MILLER, P. J., BROWN and GOSS, JJ.
MILLER, PRESIDING JUDGE.
County jury convicted Allen Jerry Love of one count of rape
(OCGA § 16-6-1), two counts of incest (OCGA §
16-6-22), one count of aggravated child molestation (OCGA
§ 16-6-4 (c)), two counts of child molestation (OCGA
§ 16-6-4 (a)), one count of statutory rape (OCGA §
16-6-3), three counts of sodomy (OCGA § 16-6-2 (a) (1)),
and one count of sexual battery against a child under 16
(OCGA § 16-6-22.1 (d)). The Superior Court of White
County denied Love's motion for new trial as amended, and
he appeals. Love raises a host of arguments, including
sufficiency of the evidence as to Counts 10 and 11 of the
indictment, ineffective assistance of trial counsel, the
denial of his motion to sever, and the failure to strike
certain testimony by an expert witness. We find no error and
argues that the State failed to prove him guilty of Counts 10
(child molestation) and 11 (sexual battery against a child
under 16) against victim M. M. beyond a reasonable
First, Love summarily contends that the evidence was
insufficient to convict him of Count 10 (child molestation).
The gravamen of Love's argument is that "M. M.
refused to accuse Mr. Love at trial" and that it was
therefore unclear "as to what exactly Mr. Love was
alleged to have done to her . . . ." We are not
[o]n appeal from a criminal conviction, the evidence must be
viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, and the
appellant no longer enjoys the presumption of innocence;
moreover, an appellate court does not weigh the evidence or
determine witness credibility but only determines whether the
evidence is sufficient under the standard of Jackson v.
Virginia, [443 U.S. 307 (99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560)
(1979)]. As long as there is some competent evidence, even
though contradicted, to support each fact necessary to make
out the State's case, the jury's verdict will be
omitted.) Watkins v. State, 336 Ga.App. 145, 146 (1)
(784 S.E.2d 11) (2016). Relevant to this case, child
molestation occurs when a person "[d]oes any immoral or
indecent act to or in the presence of or with any child under
the age of 16 years with the intent to arouse or satisfy the
sexual desires of either the child or the person." OCGA
§ 16-6-4 (a) (1).
viewed, evidence adduced at trial revealed that M. M.
formerly lived with Love, her mother, and her sister (B. W.).
Although M. M. testified that she did not remember telling
her mother that Love "used to squish [her] like a bug
and shake [her] like a milk shake," she admitted that
Love touched her in a way that she did not like and that she
and Love had "a secret." She declined to elaborate
or testify further, saying that she "just [did not] feel
comfortable talking to other people about it."
M.'s mother testified that M. M. told her she had a
secret with Love and that they played a "game." The
game involved Love removing his clothing, getting behind M.
M., and "squash[ing] her like a bug and sh[aking] her
like a milkshake." M. M. said that, on these occasions,
she would be on her hands and knees. M. M.'s mother then
got on her hands and knees and asked M. M. to demonstrate
what Love did; M. M. "got behind [her] as in like the
doggie style position and started to dry hump [her]. . .
." M. M. also said that Love did not wear clothes during
these episodes and "describe[d] in detail what [Love]
looked like naked," stating where he had hair and that
"sometimes his thing sticks up and sometimes it
investigator with the White County Sheriff's Office
videotaped a forensic interview of M. M. in 2010,
the State introduced a copy of the interview into evidence
and played the videotape for the jury. During the interview,
M. M. described getting touches she did not like, including
getting touched on her "private" and when someone
laid on top of her, although she did not elaborate. Later in
the interview, M. M. described Love "squishing [her]
like a bug" and "shaking [her] like a milk
shake." She further described the activity as Love lying
on her and bouncing up and down. Using dolls, M. M.
demonstrated herself lying face down with Love lying on top
of her and bouncing up and down.
investigator also interviewed M. M.'s sister, B. W.
During the interview, B. W. stated that one evening, when M.
M. complained to B. W. about a rash she had, M. M. told B. W.
that she and "Allen have a secret" and that he
"smushes her like a bug and shakes her like a milk
shake." B. W. told her mother about M. M.'s
statement,  and when B. W. and her mother asked M. M.
what she meant, M. M. replied that "Allen gets on top of
me and just shakes me." The State also introduced other
acts evidence against Love involving an act of child
molestation against a seven-year-old victim in 2006 or 2007.
together, we conclude that this evidence was sufficient to
convict Love of child molestation against M. M. beyond a
reasonable doubt. See Kirkland v. State, 334 Ga.App.
26, 33 (3) (778 S.E.2d 42) (2015) (sufficient evidence to
convict defendant of aggravated child molestation where
victim was non-responsive at trial, but jury could consider
victim's prior statements to mother, great-grandmother,
and forensic interviewer, as well as similar transaction
evidence); Maurer v. State, 320 Ga.App. 585, 588 (1)
(740 S.E.2d 318) (2013) (sufficient evidence to convict
defendant of child molestation where victim refused to
testify and relatives, to whom victim reported the
molestation, were reluctant, but forensic interview that
included victim's outcry admitted into evidence);
Westbrooks v. State, 309 Ga.App. 398, 400- 401 (1)
(710 S.E.2d 594) (2011) (sufficient evidence to convict
defendant of child molestation where victim did not provide
details of molestation, but uncle and forensic interviewer
testified to victim's outcry).
Second, Love asserts that there was insufficient evidence to
convict him of Count 11 (sexual battery against a child under
16). However, the trial court merged Count 11 with Count 10
for sentencing purposes. Accordingly, "[w]e need not
consider an enumeration of error which addresses the
sufficiency of the evidence to convict on a count on which
the trial court failed to enter judgment." (Citation
omitted.) Kollie v. State, 301 Ga.App. 534, 540 (3)
(687 S.E.2d 869) (2009).
next argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion
to sever his trial by individual victim. According to Love,
"nothing unified the allegations against the three . . .
victims other than they involved similar conduct." Love
contends that he therefore had an absolute right to have the
offenses severed. We disagree.
to trial, Love moved to sever the charges based upon the
three individual victims, arguing that the victims were
unrelated save for the nature of the allegations against Love
and because of the "great time differential"
between the victims. Of note, the State responded that it had
filed notice of its intent to introduce evidence of other
acts; as a result, even if Love's trial was severed based
upon the separate victims, the State would still be permitted
to introduce evidence of alleged conduct against the
remaining victims. The trial court agreed, noting that the
allegations against Love reveal "kind of a common course
of conduct" or "a common plan." As a result, the
trial court denied Love's motion to sever.
Under Georgia law,
[i]f [multiple] offenses are not joined solely because they
are of the same or similar character, and evidence of one
charged offense would be admissible as a similar transaction
during trial on another charged offense, the trial court is
vested with discretion in deciding whether to grant a motion
to sever. In making this decision, the court must consider
the number of offenses charged, the complexity of the
charges, and the complexity of the evidence and determine
whether the jury will be able to fairly and intelligently
parse the evidence and apply the law with regard to each
and punctuation omitted.) Machiavello v. State, 308
Ga.App. 772, 773 (2) (709 S.E.2d 28) (2011). "Where in
the sound discretion of the trial court, the number of
offenses charged and the complexity of the evidence do not
reasonably impinge upon a fair determination of the
defendant's guilt or innocence as to each offense
charged, a severance need not be granted." Id.
at 774 (2) (citing Chaparro v. State, 279 Ga.App.
145, 147 (3) (630 S.E.2d 645) (2006)). "We review a
trial court's denial of a motion to sever the trial of
separate charges for an abuse of discretion." (Citation
omitted.) Smith v. State, 249 Ga.App. 39, 40 (1)
(547 S.E.2d 598) (2001). Of particular relevance, "the
trial court does not abuse its ...