United States District Court, S.D. Georgia, Savannah Division
ORDER AND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
CHRISTOPHER L. RAY UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Rickey R. Harris has filed a complaint in this Court for
violations of 11 U.S.C. § 548 and the Due Process
Clause. Doc. 1 at 3. Although his complaint is difficult to
follow, it appears that he resided in a home owned by a
trust, but that Dietech Financial removed that trust from
ownership and transferred the property to defendant Federal
National Mortgage Association. Id. Defendant then
filed an eviction proceeding in the State Court of Georgia to
remove plaintiff. Id. Plaintiff alleges that this
eviction occurred “without due process.”
Id. The Court now screens the Complaint pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2),  which requires the immediate
dismissal of any pro se complaint that fails to
state at least one actionable claim.
Court lacks jurisdiction to hear plaintiff's complaint.
First, Plaintiff has brought a claim under 11 U.S.C. §
548. That provision allows bankruptcy trustees, subject to
certain provisions, to “avoid any transfer . . . of an
interest of the debtor in property, or any obligation . . .
incurred by the debtor, that was made . . . within 2 years
before the date of the filing of the petition.”
Id. However, plaintiff has not alleged either that
he is a trustee or-indeed-that he is in bankruptcy.
Accordingly, 11 U.S.C. § 548 is not the proper vehicle
for this complaint and cannot act to confer federal
addition to his bankruptcy claim, plaintiff has also sued
under the Due Process Clause. Doc. 1 at 3. Plaintiff has sued
the Federal National Mortgage Association (“Fannie
Mae”). Id. at 1. In order to be subject to a
due process claim, however, defendant must be a state actor
and Fannie Mae is not. See Matveychuk v. One West Bank,
FSB, 2016 WL 4059681, *3 (N.D.Ga. Jan. 28, 2016)
(“[E]very court to directly address the question of
Fannie Mae's status ‘consistently found that Fannie
Mae is not a government actor for purposes of a
constitutional claim.'”); see also Williams v.
Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Assoc., 2013 WL 5361211 at *2 n.3
(N.D.Ga. Sept. 25, 2013); Mik v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg.
Corp., 743 F.3d 149, 168 (6th Cir. 2014); Herron v.
Fannie Mae, 857 F.Supp.2d 87, 95-96 (D.D.C. 2012)
(“[b]ecause conservatorship is by nature temporary, the
government has not acceded to permanent control over [Fannie
Mae.]”). Because defendant is not a state actor,
plaintiff cannot sue it under the Due Process Clause.
course, even if plaintiff could pursue claims under 11 U.S.C.
§ 548 or the Due Process Clause, the Court would lack
jurisdiction over plaintiff's claims. Plaintiff is
seeking a writ of injunction against Fannie Mae, a writ of
possession of the disputed property, and $10, 000, 000.00 in
damages. Doc. 1 at 5. In effect, plaintiff asks this Court to
unwind an already concluded state eviction proceeding. Doc. 1
at 4 (“State Court of Georgia granted eviction without
due process”). However, “[t]he Rooker-Feldman
doctrine places limits on the subject matter jurisdiction of
federal district courts and courts of appeal over certain
matters related to previous state court litigation.”
Goodman ex rel. Goodman v. Sipos, 259 F.3d 1327,
1332 (11th Cir. 2001). Under this well-established doctrine,
“federal district courts cannot review state court
final judgments because that task is reserved for state
appellate courts or, as a last resort, the United States
Supreme Court.” Casale v. Tillman, 558 F.3d
1258, 1260 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing District of Columbia
Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983)).
By challenging his eviction, plaintiff is asking this Court
to overturn a final judgment of a state court of competent
jurisdiction. This the Court cannot do. Plaintiff's
claims-along with his Motion for Preliminary Injunction, doc.
2-should be DISMISSED for lack of
jurisdiction. His motions for a conference, doc. 5, and
an extension of time, doc. 7, are further
DENIED as moot.
Report and Recommendation (R&R) is submitted to the
district judge assigned to this action, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(B) and this Court's Local Rule 72.3.
Within 14 days of service, any party may file written
objections to this R&R with the Court and serve a copy on
all parties. The document should be captioned
“Objections to Magistrate Judge's Report and
Recommendations.” Any request for additional time to
file objections should be filed with the Clerk for
consideration by the assigned district judge.
the objections period has ended, the Clerk shall submit this
R&R together with any objections to the assigned district
judge. The district judge will review the magistrate
judge's findings and recommendations pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that
failure to timely file objections will result in the waiver
of rights on appeal. 11th Cir. R. 3-1; see Symonett v.
V.A. Leasing Corp., 648 Fed.Appx. 787, 790 (11th Cir.
2016); Mitchell v. United States, 612 Fed.Appx. 542,
545 (11th Cir. 2015).
ORDERED AND REPORTED AND RECOMMENDED,
 District courts have the inherent
power to dismiss sua sponte frivolous lawsuits, even
those where the plaintiff pays the full filing fee. See
Cuyler v. Aurora Loan Services, LLC, 2012 WL 10488184 at
* 2 (11th Cir. 2012) (notwithstanding filing fee payment,
“a district court has the inherent authority to dismiss
a patently frivolous complaint”); Jefferson
Fourteenth Assocs. v. Wometco de Puerto Rico, Inc., 695
F.2d 524, 526 n.3 (11th Cir. 1983) (noting that courts may
sua sponte dismiss actions for lacking merit
“if the proper procedural steps are taken and if the
determination is correct on the merits”); Wilkerson
v. Georgia, 2014 WL 3644179 at * 1 (S.D. Ga. July 21,
2014) (dismissing pro se complaint on frivolity grounds even
though plaintiff paid full filing fee), rev'd on
other grounds by 618 Fed.Appx. 610 (11th Cir.
 Because the Court applies Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(b)(6) standards in screening a complaint pursuant to
§ 1915, Leal v. Ga. Dep't of Corr., 254
F.3d 1276, 1278-79 (11th Cir. 2001), allegations in the
Complaint are taken as true and construed in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff. Bumpus v. Watts, 448
Fed.Appx. 3, 4 n.1 (11th Cir. 2011). Conclusory allegations,
however, fail. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (discussing a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal).
 In theory, plaintiff might be
able to bring a claim for the method in which the
eviction was carried out without running afoul of
Rooker-Feldman. No such claim is brought here. Plaintiff
merely states that the eviction occurred without “due
process.” Doc. 1 at 4. While the court affords a
liberal construction to a pro se litigant's pleadings,
holding them to a more lenient standard than those drafted by
an attorney, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520
(1972); Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007),
the court will not ...