MILLER, P. J., BROWN and GOSS, JJ.
she was injured in an automobile collision while in the scope
of her employment, Carla DuBose filed for workers'
compensation benefits. After her employer's workers'
compensation insurer became insolvent, the Georgia Insurers
Insolvency Pool (the "Pool") took over her claim.
The Pool then filed the instant declaratory judgment action
asking the trial court to declare that the exhaustion
provision of the Georgia Insurer's Insolvency Pool Act
(the "Pool Act"), OCGA § 33-36-14, required
that any proceeds that DuBose received from other solvent
insurance carriers (including settlements from the automobile
liability insurance for the other driver and her own
uninsured/underinsured policies, as well as benefits received
under her disability policy) should reduce her claim against
the Pool by the full amounts received. The trial court denied
the Pool's motion for summary judgment, holding that OCGA
§ 33-36-14 (a) limited "the offset to money
recovered for lost wages and medical expenses -
'claims' that could be made under the workers'
comp[ensation] statute[.]" The trial court further held
that an issue of fact existed as to the purpose of the
insurance proceeds DuBose had already received. We granted
the parties' cross-motions for interlocutory appeal.
No. A18A1531, the Pool appeals from the trial court's
order, arguing that the Pool is entitled to offset
any money recovered by DuBose under policies of
solvent insurers. The Pool argues, alternatively, that the
trial court erred in concluding that a fact issue precluded
summary judgment. In Case No. A18A1532, DuBose filed a
cross-appeal, contending that the trial court erred to the
extent that the Pool is entitled to any offset from
proceeds she received from other insurers. Because we
conclude that the language of the Pool Act's exhaustion
provision at OCGA § 33-36-14 (a) does not require
solvent and insolvent carriers provide identical coverage, we
reverse the trial court's denial of the Pool's motion
for summary judgment in part, vacate it in part and remand
the case for further proceedings consistent with this
Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine
issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. In reviewing the grant or denial of a
motion for summary judgment, we apply a de novo standard of
review, and we view the evidence, and all reasonable
conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most
favorable to the nonmovant.
(Footnote omitted.) Grizzle v. Norsworthy, 292
Ga.App. 303, 303-304 (664 S.E.2d 296) (2008).
relevant facts are not in dispute. This case arose from a
motor vehicle collision on June 20, 2014, between Carla
DuBose and Kimberly Dyar. DuBose was injured when her vehicle
was struck by a vehicle driven by Dyar.
time of the collision, DuBose was employed by Compassionate
Care Hospice ("Compassionate") and she was working
within the course and scope of her employment. DuBose then
filed a claim with the State Board of Workers'
Compensation. Compassionate had a workers' compensation
policy issued by Lumberman's Underwriting Alliance
("Lumberman's"). On May 23, 2016,
Lumberman's was placed into liquidation, with all of its
Georgia claims transferred to the Pool by the liquidator, and
the Pool undertook responsibility for the administration of
Lumberman's claims. These claims included DuBose's
workers' compensation claim.
also filed a claim against Dyar, the driver responsible for
the collision. Dyar was insured by Geico Insurance Company
("Geico"). On December 17, 2014, DuBose settled
with Geico for the automobile liability insurance policy
limits of $250, 000.
time of the collision, DuBose had additional insurance under
two uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage policies and two
personal disability policies issued by State Farm Insurance
Company ("State Farm"). DuBose settled with State
Farm for $200, 000 under the uninsured/underinsured motorist
carrier policies. State Farm denied her coverage as to one of
the disability policies; however, she is receiving $540 per
month for up to 58 months under the other personal disability
A18A1531, the Pool argues that the trial court erred by
limiting the offset rights of the Pool under OCGA §
33-36-14 to amounts received by DuBose specific to lost wages
and medical expenses. The Pool claims that its obligations do
not arise unless and until the amounts owed under the
workers' compensation claim exceed the amount paid out by
all other solvent insurers, regardless of what
coverage was provided by the solvent policies. Because we
conclude that OCGA § 33-36-14 (a) does not require the
policies of the solvent and insolvent carriers to provide
identical coverage and the Pool is entitled to offset the
amounts recovered from the Geico automobile liability policy
and the State Farm uninsured/underinsured motorist policies,
we reverse the trial court's denial of the Pool's
motion for summary judgment in part.
outset, we note that the interpretation of a statute is a
question of law, which this Court "review[s] de novo on
appeal." (Punctuation omitted.) Brantley Land &
Timber, LLC v. W&D Investments, Inc., 316 Ga.App.
277, 279 (729 S.E.2d 458) (2012). When interpreting any
statute, we begin our analysis with "familiar and
binding canons of construction." Holcomb v.
Long, 329 Ga.App. 515, 517 (1) (765 S.E.2d 687) (2014).
In considering the meaning of a statute, our charge as an
appellate court is to "presume that the General Assembly
meant what it said and said what it meant." (Punctuation
and footnote omitted.) Id. Accordingly,
we must afford the statutory text its plain and ordinary
meaning, consider the text contextually, read the text in its
most natural and reasonable way, as an ordinary speaker in
the English language would, and seek to avoid a construction
that makes some language mere surplusage.
(Punctuation and footnotes omitted.) Harris v.
Mahone, 340 Ga.App. 415, 417-418 (1) (797 S.E.2d 688)
(2017). Accord Oxendine v. Comm'r of Ins. of N.
C., 229 Ga.App. 604, ...