United States District Court, M.D. Georgia, Columbus Division
D. LAND CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
Greene defaulted on a home refinance loan issued by Quicken
Loans (“Quicken”). She then brought this action
against Quicken and several other Defendants alleging
violations of the Real Estate Settlement and Procedures Act
(“RESPA”), 12 U.S.C. § 2601 et
seq., the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”), 15
U.S.C. § 1601 et seq., and Georgia law. Quicken
moved to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint pursuant to
Federal Rule of Procedure 12(b)(6).
first alleges that her loan escrow payments were
miscalculated in violation of RESPA. Even if her payments
were miscalculated, RESPA provides no private cause of action
for violations of the applicable statutory provision. See
Hardy v. Regions Mortg., Inc., 449 F.3d 1357, 1359 (11th
Cir. 2006) (“Under § 10, no private right of
action exists because ‘the Secretary shall assess to
the lender or escrow servicer failing to submit the statement
a civil penalty.'” (quoting 12 U.S.C. §
2609(d)(1))); see also 12 C.F.R. §§ 1024.8
& 1024.35 (providing no private cause of action).
Accordingly, Plaintiff's complaint fails to state a
plausible claim for a violation of RESPA.
only other remaining federal claim, Plaintiff alleges a
violation of TILA. Unlike the relevant RESPA provisions, TILA
does provide a private right of action. 15 U.S.C. §
1640(a). Such an action, however, must be brought within one
year “from the date on which the first regular payment
of principal is due under the loan.” Id.
§ 1640(e); see also Frazile v. EMC Mortg.
Corp., 382 Fed.Appx. 833, 838 (11th Cir. 2010) (per
curiam) (“[A] TILA nondisclosure ‘violation
“occurs” when the transaction is
consummated,' in other words, at the time of closing of a
residential mortgage transaction.” (quoting In re
Smith, 737 F.2d 1549, 1552 (11th Cir. 1984))). Even
assuming a TILA violation, Greene's action is untimely.
Her loan transaction was consummated in April 2016. And she
brought this action nearly two and a half years later in
on the foregoing, Plaintiff's federal claims must be
dismissed; Quicken's motion to dismiss (ECF No. 46) is
therefore granted as to Plaintiff's federal claims.
Further, to the extent Plaintiff alleges federal claims
against any other Defendants, including Defendants that did
not file motions to dismiss, the Court finds that those
claims must also be dismissed for the same reasons.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); Miley v.
Thornburg Mortg. Home Loans Inc., 613 Fed.Appx. 915, 916
(11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (sua sponte dismissal
authorized for failure to state a claim asserted by plaintiff
proceeding in forma pauperis); Bricker v. Cobb
Cty. Gov't & Pers., 399 Fed.Appx. 463, 463-64
(11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (sua sponte dismissal
authorized on statute of limitations grounds for claim
asserted by plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis).
dismissed all of Plaintiff's federal law claims, the
Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
Plaintiff's remaining state law claims. 28 U.S.C. §
1367(c)(3). Those claims are therefore dismissed without
prejudice. Plaintiff may pursue those claims in state court.
But this action is dismissed in its entirety.
 Plaintiff does not meaningfully
distinguish the conduct of Quicken, Amrock, or MERS that she
contends is unlawful. These defendants jointly moved to
dismiss. The Court therefore refers to these defendants
collectively as “Quicken.” Plaintiff also named
“Rocket Mortgage” as a defendant. “Rocket
Mortgage” is the name of a Quicken product, not an
entity capable of being sued. Accordingly, her claims against
“Rocket Mortgage” are dismissed.
 The Court's jurisdiction is based
solely upon federal question given that complete diversity of
citizenship does not exist among the parties.
 Rubin Lublin LLC and Liberty
Utilities' motions to dismiss (ECF Nos. 20 & 31) are