United States District Court, S.D. Georgia, Savannah Division
ORDER AND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Christopher L. Ray, United States Magistrate Judge.
Glenn Lewis filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action after he
was deprived of his hypertension medication for six days
while held in segregation. Doc. 1 at 8. The Court, having
granted his request to pursue his case in forma
pauperis, doc. 3, and Lewis having returned the
necessary forms, docs. 4 & 5, now screens his Complaint
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires the
immediate dismissal of any pro se Complaint that
fails to state at least one actionable claim against a
governmental entity or official.
allegations are straightforward. After a weapon was found in
boots in his cell, he was provided with a copy of a
disciplinary report referencing the discovery of the weapon,
he was taken to segregation, and his personal items were
inventoried and confiscated. His hypertension medication was
among the seized items. He requested his medication
(Lisinopril and Hetz) and Nurse Peacock gave him one dose and
promised Lewis had been “added to the list to receive
[his] medication.” Doc. 1 at 7. Six days went by
without medication, and Lewis started experiencing chest
pains. Doc. 1 at 8. He filled out a sick-call request form,
reporting that he was unmedicated and experiencing symptoms.
Id. He was taken to medical and a blood pressure
check revealed a “blood pressure reading of 176/126 and
a heart beat of 98” which he alleges are
“extremely high and abnormal posing the risk of a
stroke or heart-attack.” Id. Nurse Williams
then gave him his medication. Id. At a disciplinary
hearing later that afternoon, the weapons charge was
dismissed. Id. (an investigation having revealed
that Lewis had never been issued boots and camera footage
having demonstrated the boots belonged to his cellmate).
Lewis later discovered that his sick-call request had been
destroyed. Id. at 9.
alleges that the Warden failed to train his subordinates,
that Captain David Royal wrongfully approved his placement in
segregation without proof or an investigation, that Officer
Ashley Martin “malicious[ly]” filed a
disciplinary report that the weapon was his, and that Jenkins
Correctional Center medical staff “failed to provide
medication” and thereby “put [Lewis] at risk of a
stroke or heart attack.” Doc. 1 at 9. He seeks the
appointment of counsel and more than 15 million dollars in
damages. Id. at 6.
out a denial-of-procedural-due-process claim under §
1983, a plaintiff must establish three
elements: (1) a deprivation of a constitutionally protected
liberty or property interest; (2) state action; and (3)
constitutionally inadequate process. Grayden v.
Rhodes, 345 F.3d 1225, 1232 (11th Cir. 2003); Cryder
v. Oxendine, 24 F.3d 175, 177 (11th Cir. 1994). Even
assuming that Lewis' placement in segregation pending the
outcome of an investigation meets the first two elements, he
has not plausibly alleged that he received inadequate
[A]n informal, nonadversary evidentiary review [is]
sufficient both for the decision that an inmate represents a
security threat and the decision to confine an inmate to
administrative segregation pending completion of an
investigation into misconduct charges against him. An inmate
must merely receive some notice of the charges against him
and an opportunity to present his views to the prison
official charged with deciding whether to transfer him to
Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 476 (1983),
abrogated on other grounds by Sandin, 459 U.S. 460.
Lewis was provided with notice of the charge against him (the
disciplinary report) and the ongoing investigation, and was
then provided with a hearing to argue his innocence. Doc. 1.
“[E]ven if a prisoner is [ ] deprived of his liberty,
thus requiring due process, it is well established that the
state may cure a procedural deprivation by providing a later
procedural remedy; only when the state refuses to provide a
process sufficient to remedy the procedural deprivation does
a constitutional violation actionable under section 1983
arise.” Baker v. Rexroad, 159 Fed.Appx. 61, 63
(11th Cir. 2005) (quote and cite omitted). Lewis has
affirmatively pled that he was provided with meaningful due
process. Doc. 1 at 8 (after less than one week, the
investigation concluded and the charge against him was
dismissed). Plaintiff has failed to state a procedural due
Denial of Medical Care
well established that “deliberate indifference to
serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the
‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain' . . .
proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.” Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (cites and footnotes
omitted). A prisoner states a valid claim, under 42 U.S.C.
section 1983, “whether the indifference is manifested
by prison doctors in their response to the prisoner's
needs . . . or by prison guards in intentionally denying or
delaying access to medical care . . . or intentionally
interfering with treatment once proscribed.”
Id. at 104-05.
show that a prison official acted with deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs, a plaintiff must
satisfy both an objective and a subjective inquiry.”
Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir.
2003). First, the plaintiff must prove an objectively serious
medical need. Id. Second, the plaintiff must prove
that the prison official acted with deliberate indifference
to that need. Id.
serious medical need is considered ‘one that has been
diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that
is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize
the necessity for a doctor's attention.'”
Id. (citing Hill v. Dekalb Reg'l Youth Det.
Ctr., 40 F.3d 1176, 1187 (11th Cir.1994)). In either
case, “the medical need must be one that, if left
unattended, pos[es] a substantial risk of serious
harm.” Id. (cite and internal quote omitted).
Hypertension, of course, meets either of these definitions.
Carter v. Broward Cty. Sheriff Office, 710 Fed.Appx.
387, 391-92 (11th Cir. 2017); see generally Jackson v.
Pollion, 733 F.3d 786, 789 (7th Cir. 2013)
(“Hypertension is a serious condition. Untreated it can
result in strokes or heart attacks.”); Hunt v.
Uphoff, 199 F.3d 1220, 1222 (10th Cir. 1999) (prisoner
who claimed serious medical needs of diabetes and
hypertension had sufficiently pleaded facts to allege