Ctr. for Choice,
Inc., 253 F.3d 678, 683 (11th Cir. 2001)).
2, 2018, Plaintiff filed this action, pro se,
pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (``Title VII"),
42 U.S.C. § 2OOOe et seg., and a number of other federal
statutes, alleging, among other things, employment
discrimination and retaliation against him by Defendant Woody
Folsom Automotives and two individual Defendants. Dkt. No. 1.
The Court subsequently dismissed all of Plaintiff's
claims except for Plaintiff's Title VII claims against
Woody Folsom Automotives. Dkt. No. 7. On February 5, 2019,
the Court denied Defendant's first motion to dismiss.
Dkt. No. 18. In that Order, the Court recognized that
Defendant had shown that Plaintiff had sued the wrong entity
because Defendant had never employed Plaintiff. Indeed,
Defendant provided records showing that a different entity,
Woody Folsom Auto Group, Inc., had employed Plaintiff.
Nevertheless, the Court denied Defendant's motion to
dismiss and granted Plaintiff leave to amend his Complaint
with instructions to name the correct entity, Woody Folsom
Auto Group, Inc., as a defendant. In addition, the Court
noted that if Plaintiff did not cure the identified
deficiency, then Defendant could reurge its motion to
dismiss, which it did.
March 6, 2019, Plaintiff filed a letter with the Court
stating that he was attempting to retain counsel. Plaintiff,
however, has not amended his Complaint nor has counsel
appeared in this action on his behalf. Thus, the wrong entity
is still the only remaining Defendant.
on the Complaint, the Confirmation of Submission of New Hire
Reports Defendant filed with the Court, and the pay stubs
that Plaintiff filed with the Court, the Court finds that it
is not plausible that Plaintiff was an employee of Defendant.
See Peppers v. Cobb Cty., Georgia, 835 F.3d 1289,
1297 (11th Cir. 2016) (``A Title VII workplace discrimination
claim can only be brought by an employee against his
employer."). Accordingly, Plaintiff's only remaining
claims, for violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, are due to be dismissed because the Complaint does
not "contain either direct or inferential allegations
respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain a
recovery under some viable legal theory." Fin. Sec.
Assurance, 500 F.3d at 1282-83 (citation omitted).
reasons stated above, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is
GRANTED. This action is hereby
DISMISSED without prejudice.