MCFADDEN, P. J., MCMILLIAN and GOSS, JJ.
McFadden, Presiding Judge.
jury trial, Mark Bradley Boyd was convicted of child
molestation for having sexual intercourse with 14-year-old V.
B. and for sexual exploitation of a child for knowingly
possessing a digital image of V. B.'s genitals on his
cellular phone. Boyd argues that the state failed to prove
venue as to either offense, but the evidence was sufficient
to authorize the jury to find that the crimes were committed
in Coweta County, as charged. Boyd argues that the trial
court erred in admitting evidence that he had engaged in
other acts of sexual intercourse with minors, but the trial
court did not abuse his discretion in that ruling. Finally,
Boyd argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing
to seek to strike a juror who had been molested as a child,
but he has not shown both that this failure constituted
deficient performance and that he was prejudiced by it. So we
appeal from a criminal conviction, we view the evidence
"in the light most favorable to the verdict, and the
defendant no longer enjoys the presumption of
innocence[.]" Morris v. State, 322 Ga.App. 682
(1) (746 S.E.2d 162) (2013) (citation omitted). So viewed,
the evidence showed that for several months in late 2014,
Boyd dated V. B.'s mother. During that time, Boyd
sometimes made suggestive comments to V. B., the two
exchanged sexual messages over a messaging app on their
cellular devices, and V. B. sent Boyd some nude photographs
of herself, including a photograph of her genitals. On
December 15, 2014, V. B. spent the night at Boyd's house
and the two had sexual intercourse. V. B. disclosed that
event to Boyd's daughter, who was her school friend. In
January 2015, after Boyd and V. B.'s mother broke off
their relationship, V. B. disclosed to her mother that Boyd
had molested her. She repeated this disclosure to a
psychologist during a forensic examination. Law enforcement
officers arrested Boyd, and they recovered from his cellular
phone nude photographs of V. B.
Boyd does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence
except as to venue, the evidence recited above is sufficient
under the standard of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307 (99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560) (1979). See generally
OCGA § 16-6-4 (a) (1) ("A person commits the
offense of child molestation when such person . . . [d]oes
any immoral or indecent act to or in the presence of or with
any child under the age of 16 years with the intent to arouse
or satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the
person[.]"); OCGA § 16-12-100 (b) (8) ("It is
unlawful for any person knowingly to possess or control any
material which depicts a minor or a portion of a minor's
body engaged in any sexually explicit conduct."); OCGA
§ 16-12-100 (a) (4) (D) ("[s]exually explicit
conduct" means "actual or simulated . . . [l]ewd
exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any
Venue. Boyd argues that the state failed to prove
venue as to either offense. We disagree.
the other elements of a criminal offense, the state must
prove the element of venue beyond a reasonable doubt. See
Pike v. State, 302 Ga. 795, 797 (1) (809 S.E.2d 756)
(2018). On appeal, "we view the evidence of venue in a
light most favorable to support the verdict and determine
whether the evidence was sufficient to permit a rational
trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the
crime or crimes were committed in the county in which the
defendant was indicted." Worthen v. State, 304
Ga. 862, 865 (3) (a) (823 S.E.2d 291) (2019) (citation and
punctuation omitted). "Whether the state met its burden
as to venue is a matter resting soundly within the purview of
the jury, and ambiguities in the trial evidence must be
resolved by the trial jury, not appellate courts."
Garza v. State, 347 Ga.App. 335, 337 (1) (b) (819
S.E.2d 497) (2018) (citations and punctuation omitted).
Evidence of venue as to child molestation.
trial evidence, viewed most favorably to the verdict, showed
that Boyd's act of child molestation - having sexual
intercourse with 14-year-old V. B. - occurred at his house.
Boyd argues that the evidence was insufficient to show that
his house was located in Coweta County, where he was
indicted. But V. B. testified at trial that she thought
Boyd's house was in Coweta County. When asked the
location of the house, she first replied that it was in the
city of Moreland. She was then asked, "Do you know what
county that is?" She replied, "I think that's
still in Coweta County."
B.'s testimony authorized the jury to find that the act
of child molestation occurred, as charged, in Coweta County.
See Liggins v. State, 239 Ga. 452, 454 (2) (238
S.E.2d 34) (1977) (victim's testimony that crime occurred
in particular county was sufficient to establish venue);
Long v. State, 324 Ga.App. 882, 889 (1) (752 S.E.2d
54) (2013) (same). We find no merit in Boyd's argument
that, because V. B. prefaced her testimony with the phrase
"I think," her testimony about the location of
Boyd's house was a lay opinion subject to the
foundational requirements of OCGA § 24-7-701 (a). See
generally Butler v. State, 292 Ga. 400, 405-406 (3)
(a) & n. 10 (738 S.E.2d 74) (2013) (discussing difference
between fact testimony and opinion testimony). While the
phrase "I think" may have raised a question about
the certainty of V. B.'s testimony that the house was in
Coweta County, it was for the jury as factfinder, rather than
this court, to determine whether to credit the testimony. See
In the Interest of S. W., 337 Ga.App. 110, 111-112
(1) (786 S.E.2d 499) (2016) (trier of fact was authorized to
resolve any apparent uncertainties in evidence regarding
Evidence of venue as to sexual exploitation.
state charged Boyd with committing, in Coweta County, the
offense of sexual exploitation of a child by possessing a
digital image of V. B.'s genitals. Boyd challenges the
evidence that his workplace was located in Coweta County.
While the state offered no direct evidence of this fact,
circumstantial evidence authorized the jury to find the
most favorably to the verdict, the trial evidence showed that
the image was on Boyd's cellular phone from November
2014, when he received it, through January 21, 2015, when he
was apprehended and the phone seized from him while he was at
work. As discussed above, the trial evidence also showed that
Boyd lived in Coweta County during this time frame.
"[L]ike any other fact, venue may be proved by
circumstantial evidence, and it is enough if the fact of
venue is properly inferable from all the evidence."
Worthen, 304 Ga. at 871 (3) (e) n. 6 (citation and
punctuation omitted). The jury could properly infer from this
evidence that Boyd possessed his cellular phone, and thus
possessed the image of V. B.'s genitals, in Coweta County
on some date within the statute of limitation. See Weyer
v. State, 333 Ga.App. 706, 712 (1) (b) (776 S.E.2d 304)
(2015) (jurors are permitted to consider "their own
common-sense understanding of the world" when drawing
reasonable inferences from circumstantial evidence). Contrary
to Boyd's assertion, the state was not required to prove
that he possessed ...