United States District Court, M.D. Georgia, Macon Division
T. TREADWELL, JUDGE.
Middle District of Georgia Judges Ashley Royal and Tilman
Self, Houston County Superior Court Judge Edward
Lukemire, Houston County Magistrate Judge Angela Sammons,
Vendor Resource Management (VRM), Steven Flynn, and Greg
Krivo have moved to dismiss the claims against them brought
by Plaintiff Rodney McColligan. Docs. 8; 9; 11; 35. The
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, responded to the motions. Docs.
21; 22; 23; 38. For the following reasons, the
Defendants' motions (Docs. 8; 9; 11; 35) are
factual allegations outlined in the Plaintiff's complaint
are difficult to follow. It appears that this case arises
from the Plaintiff being “wrongfully evicted from
proprietary property” due to “a foreclosure
Judgment dated April 4[, ] 2017 without just cause and
without due process; and then enforcing an evict of Plaintiff
from his property . . . on APRIL 16, 2018 unlawfully.”
Doc. 1 ¶¶ 13, 43. The Plaintiff attached to his
complaint multiple court documents from prior cases regarding
his eviction, as well as what appears to be the
Plaintiff's interpretation and history of various
statutes and case law. See generally Docs. 1-2; 1-3;
1-4; 1-5; 1-6; 1-7; 1-8; 1-9; 1-10; 1-11; 1-12; 1-13; 1-14;
1-15; 1-16; 1-17; 1-18; 1-19; 1-20; 1-21; 1-22; 1-23; 1-24;
1-25; 1-26; 1-27; 1-28; 1-29; 1-30; 1-31; 1-32.
Plaintiff claims that he owned the real property at 111
Glendale Court, Warner Robins, Georgia. Doc. 1 at 10. On
August 20, 2007, the Plaintiff signed a promissory note and
security deed to obtain a mortgage from Market Street
Corporation, giving Market Street the power to foreclose on
the Plaintiff's Property upon the Plaintiff's
default. Doc. 1-19. On September 5, Market Street assigned
the security deed to the Georgia Housing and Finance
Authority (GHFA). Id. On April 4, 2017, the GHFA
foreclosed on the Property and was the successful bidder.
Doc. 1-18. GHFA subsequently conveyed the Property to VRM.
Doc. 1-19. On May 20, VRM mailed a written demand to the
Plaintiff for possession of the Property. Doc. 1-20.
8, VRM initiated dispossessory proceedings against the
Plaintiff in Houston County Magistrate Court, and the
Plaintiff filed an answer a week later. Doc. 1-15 at 2. After
a contested hearing, Judge Sammons entered judgment, ruling
that VRM was entitled to a writ of possession for the
Property and ordering removal of the Plaintiff from the
Property. Doc. 1-21. A final order by the Houston County
Superior Court was entered. Id. The Plaintiff
appealed the judgment in Houston County Superior Court. Doc.
1-25. VRM then filed a motion for summary judgment, which
Judge Lukemire granted. Docs. 1-5; 1-16.
Plaintiff subsequently filed two lawsuits regarding his
eviction. The first lawsuit-brought in Houston County
Superior Court and later removed to this Court- alleged fraud
and misrepresentation during his eviction and foreclosure
proceedings by State Home Mortgage (SHM) and GHFA. Doc. 1-3.
The lawsuit was assigned to Judge Royal, who ultimately
granted SHM and GHFA's motion to dismiss. Id.
SHM and GHFA were represented by Flynn and Jimmy Thomas
Howell, Jr. of McCalla Raymer Leibert Pierce,
Id. The Plaintiff did not appeal. Rather, he filed a
second complaint in this Court against VRM, represented by
Krivo, and “DOES 1 THROUGH 94, INCLUSIVE”
(“Unknown Investors and Agents” of VRM) alleging
deprivation of his civil rights during the foreclosure
process under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Doc. 1-2. Judge Self was
assigned the case. Id. Judge Self denied the
Plaintiff's motion to preliminarily enjoin VRM from
evicting him from the Property, denied his motion for a
temporary restraining order, and denied his motion to cease
and desist. Id. The Plaintiff appealed Judge
Self's denial of his motions. McColligan v. Vendor
Res. Mgmt., No. 5:18-cv-111, Doc. 13. That case remains
Plaintiff now brings his third complaint regarding these
facts and allegations against VRM, Howell, Flynn, Judge
Royal, Judge Self, Krivo, Judge Lukemire, Judge Sammons, and
“DOES 1 THROUGH 100, INCLUSIVE” (“Unknown
Investors and Agents” of VRM). Doc. 1 at 2. The
Plaintiff attempts to allege constitutional violations under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, civil conspiracy to interfere with his
civil rights, copyright violations under 18 U.S.C. §
1342, and conspiracy to deny him equal protection under 42
U.S.C. § 1985. Id. at 2-16.
Plaintiff requests compensatory damages “of $10, 000
per day for every day that [the Plaintiff] is without control
of his property due to evition [sic], from each Defendant,
for each cause of action; This shall be payable to the
Plaintiff in Constitutional Lawful Money redeemable in gold
or silver coin as set fouth [sic] in Article 1 Sec. 10 of the
constitution.” Id. at 15. The Plaintiff also
requests $8, 000, 000 in damages for the Defendants'
unauthorized use of his copyright via United States mail.
Id. at 14. The Plaintiff additionally requests
punitive damages, “cost of this suit, ” a jury
trial, and “[a] declaratory judgment that the practices
of the Defendants violated the substantive and procedural due
process.” Id. at 15-17. Finally, the Plaintiff
requests “[a]n Order from the court explaining wherein
the complaint is deficient and how to correct it” and
“Orders and Judgment or the like or similar ruling . .
. to be supported by Findings of Fact and Conclutions [sic]
of Law in pursuance of the Federal Constitution, not mere
unsupported opinions and judgments without explaining the
constitutional basis of the ruling(s)” and leave to
amend the complaint “once discovery is completed, and
Defendants have raised the usual Fed. R. Civ. [P.] 12(b)(6)
objections and avalanche of procedural gimmicks.”
Id. at 15-16.
MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require a pleading to
contain a “short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). To avoid dismissal pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter to “‘state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.'”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). “At the motion to dismiss stage, all
well-pleaded facts are accepted as true, and the reasonable
inferences therefrom are construed in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff.” Garfield v. NDC Health
Corp., 466 F.3d 1255, 1261 (11th Cir. 2006) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). However, “where
the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more
than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has
alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]'- ‘that the
pleader is entitled to relief.'” Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)).
“[C]onclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of
facts or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not
prevent dismissal.” Oxford Asset Mgmt., Ltd. v.
Jaharis, 297 F.3d 1182, 1188 (11th Cir. 2002). Although
a pro se complaint, “however inartfully pleaded,
” will “be held to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, ” Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976), the complaint must
“give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim
is and the grounds upon which it rests.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). Where there are dispositive issues of
law, a court may dismiss a claim regardless of the alleged
facts. Marshall Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Marshall Cty. Gas
Dist., 992 F.2d 1171, 1174 (11th Cir. 1993).
are “entitled to absolute judicial immunity from
damages for those acts taken while they are acting in their
judicial capacity unless they acted in the clear absence of
all jurisdiction.” Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d
1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). “[A] court must construe
jurisdiction broadly in favor of the defendant judge.”
Otworth v. The Fla. Bar, 71 F.Supp.2d 1209, 1218
(M.D. Fla. 1999) (citing Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S.
349, 356 ...