United States District Court, M.D. Georgia, Columbus Division
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
STEPHEN HYLES UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
pending before the Court is Respondent's motion to
dismiss Petitioner's application for habeas relief. (ECF
No. 10.) For the reasons described below, it is recommended
that Respondent's motion be granted and Petitioner's
application for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 (ECF No. 1) be dismissed as untimely.
to Petitioner, he pleaded guilty to “Possession of
Tools in the Commission of a Crime, Criminal Trespassing,
Driving [with] License Suspended, [and] No Proof of
Insurance” in February 2014. Pet. 1, ECF No. 1. He was
sentenced to five years imprisonment with six months to
serve. Id. Petitioner states that he did not seek
review of this conviction in any forum. Id. at 2-4.
initiated this suit on May 14, 2018 (ECF No. 1). He only
claims one ground for relief-that “[i]t's not a
crime to ride in your automobile and have your tools inside
your automobile; there was no crime being committed; I was
only driving.” Pet. 5. On September 12, 2018,
Respondent moved to dismiss Petitioner's application for
habeas relief, arguing it “is barred because it is
untimely.” Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss 1, ECF No.
10-1. Petitioner was notified of Respondent's motion on
September 13, 2018 (ECF No. 11), but has not responded to
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (hereinafter
“AEDPA”) was enacted primarily to put an end to
the unacceptable delay in the review of prisoners' habeas
petitions. “The purpose of the AEDPA is not obscure. It
was to eliminate the interminable delays in the execution of
state and federal criminal sentences, and the . . .
overloading of our federal criminal justice system, produced
by various aspects of this Court's habeas corpus
jurisdiction.” Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S.
236, 264-65 (1998). The AEDPA, which became effective on
April 24, 1996, therefore instituted a time bar as follows:
(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an
application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.
. . .
(2) The time during which a properly filed application for
State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect
to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be
counted toward any period of limitation under this
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Under the statute, the limitation
period begins to run on “the date on which the judgment
became final by the conclusion of direct review or the
expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28
U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Thus, in order to determine
whether a petition was timely filed, the Court “must
determine (1) when the [collateral] motion was filed and (2)
when [the] judgment of conviction became final.”
McCloud v. Hooks, 560 F.3d 1223, 1227 (11th Cir.
2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)
(alterations in original).
to Petitioner, the conviction he is challenging was issued in
February 2014, and he did not appeal it directly or through
any collateral review process. Therefore, his conviction
became final on the expiration date of the period in which he
could have sought direct review. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(d)(1)(A) (explaining that in the context of
determining the AEDPA limitations period, the judgment is
final on the date of “the conclusion of direct review
or the ...