United States District Court, M.D. Georgia, Macon Division
ROBERT L. MERIWETHER, Plaintiff,
PA HOWARD, et al., Defendants.
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S
E. SELF, III, JUDGE.
the Court for consideration is Plaintiff's Reply [Doc.
35] to Defendant Jessica Battle's Objection [Doc. 30] and
Supplemental Objection [Doc. 32] to the United States
Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation
(“Recommendation”) [Doc. 29]. In his
Recommendation, the magistrate judge correctly recommended
that the Court deny Defendant Battle's Motion to Dismiss
[Doc. 25] because the three cases on which Defendant hedged
her motion were not a part of the record and it could not
“be said that those cases were dismissed either as
frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a claim.”
[Doc. 29 at p. 3]. Because Defendant Battle sought dismissal
of Plaintiff's action pursuant to the Prison Litigation
Reform Act's (“PLRA”) three-strikes rule, the
Court was obligated to “consult the prior order[s] that
dismissed the action[s] . . . and to identify the reasons
that the court gave for dismissing [them].” [Doc. 29 at
p. 2 (quoting Daker v. Comm'r, Ga. Dep't of
Corr., 820 F.3d 1278, 1284 (11th Cir. 2016) (emphasis
order to do so, the Court awaited Defendant Battle's
receipt of the three casesat issue from the National Archives in
order to determine the reason the prior court dismissed
Plaintiff's previous cases. See [Doc. 30 at pp.
3-4 (“Battle has ordered copies of the district
court's complete files for the three 2000 cases from the
National Archives. . . . Battle will supplement the record
immediately upon receipt of the archived materials.”)].
reviewing Defendant Battle's supplemented materials, the
Court issued its Order [Doc. 33] on the magistrate
judge's Recommendation. In that Order, the Court found
that the prior court dismissed the three 2000 Meriwether
cases based upon Meriwether's “fail[ure] to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted, one of the three
bases of dismissal at the PLRA's frivolity-review
stage” and granted Defendant Battle's dismissal
motion. [Doc. 33 at p. 3].
Plaintiff has filed his “Reply to Defendant['s]
Objection” in which he contends that because he
“sign[ed] [a] sworn affidavit on 12/8/2000, the claims
[in the 2000 Meriwether cases] [were] never processed.”
[Doc. 35 at p. 2]. Under 28 U.S.C. § 636, a party,
within 14 days “after being served with a copy”
of the magistrate judge's proposed findings and
recommendations, “may serve and file written objections
to such proposed findings and
recommendations.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C)
(emphasis added). Accordingly, Plaintiff is only permitted to
file objections to the magistrate judge's Recommendation,
not a reply to Defendant Battle's Objection. As such, the
Court construes Plaintiff's filing as his own Objection
and, in the alternative, Motion for Reconsideration to the
Court's previously entered Order closing his case. [Doc.
33 at pp. 3-4].
to local rules, “[m]otions for reconsideration shall
not be filed as a matter of routine practice.” L.R.
7.6, M.D. Ga. Accordingly, such motions are appropriate
only if Plaintiff demonstrates that “(1) there has been
an intervening change in the law, (2) new evidence has been
discovered that was not previously available to the parties
at the time the original order was entered, or (3)
reconsideration is necessary to correct a clear error of law
or prevent manifest injustice.” Bryant v.
Walker, No. 5:10-CV-84, 2010 WL 2687590, at *1 (M.D. Ga.
July 1, 2010) (quoting Wallace v. Ga. Dep't of
Transp., No. 7:04-cv-78, 2006 WL 1582409, at *2 (M.D.
Ga. June 6, 2006)). A motion for reconsideration may not be
used to relitigate old matters or reargue settled issues.
See id.; Smith v. Ocwen Fin., 488 Fed.Appx.
426, 428 (11th Cir. 2012).
magistrate judge issued his Recommendation on February 12,
2019, and Plaintiff filed his reconsideration motion on March
29, 2019, well outside the 14-day objection period under 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). Notwithstanding its untimeliness,
the arguments in Plaintiff's filing-even after a
subsequent “de novo determination of those portions of
the [Recommendation] . . . to which” he made objection,
or in the alternative, sought reconsideration-fails to cause
the Court to reconsider its previous ruling. 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1)(C). The prior court's reason for dismissal of
the three 2000 Meriwether cases is clear. See [Docs.
32-1 at p. 6, 32-2 at p. 6, 32-3 at p. 6 (“Because
Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted, the instant actions (Meriwether v.
Rasnick, No. 1:00-CV-2952; Meriwether v.
Baldwin, No. 1:00-CV-2953; and Meriwether v.
Hayes, No. 1:00-CV-2954) are hereby
DISMISSED, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
Objection, Plaintiff argues that “U.S. District Court
Judge Clarence Cooper only authorized [in forma pauperis] for
the purpose of sworn ‘affidavit' to be accepted,
not the 42 U.S.C. [§] 1983 complaints . . .” and
that he “should be allowed to proceed on in forma
pauperis [in this case] because Plaintiff have [sic] no
strikes under 1915(g).” [Doc. 35 at p. 2]. However, the
prior court's orders state that “IT IS
FURTHER ORDERED that these three complaints be filed
in forma pauperis for the purpose of dismissal only.”
[Docs. 32-1 at p. 6, 32-2 at p. 6, 32-3 at p. 6 (emphasis
on the orders filed in the three 2000 Meriwether cases, the
prior court's rulings unequivocally constituted strikes
under the PLRA, and as such, the Court's previous Order
does not work manifest injustice. Finally, Plaintiff's
motion attempts to reargue this previously settled issue and
is therefore not appropriately before the Court. Accordingly,
the Court DENIES Plaintiff's Motion for
Reconsideration [Doc. 35] and the Court's previous Order
[Doc. 33] stands as filed.
 Meriwether v. Rasnick, No.
1:00-CV-2952 (N.D.Ga. Dec. 8, 2000); Meriwether v.
Baldwin, No. 1:00-CV-2953 (N.D.Ga. Dec. 8, 2000); and
Meriwether v. Hayes, No. 1:00-CV-2954. Collectively
referred to as the “2000 Meriwether
 This Court's local rules also
state that “[t]he following motions may be considered
by the Court immediately after filing: motions for extension
of time, motions to exceed the page limitation, motions for
hearings, motions to file surreply briefs, motions which
clearly have no basis in law, and such other motions as the
Court may otherwise determine from the parties to be
unopposed or in which the Court may clearly determine from
the record before it the relative legal positions of the