United States District Court, M.D. Georgia, Macon Division
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO
FILE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE A
MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT
E. SELF, III, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT.
Mia Hollingsworth, seeks reconsideration of the Court's
Order [Doc. 30] granting summary judgment to LM Insurance
Corporation (“LM”), or in the form of alternative
relief, she seeks an alteration or amendment to the
Court's Entry of Judgment [Doc. 31]. After consideration
of her arguments, the Court DENIES
Plaintiff's requested relief for the following reasons.
Standard of Review
to local rules, “[m]otions for reconsideration shall
not be filed as a matter of routine practice.” LR 7.6,
MDGa. Accordingly, such motions are appropriate only if
Plaintiff demonstrates that “(1) there has been an
intervening change in the law, (2) new evidence has been
discovered that was not previously available to the parties
at the time the original order was entered, or (3)
reconsideration is necessary to correct a clear error of law
or prevent manifest injustice.” Bryant v.
Walker, No. 5:10-CV-84, 2010 WL 2687590, at *1 (M.D. Ga.
July 1, 2010) (quoting Wallace v. Ga. Dep't of
Transp., No. 7:04-cv-78, 2006 WL 1582409, at *2 (M.D.
Ga. June 6, 2006)). A motion for reconsideration may not be
used to relitigate old matters or reargue settled issues.
See id.; Smith v. Ocwen Fin., 488 Fed.Appx.
426, 428 (11th Cir. 2012).
Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration or in the
Alternative a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment [Doc.
motion, Plaintiff states that she “seeks the
opportunity to bring to the attention of the Court evidence
that does in fact show the cost of new construction and [to]
properly lay the foundation for the Court why the evidence is
admissible.” [Doc. 32-1 at p. 1]. As to the estimates
for new construction costs from the Home Builders Association
of Middle Georgia, Plaintiff says that while she did obtain
those estimates as hearsay, “there is other evidence
[(five listings for new construction)] showing the cost of
new construction that was proffered to the Court in an
admissible form of evidence.” [Id. at p. 2].
This argument simply misses the mark.
argues, “[t]he asking prices of new construction in
turn can be used to calculate that the cost per square foot
of new construction in the area was in fact between
$100.00-$112.00 per square foot.” [Id.]. While
these calculations are concordant with the inadmissible
figures provided by the unnamed secretary from the Middle
Georgia Homebuilders Association, they do not produce the
value Plaintiff needed to overcome LM's summary judgment
motion. In her argument urging the Court to reconsider its
Order, Plaintiff clearly admits that not only were the
“five listings for new construction” just
“asking prices, ” they presumably
included both the price for the land on which the five houses
sit as well as improvements to the land itself.
[Id.]. Because Plaintiff already owns the real
property at 988 High Street, these estimates are not relevant
and she definitively cannot show the costs of new
construction stripped to construction materials and labor.
[Doc. 30 at pp. 17-18]. Each house's “asking
price” divided by its respective square footage does
not show the cost of new construction for the simple fact
that land is included in those prices. See, e.g.,
[Doc. 32-1 at p. 2].
Plaintiff contends that the “five listings for new
construction, ” despite being found on the internet,
are admissible because they are compilations of market
information exempted from the rule against hearsay under
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(17). [Id. at p. 3].
Plaintiff provides absolutely no legal support for this
contention in the instant motion and failed to even make such
an argument in her Response [Doc. 26] to LM's summary
judgment motion. Once the movant, LM in this case, satisfied
its burden on summary judgment, the burden shifted to the
non-movant, Plaintiff, to present admissible evidence that
would create the genuine issue of material fact needed to
carry the case to a jury. [Doc. 30 at p. 9 quoting Porter
v. Ray, 461 F.3d 1315, 1320 (11th Cir. 2006)]. Plaintiff
failed to present this evidence. It was not until
after the Court discussed Rule 803(17) in its Order
in light of LM's admissibility argument against the
reports from Realtor.com and Zillow.com that Plaintiff made
her argument regarding market compilations. [Doc. 32-1 at p.
3]; see also [Doc. 27 at p. 3 citing In re
Cochreham, No. 13-26465-A-13J, 2013 WL 4510694 at *3
(Bankr. E.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2013)]. As such, the Court will
not entertain such argument at this late stage in the
proceedings. Wilchombe v. TeeVee Toons, Inc., 555
F.3d 949, 957 (11th Cir. 2009) (internal citations and
quotations omitted) (“A motion for reconsideration
cannot be used to relitigate old matters, raise argument or
present evidence that could have been raised prior to the
entry of judgment. This prohibition includes new arguments
that were previously available, but not pressed.”).
Even if the Court did consider her five
“asking-price” estimates, they are not the
correct values Plaintiff needed in order to show that the
cost of new construction (replacement costs) exceeds the cost
to repair. Thus, summary judgment in favor of LM was
light of the foregoing, the Court DENIES
Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Motion for
Reconsideration or in the Alternative a Motion to Alter or
Amend Judgment [Doc. 32]. The Court's previous Order
stands and the Clerk's Entry of Judgment shall remain