Tyrone Lamark Davis ("Appellant") challenges his
convictions for felony murder and a firearm offense in
connection with the shooting death of Keith Moses. He
contends that the evidence was legally insufficient to
support his convictions; that the trial court erred in
denying his pretrial motion to suppress his custodial
statement to the police; that the trial court erred in
denying his motion to prevent a document reflecting a
co-defendant's sentence from going out with the jury
during deliberations; and that he was denied the effective
assistance of counsel at trial. We affirm.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the
evidence at trial showed the following. On August 2, 2012,
Bobby Releford met up with Mart'e Polk at the home of
Polk's ex-girlfriend in Warner Robins. Releford and Polk
decided to buy drugs from Keith Moses, Releford's drug
dealer, and Polk drove them to Moses' house in his white,
four-door car. On the way, they picked up Appellant and
Hubert Hillery. Releford was armed with a .380 pistol, and
Appellant was armed with a nine-millimeter pistol that
Releford sold him two months earlier.
Polk pulled into the driveway at Moses' house, Releford
got out of the car and went inside. After a minute or two,
Releford came back and spoke with Appellant, who had gotten
out of the car. Polk overheard Releford say to Appellant,
"We've got to get this dude." Releford then
told Polk, "Hold on, I'll be back out," and
Appellant and Releford went inside the house.
Appellant and Releford tried to negotiate a drug deal with
Moses, but Moses said that he did not have the quantity of
drugs that they wanted and told them to come back later.
Appellant and Releford got ready to leave, and as Releford
was standing at the front door, he heard Moses say, "Oh,
sh*t." Releford turned around and saw Appellant, who was
behind him, pointing his gun at Moses. Appellant hit Moses in
the head with the gun, and Moses fell back onto a sofa by the
front door. Appellant told Moses, "You know what it
is," and took a wallet and a .380 pistol from Moses.
Moses then rushed Appellant, knocking him into Releford, and
the three of them fell through the front door outside. The
fight continued, and Appellant shot Moses once in the chest.
Moses then jumped up and ran to a neighbor's house, where
he banged on the door. When the door opened, he collapsed in
the entryway. Moses told the neighbor's brother, who was
there, that he had been shot and needed help, and the
neighbor's brother called 911. Moses also told the
neighbor's brother that he knew who shot him and that the
shooter lived in the area.
Polk, who had gotten tired of waiting for Appellant and
Releford, pulled out of the driveway and drove to the stop
sign at the end of the street, but he turned around when
Hillery reminded him that Releford had not yet given Polk gas
money as promised. As Polk drove back towards Moses'
house, he heard a gunshot, saw Moses running to the
neighbor's house with blood on the front of his shirt,
and watched as Releford pulled his gun and fired a single
shot at Moses but missed.
and Releford ran to Polk's car and jumped inside.
Releford started yelling at Appellant, asking why he shot
Moses. Appellant said that he shot Moses because Moses rushed
him and grabbed his collar. Appellant still had Moses'
gun but had dropped
wallet in the front yard during the fight. Appellant and
Releford also had marijuana and cocaine that they took from
Moses. Moses was taken to the hospital but died the next
morning from the gunshot wound to his chest.
police recovered one nine-millimeter shell casing and one
.380 shell casing near the front door to Moses' house and
found Moses' wallet in the front yard. The police lifted
a fingerprint from the inside doorknob of Moses' front
door, which an expert in fingerprint analysis matched to a
known print from Appellant. The police executed a search
warrant at the home of Appellant's mother and found an
empty box of nine-millimeter ammunition in a closet where
Appellant's mother said Appellant used to keep his
contends that the evidence presented at trial was legally
insufficient to support his convictions, because the evidence
was vague, ambiguous, and conflicting as to what specific
involvement he had in the shooting and how the shooting
actually occurred. However, "[i]t was for the jury to
determine the credibility of the witnesses and to resolve any
conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence." Brown
v. State, 302 Ga. 454, 456 (807 S.E.2d 369) (2017)
(citation and punctuation omitted). When viewed in the light
most favorable to the verdicts, the evidence presented at
trial and summarized above was sufficient to authorize a
rational jury to find Appellant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt of the crimes for which he was convicted. See
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (99 S.Ct.
2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560) (1979). Accordingly, we reject
Appellant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.
See Battle v. State, 298 Ga. 661, 663 (784 S.E.2d
381) (2016) (rejecting claim that "vague, ambiguous, and
conflicting" evidence was legally insufficient to
support convictions for murder and other crimes).
Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in denying his
pretrial motion to suppress his custodial statement to the
police. But the State did not introduce Appellant's
statement at trial, so this claim is moot. See Rai v.
State, 297 Ga. 472, 476 n.2 (775 S.E.2d 129) (2015);
Miller v. State, 295 Ga. 769, 777 (764 S.E.2d 135)
Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his
motion to prevent a copy of the indictment showing
Releford's change of plea from "Not Guilty" to
"Guilty" on the felony murder charge and sentence
of "parolable life" from going out with the jury
during deliberations. Regardless of whether the indictment
should have been redacted to remove this information before
the trial court sent it out with the jury, Appellant has
failed to show harm, because Releford testified to the same
facts without objection on both direct and cross-examination.
See Wilkins v. State, 291 Ga. 483, 488 (731 S.E.2d
346) (2012) (holding that it was highly probable that
allowing summary of cellular telephone records to go out with
jury during deliberations did not contribute to verdict where
underlying records were admitted into evidence by
Appellant claims that he received ineffective assistance of
trial counsel in several respects. To prevail on this claim,
Appellant must prove both that his attorney's performance
was professionally deficient and that the deficiency resulted
in prejudice to his case. See Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (104 S.Ct. 2052, 80
L.Ed.2d 674) (1984). To establish deficient performance,
Appellant must show that his counsel's acts or omissions
were objectively unreasonable, considering all the
circumstances at the time and in the light of prevailing
professional norms. See id. at 687-690. To establish
prejudice, Appellant must show "a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result
of the proceeding would have been different."
Id. at 694. A reviewing court need not "address
both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an
insufficient showing on one." Id. at 697.
"This burden, though not impossible to carry, is a heavy
one." Arnold v. State, 292 Ga. 268, 270 (737
S.E.2d 98) (2013). Appellant has not carried his burden in
points first to his trial counsel's alleged failure to
object at a pretrial hearing held pursuant to Jackson v.
Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908)
(1964), to Detective Wright's "vague
recollection" and "statements said" and to his
trial counsel's allegedly giving the jury an incorrect
standard of proof during opening statements by telling the
jury, "That's what your job to determine is, who did
it and what complicity, if any, [Appellant] had."
However, Appellant did not raise either of these instances at
the motion for new trial stage when he had new counsel, so
they are not preserved for ...