United States District Court, M.D. Georgia, Valdosta Division
ORDER AND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
STEPHEN HYLES UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
before the Court is Petitioner's original and amended
applications for habeas corpus relief (ECF Nos. 1, 10, 16,
20), his motion for recusal of the undersigned (ECF No. 42),
and his various other motions (ECF Nos. 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14,
15, 24, 25, 33, 35). For the reasons explained below,
Petitioner's motion for recusal is denied and it is
recommended that his applications for habeas relief be
denied, and his remaining motions be denied as moot.
is a native and citizen of India. Resp'ts' Resp. to
Pets. 1, ECF No. 19. He entered the United States on
September 9, 2016, with temporary “B-1 status”
which, after an extension, was to expire on September 8,
2017. Id. In January 2016, U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services (“USCIS”) revoked an H-1B
visa application filed by an employer on Petitioner's
behalf, because the employer had filed a withdraw request
citing Petitioner's choice to not work for them.
Id. at 1-2. USCIS also denied an I-140
“immigrant petition for alien worker” filed by
Petitioner, along with Petitioner's appeal of that
initial denial. Id. at 2.
was transferred to U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement's (“ICE's”) custody on August
26, 2018, following his arrest for false imprisonment.
Resp'ts' Resp. to Pets. 2. Administrative removal
proceedings were initiated against Petitioner that day.
Id. On August 28, 2018, Petitioner was notified that
he would remain in ICE custody “pending final
administrative determination of [his] case.”
Id. The record indicates that Petitioner's
administrative proceedings are ongoing. See
Resp'ts' Resp. to Mot. to Strike 2, ECF No. 37
(notifying the Court that Petitioner's next hearing had
been “rescheduled for January 31, 2019”).
Petitioner initiated this habeas action on September 13, 2018
(ECF No. 1).
Motion for Recusal
February 14, 2019, Petitioner moved for the undersigned to be
disqualified or recused from the case alleging, among other
things, that the undersigned is “extremely corrupt,
vicious[, ] and inhuman[.]” Mot. for Recusal 1, ECF No.
42. He states that he is aware such motions “are filed
under two primary statutory provisions” but, due to
inadequate legal resources, he cannot “recollect, what
 the exact title and USC numbers for those
provisions” are. Id. at n.1. Because
Petitioner has not shown recusal is required, his motion is
Standard Governing Recusal
U.S.C. § 455 provides the standard for when a judge,
justice, or magistrate judge must disqualify himself from a
particular proceeding. The statute generally provides that a
magistrate judge “shall disqualify himself in any
proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be
questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). The statute also
enumerates certain other circumstances requiring a judge to
disqualify himself. Id. at § 455(b)(1)-(5).
standard under subsection (a) is objective and requires the
Court to ask “whether an objective, disinterested lay
observer fully informed of the facts underlying the grounds
on which recusal was sought would entertain significant doubt
about the judge's impartiality.” United States
v. Patti, 337 F.3d 1317, 1321 (11th Cir. 2003) (internal
quotation marks omitted). In the Eleventh Circuit, “it
is well settled that the allegation of bias must show that
the bias is personal as distinguished from judicial in
nature.” Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1239
(11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). As a result, “a judge's rulings
in the same or a related case are not a sufficient basis for
recusal, ” except in rare circumstances where the
previous proceedings demonstrate pervasive bias and
prejudice. Id.; see also Liteky v. United
States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994) (“[J]udicial
rulings alone almost never constitute [a] valid basis for a
bias or partiality recusal motion.”); McWhorter v.
City of Birmingham, 906 F.2d 674, 678 (11th Cir. 1990)
(“[The bias] must derive from something other than that
which the judge learned by participating in the
U.S.C. § 455(b)(1) requires disqualification where the
judge “has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a
party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts
concerning the proceeding[.]” “Recusal under this
subsection is mandatory, because ‘the potential for
conflicts of interest are readily apparent.'”
Patti, 337 F.3d at 1321 (quoting Murray v.
Scott, 253 F.3d 1308, 1312 (11th Cir. 2001)). Any
knowledge gained through the course of a judicial proceeding
is not a “disputed evidentiary fact” that
requires recusal. United States v. Bailey, 175 F.3d
966, 969 (11th Cir. 1999). Instead, knowledge of disputed
evidentiary facts must be gained through an extrajudicial
source to warrant recusal.
U.S.C. § 144 also governs recusal, but it requires the
moving party to file an affidavit stating that the judge has
a personal bias or prejudice against the plaintiff or
defendant, and the affidavit must provide facts and reasons
for the belief that bias or prejudice exists. The
statute's affidavit requirement is strictly enforced.
See, e.g., United States v. Perkins, 787 F.3d 1329,
1343 (11th Cir. 2015) (finding that the court did not abuse
its discretion by denying litigant's pro se motion for
recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 144 because the affidavit did
not meet the statute's procedural requirements). The
party seeking recusal under § 144 “must allege
facts that would convince a reasonable person that bias
actually exists.” Stringer v. Doe, 503
Fed.Appx. 888, 890 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Christo v.
Padgett, 223 F.3d 1324, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000)).