BARNES, P. J., MERCIER and BROWN, JJ.
cross-appeals stem from a lawsuit filed by W. Baxter Brown to
enforce an express easement that runs through Charles
Sapp's property. Sapp claims that the express easement
was abandoned through nonuse, and both parties filed motions
for summary judgment. The trial court issued an order denying
both motions, finding, inter alia, that a question of fact
remained as to whether the express easement had been
abandoned. This Court granted the parties' applications
for interlocutory appeal. For the reasons that follow, we
reverse in part and affirm in part.
review a grant or denial of summary judgment de novo and
construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmovant. Because this opinion addresses cross-motions for
summary judgment, we will construe the facts in favor of the
nonmoving party as appropriate." 905 Bernina Avenue
Coop., v. Smith/Burns, LLC, 342 Ga.App. 358,
361 (1) (802 S.E.2d 373) (2017) (citation and punctuation
viewed, the evidence shows the following. In September 1972,
Brown purchased property in Dougherty County via a warranty
deed. The property contained an express easement which
originated in 1947. The easement pertains to "a strip of
land approximately sixteen (16) feet in width . . . located
on the South side of the tract . . . for ingress and egress
for vehicular traffic," that crossed Sapp's
neighboring land. Sometime in the 1970s, Sapp built a roadway
on another part of his property, named "Sapp
Road." Following a lawsuit filed in 1988 by Lee
County against Sapp, the County and Sapp entered into an
agreement which provided that Sapp Road would be a public
road and that Sapp would claim no interest in the road.
2015, Brown filed the underlying lawsuit seeking, inter alia,
to have Sapp "rebuild" the easement referenced in
the warranty deed. He claims that Sapp "destroyed the
concrete culvert providing entrance to the easement[.]"
During discovery, Brown admitted that he had not used the
express easement in 44 years and did not know about the
easement until 2015. Sapp admitted that he was aware of the
existence of the easement when he purchased his property in
1951 and prior to building his house. Sapp also admitted that
he attempted to move and replace the easement by creating
Brown asserts that the trial court erred by finding that a
genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether he had
abandoned the express easement. "An express easement,
also known as an easement acquired by grant, is an easement
expressly agreed upon by contract between a landowner and
another." 905 Bernina Avenue Coop.,
supra at 368 (3) (citations and punctuation omitted).
[W]here a right of way or other easement is acquired by grant
or deed, no duty is thereby cast upon the owner of the
dominant estate thus created to make use thereof or enjoy the
same as a condition to the right to retain his interest
therein, and the mere non-user of such an easement for a
period however long will not amount to an abandonment. The
mere fact that one does not immediately begin to exercise his
right of use under an easement, or that he delays doing so
for a number of years, would not occasion a loss of the
Sermons v. Agasarkisian, 323 Ga.App. 642, 645-646
(1) (746 S.E.2d 596) (2013) (citation omitted). "Where
an easement of way has been acquired by grant, the doctrine
of extinction by nonuse does not apply; and mere nonuser
without further evidence of an intent to abandon such
easement will not constitute an abandonment." Sadler
v. First Nat. Bank of Baldwin County, 267 Ga. 122, 123
(2) (475 S.E.2d 643) (1996) (citation and punctuation
omitted). "Although intent to abandon an easement often
is an issue for the factfinder, the issue can be resolved on
summary judgment if there is not clear, unequivocal, and
decisive evidence of intent." 905 Berni na Avenue
Coop., supra at 372 (4) (citations omitted).
such, Sapp was required to point to evidence that Brown
either expressly abandoned the easement or engaged in
conduct, beyond mere nonuse, that was tantamount to an
express abandonment. See id. at 372 (4). But Sapp has pointed
to no evidence that Brown expressly abandoned the easement.
Instead he states that "the easement in questions[sic]
has not been used by [Brown] in excess of 44 years and [Sapp]
has occupied the land on which the easement is located and
has had total control during the same period of time."
This is evidence of mere nonuse, not intent to abandon. See
Salder, supra. Compare Duffy Street S. R. O., v.
Mobley, 266 Ga. 849, 849-850 (1) (471 S.E.2d 507) (1996)
(affirmed a denial of motion for new trial following jury
finding that the easement had been abandoned when, in
addition to nonuse, the predecessor in title had blocked the
easement with a fence.). Sapp points to no evidence that
Brown or his predecessors in title expressed or engaged in
conduct revealing an intent to abandon the easement. See
905 Berni na Avenue Coop., supra at 373 (4).
Brown's failure to exercise his right to use the easement
is not evidence of an intent to abandon the right forever.
upon the evidence of record, there was no genuine issue of
material fact regarding abandonment of the easement.
Therefore Brown was entitled to summary judgment on this
issue and the trial court erred. See id; Whipple v.
Hatcher, 283 Ga. 309, 310-311 (658 S.E.2d 585) (2008).
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's holding that
there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding
abandonment of the easement.
Brown's only other enumerated error claims that the trial
court erred in denying his motion for summary judgment in
general. In addition to his assertion that no issue of
material fact existed regarding abandonment of the easement,
Brown's motion for summary judgment claimed that Sapp
"should be responsible for returning the easement to its
condition prior to the illegal attempt to relocate the
same." However, he did not support this claim with any
citation to authority, which the trial court noted in its
order denying his motion for summary judgment.
failed to support this enumerated error with argument or
citation to authority. As Brown has failed to support the
enumerated error in his appellate brief, we have nothing to
review, and we affirm the trial court's ruling on
Brown's motion for summary judgment in part. See Court of
Appeals Rule 25 (c) (2) ("Any enumeration of error that
is not supported in the brief by citation of authority ...