NAHMIAS, PRESIDING JUSTICE.
Moore appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to
set aside the court's September 2017 order denying his
motion for an out-of-time appeal, contending that the court
did not give him notice of the September 2017 order. The
State concedes that the trial court did not properly evaluate
Moore's motion to set aside. We agree, so we vacate the
trial court's order and remand the case for the court to
make findings about whether Moore was given proper notice of
the September 2017 order.
After a jury trial in 1977, Moore was convicted of murder and
rape and sentenced to death; his convictions and sentences
were affirmed on appeal. See Moore v. State, 240 Ga.
807 (243 S.E.2d 1) (1978). Moore then filed a federal habeas
corpus petition, and he was granted a new sentencing
proceeding on the ground that the jury had not been properly
instructed at the sentencing phase of his trial. See
Moore v. Kemp, 809 F.2d 702, 730-733 (11th Cir.
1987) (en banc). The State indicated that it would again seek
the death penalty. On June 18, 2002, Moore, who was
represented by counsel, waived his right to a jury trial for
sentencing and agreed to be sentenced to life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole.
did not appeal the new sentencing order. Fifteen years later,
on June 22, 2017, he filed a pro se motion for an out-of-time
appeal. On September 20, 2017, the trial court denied that
motion. Moore did not file a timely appeal from that order.
On October 3, 2017, he filed an "amended" motion
for an out-of-time appeal, which the trial court also denied.
Moore appealed that denial order, but on May 21, 2018, this
Court affirmed it, explaining that Moore's attempt to
amend the already adjudicated motion for an out-of-time
appeal was untimely and jurisdictionally improper. See
Moore v. State, 303 Ga. 743, 746 (814 S.E.2d 676)
(2018). We noted Moore's contention that he was not
served with a copy of the September 2017 order, and we
explained that although such a circumstance would not extend
the time in which a notice of appeal must be filed, Moore
could seek to have the order set aside. See id. at 747 n.6.
on May 22, 2018, Moore filed a motion to set aside the
September 2017 order denying his original motion for an
out-of-time appeal, asserting that he was never served with a
copy of that order. On August 10, 2018, the trial court
denied Moore's motion without a hearing, explaining:
"The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial
court on May 21, 2018. Therefore, this Court will not grant
Defendant's Motion to set aside."
2. OCGA § 15-6-21 (c) says:
When [the judge] has so decided [a motion], it shall be the
duty of the judge to file his or her decision with the clerk
of the court in which the cases are pending and to notify the
attorney or attorneys of the losing party of his or her
decision. Said notice shall not be required if such notice
has been waived pursuant to subsection (a) of Code Section
9-11-5 [by a failure to file pleadings].
the trial court does not give the required notice of an order
to the losing party, "the losing party should file a
motion to set aside, and the trial court should grant the
motion and re-enter the judgment, whereupon the 30-day appeal
period would begin to run again." Pierce v.
State, 289 Ga. 893, 895 (717 S.E.2d 202) (2011)
(citations and quotation marks omitted). See also Cambron
v. Canal Ins. Co., 246 Ga. 147, 148 (717 S.E.2d 202)
(1980), disapproved in part by Wright v. Young, 297
Ga. 683, 684 n.3 (777 S.E.2d 475) (2015). When considering
the motion to set aside, "the trial court must first
make a finding regarding whether the duty imposed by OCGA
§ 15-6-21 (c) was met." Pierce, 289 Ga. at
895 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
the trial court did not make any findings as to whether Moore
was given notice of the September 2017 order denying his
motion for an out-of-time appeal. Instead, the trial court
denied Moore's motion to set aside that order on the
ground that this Court had affirmed an order denying a
different motion - Moore's amended motion for an
out-of-time appeal. That was not a proper basis for denying
the motion to set aside. In fact, as noted above, this Court
explained in its opinion that if the trial court had not
provided proper notice of the September 2017 order, Moore
could move to have that order set aside. See Moore,
303 Ga. at 747 n.6. Accordingly, the trial court's order
denying Moore's motion to set aside is vacated, and the
case is remanded for the trial court to decide whether it
provided Moore with notice of the September 2017 order, as
required by OCGA § 15-6-21 (c), and to rule on
Moore's motion to set aside accordingly. See
Pierce, 289 Ga. at 895.
vacated and case remanded. All the Justices concur.
 The trial court was apparently
referring to this Court's May 21, 2018 decision
affirming the trial court's denial of Moore's
amended motion for out-of-time appeal.
 In Wright, this Court
clarified that "OCGA § 15-6-21 (c) only requires
that the trial court give notice to the losing party,"
and disapproved Cambron to the extent it held that
"notice must be sent and received."
Wright, 297 Ga. at ...