United States District Court, S.D. Georgia, Augusta Division
MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND
K. EPPS UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
an inmate at FCI Williamsburg in Salters, South Carolina, has
filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set
aside, or correct his sentence. For the reasons set forth
below, the Court REPORTS and RECOMMENDS the § 2255
motion be DENIED without an evidentiary hearing, this civil
action be CLOSED, and a final judgment be ENTERED in favor of
6, 2016, the grand jury in the Southern District of Georgia
charged Petitioner in a seven count indictment with (1) one
count of conspiracy to commit robbery of a commercial
business under 18 U.S.C. § 1951; (2) one count of
conspiracy to use and carry a firearm during crimes of
violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(o); (3) two counts of
robbery of a commercial business under 18 U.S.C. §§
1951 and 1952; (4) two counts of carrying, using, and
brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence under 18
U.S.C. § 924 (c)(1)(A)(ii) and (c)2; and (5) one count
of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon under 18
U.S.C. §§ 922 (g)(1) and 924. United States v.
Saylors, CR 116-048, doc. no. 1 (S.D. Ga. July 6, 2016)
(hereinafter “CR 116-048”). The Court appointed
attorney Grant K. Usry to represent Petitioner. See id., doc.
Agreement to Plead Guilty
February 13, 2017, Petitioner appeared with counsel before
Chief United States District Judge J. Randal Hall and pled
guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit robbery of a
commercial business (“Count One”), one count of
robbery of a commercial business (“Count Three”),
and one count of carrying, using, and brandishing a firearm
during a crime of violence (“Count Four”).
Id., doc. nos. 50-51. In exchange for the guilty
plea, the government agreed to (1) dismiss the remaining
counts of the indictment; (2) not object to a recommendation
from the probation office for a two-point acceptance of
responsibility reduction; and (3) consider filing a motion,
based on any “substantial assistance” provided by
Petitioner, for downward departure under U.S.S.G. §
5K1.1 or requesting a reduction of Petitioner's sentence
under Fed. R. Crim. P. 35. Id., doc. no. 51, pp.
7-8. The plea agreement contained a factual basis for the
plea, which stated in relevant part:
[As to Count One, Petitioner] did knowingly and willfully
combine, conspire, confederate and agree with ROBBIE LEE
MOUZON to knowingly and unlawfully take and obtain personal
property from the person and presence of employees of
commercial businesses against their will by means of actual
and threatened force, violence, and fear of injury to their
person . . . in violation of Title 18, United States Code,
[As to Count Three, Petitioner], aided and abetted by ROBBIE
LEE MOUZON, did unlawfully obstruct, delay, and affect, and
attempt to obstruct, delay and affect commerce, as that term
is defined in Title 18, United States Code, Section 1951, and
the movement of articles and commodities in such commerce, by
robbery, . . . in that [Petitioner] did knowingly, willfully,
and unlawfully take and obtain personal property, that is,
United States currency, from the presence and person of an
individual . . ., against her will, and by means of actual
and threatened force, violence, and fear of injury, immediate
or future, to [the individual's] person, and to property
in [the individual's] custody and possession, that is, by
brandishing a firearm and demanding money, said United States
Currency then being in the property of Speedee Cash, . . . a
business engaged in and affecting interstate commerce, all
done in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections
1951 and 2.
[As to Count Four, Petitioner] aided and abetted ROBBIE LEE
MOUZON to knowingly carry, use, and brandish a firearm during
and in relation to a crime of violence, that is, robbery of a
commercial business . . . as set forth in Count Three of the
Indictment filed in the above-styled case; and done with the
advanced knowledge that ROBBIE LEE MOUZON would carry, use,
and brandish a firearm during and in relation to a crime of
violence that is, robbery of a commercial business, . . . in
violation of Title 18 United States Code, Sections
924(c)(1)(A)(ii) and 2.
Id. at 2-5.
plea agreement also contained an appeal and collateral attack
waiver, as follows:
Defendant entirely waives his right to a direct appeal of his
conviction and sentence on any ground. The only exceptions
are that the Defendant may file a direct appeal of his
sentence if (1) the court enters a sentence above the
statutory maximum, (2) the court enters a sentence above the
advisory Sentencing Guidelines range found to apply by the
court at sentencing; or (3) the Government appeals the
sentence. Absent those exceptions, Defendant explicitly and
irrevocably instructs his attorney not to file an appeal.
Defendant entirely waives his right to collaterally attack
his conviction and sentence on any ground and by any method,
including but not limited to a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion.
The only exception is that Defendant may collaterally attack
his conviction and sentence based on a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel.
Id. at 11.
attested he read and carefully reviewed the plea agreement,
understood what it said and meant, voluntarily agreed to it,
and stipulated to the factual basis therein as true and
accurate in every respect. Id. at 13.
Change of Plea Hearing
the Change of Plea Hearing, Chief United States District
Judge J. Randal Hall established Petitioner's competence
to enter a guilty plea if he desired. Id., doc. no.
129, pp. 4-7, 25. Petitioner testified under oath he had
adequate time to discuss his case with Mr. Usry and was
entirely satisfied with the services rendered by him.
Id. at 8-9. Judge Hall read each count of the
indictment and asked if Petitioner understood the charges.
Id. at 7-8. Petitioner confirmed he understood.
Id. at 8. Judge Hall also explained the rights
Petitioner would be waiving by pleading guilty, and
Petitioner affirmed he clearly understood those rights.
Id. at 9-11.
the rights explained, Judge Hall reviewed the right to trial
by jury, the presumption of innocence, the government's
burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the right to
present and cross-examine witnesses, and the right to remain
silent. Id. Petitioner affirmed no one had forced,
threatened, or pressured him to plead guilty, nor ...