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McColligan v. Vendor Resource Management

United States District Court, M.D. Georgia, Macon Division

March 5, 2019




         Defendants Middle District of Georgia Judges Ashley Royal and Tilman Self, [1]Houston County Superior Court Judge Edward Lukemire, Houston County Magistrate Judge Angela Sammons, Vendor Resource Management (VRM), Steven Flynn, and Greg Krivo have moved to dismiss the claims against them brought by Plaintiff Rodney McColligan. Docs. 8; 9; 11; 35. The Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, responded to the motions. Docs. 21; 22; 23; 38. For the following reasons, the Defendants' motions (Docs. 8; 9; 11; 35) are GRANTED.


         The factual allegations outlined in the Plaintiff's complaint are difficult to follow. It appears that this case arises from the Plaintiff being “wrongfully evicted from proprietary property” due to “a foreclosure Judgment dated April 4[, ] 2017 without just cause and without due process; and then enforcing an evict of Plaintiff from his property . . . on APRIL 16, 2018 unlawfully.” Doc. 1 ¶¶ 13, 43. The Plaintiff attached to his complaint multiple court documents from prior cases regarding his eviction, as well as what appears to be the Plaintiff's interpretation and history of various statutes and case law. See generally Docs. 1-2; 1-3; 1-4; 1-5; 1-6; 1-7; 1-8; 1-9; 1-10; 1-11; 1-12; 1-13; 1-14; 1-15; 1-16; 1-17; 1-18; 1-19; 1-20; 1-21; 1-22; 1-23; 1-24; 1-25; 1-26; 1-27; 1-28; 1-29; 1-30; 1-31; 1-32.

         The Plaintiff claims that he owned the real property at 111 Glendale Court, Warner Robins, Georgia. Doc. 1 at 10. On August 20, 2007, the Plaintiff signed a promissory note and security deed to obtain a mortgage from Market Street Corporation, giving Market Street the power to foreclose on the Plaintiff's Property upon the Plaintiff's default. Doc. 1-19. On September 5, Market Street assigned the security deed to the Georgia Housing and Finance Authority (GHFA). Id. On April 4, 2017, the GHFA foreclosed on the Property and was the successful bidder. Doc. 1-18. GHFA subsequently conveyed the Property to VRM. Doc. 1-19. On May 20, VRM mailed a written demand to the Plaintiff for possession of the Property. Doc. 1-20.

         On June 8, VRM initiated dispossessory proceedings against the Plaintiff in Houston County Magistrate Court, and the Plaintiff filed an answer a week later. Doc. 1-15 at 2. After a contested hearing, Judge Sammons entered judgment, ruling that VRM was entitled to a writ of possession for the Property and ordering removal of the Plaintiff from the Property. Doc. 1-21. A final order by the Houston County Superior Court was entered. Id. The Plaintiff appealed the judgment in Houston County Superior Court. Doc. 1-25. VRM then filed a motion for summary judgment, which Judge Lukemire granted. Docs. 1-5; 1-16.

         The Plaintiff subsequently filed two lawsuits regarding his eviction. The first lawsuit-brought in Houston County Superior Court and later removed to this Court- alleged fraud and misrepresentation during his eviction and foreclosure proceedings by State Home Mortgage (SHM) and GHFA. Doc. 1-3. The lawsuit was assigned to Judge Royal, who ultimately granted SHM and GHFA's motion to dismiss. Id. SHM and GHFA were represented by Flynn and Jimmy Thomas Howell, Jr. of McCalla Raymer Leibert Pierce, LLC.[2] Id. The Plaintiff did not appeal. Rather, he filed a second complaint in this Court against VRM, represented by Krivo, and “DOES 1 THROUGH 94, INCLUSIVE” (“Unknown Investors and Agents” of VRM) alleging deprivation of his civil rights during the foreclosure process under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Doc. 1-2. Judge Self was assigned the case. Id. Judge Self denied the Plaintiff's motion to preliminarily enjoin VRM from evicting him from the Property, denied his motion for a temporary restraining order, and denied his motion to cease and desist. Id. The Plaintiff appealed Judge Self's denial of his motions. McColligan v. Vendor Res. Mgmt., No. 5:18-cv-111, Doc. 13. That case remains pending. Id.

         The Plaintiff now brings his third complaint regarding these facts and allegations against VRM, Howell, Flynn, Judge Royal, Judge Self, Krivo, Judge Lukemire, Judge Sammons, and “DOES 1 THROUGH 100, INCLUSIVE” (“Unknown Investors and Agents” of VRM). Doc. 1 at 2. The Plaintiff attempts to allege constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, civil conspiracy to interfere with his civil rights, copyright violations under 18 U.S.C. § 1342, and conspiracy to deny him equal protection under 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Id. at 2-16.

         The Plaintiff requests compensatory damages “of $10, 000 per day for every day that [the Plaintiff] is without control of his property due to evition [sic], from each Defendant, for each cause of action; This shall be payable to the Plaintiff in Constitutional Lawful Money redeemable in gold or silver coin as set fouth [sic] in Article 1 Sec. 10 of the constitution.” Id. at 15. The Plaintiff also requests $8, 000, 000 in damages for the Defendants' unauthorized use of his copyright via United States mail. Id. at 14. The Plaintiff additionally requests punitive damages, “cost of this suit, ” a jury trial, and “[a] declaratory judgment that the practices of the Defendants violated the substantive and procedural due process.” Id. at 15-17. Finally, the Plaintiff requests “[a]n Order from the court explaining wherein the complaint is deficient and how to correct it” and “Orders and Judgment or the like or similar ruling . . . to be supported by Findings of Fact and Conclutions [sic] of Law in pursuance of the Federal Constitution, not mere unsupported opinions and judgments without explaining the constitutional basis of the ruling(s)” and leave to amend the complaint “once discovery is completed, and Defendants have raised the usual Fed. R. Civ. [P.] 12(b)(6) objections and avalanche of procedural gimmicks.” Id. at 15-16.


         The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require a pleading to contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). To avoid dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to “‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “At the motion to dismiss stage, all well-pleaded facts are accepted as true, and the reasonable inferences therefrom are construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Garfield v. NDC Health Corp., 466 F.3d 1255, 1261 (11th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). However, “where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]'- ‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)). “[C]onclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal.” Oxford Asset Mgmt., Ltd. v. Jaharis, 297 F.3d 1182, 1188 (11th Cir. 2002). Although a pro se complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, ” will “be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, ” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976), the complaint must “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Where there are dispositive issues of law, a court may dismiss a claim regardless of the alleged facts. Marshall Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Marshall Cty. Gas Dist., 992 F.2d 1171, 1174 (11th Cir. 1993).


         A. Judicial Immunity

         Judges are “entitled to absolute judicial immunity from damages for those acts taken while they are acting in their judicial capacity unless they acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “[A] court must construe jurisdiction broadly in favor of the defendant judge.” Otworth v. The Fla. Bar, 71 F.Supp.2d 1209, 1218 (M.D. Fla. 1999) (citing Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 ...

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