MILLER, P. J., BROWN and GOSS, JJ.
granted Sheryl Daniel's application for discretionary
appeal to review the superior court's order which
affirmed the decision of the Appellate Division of the State
Board of Workers' Compensation to deny Daniel's claim
for benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act (the
"Act"). For the following reasons, we affirm.
facts in this case are undisputed. At the time of the
incident, Daniel was employed as a seamstress at
Bremen-Bowden Investment Company(the "Employer").
Daniel parked in a lot owned by the Employer, but in order to
get to and from the parking lot she was required to walk down
a public sidewalk and across the street. On July 22, 2016,
Daniel left her work station for her regularly scheduled
lunch break and planned to drive home. The Employer's
employees were allowed to leave the workplace and do whatever
they wished during this regularly scheduled lunch break. As
she walked to her car, Daniel tripped on the sidewalk and was
sought temporary total disability benefits beginning the day
after her injury, payment of medical bills, designation of a
certain doctor as the authorized testing physician, and
attorney fees. Relying upon this Court's decision in
Rockwell v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 248 Ga.App. 73
(545 S.E.2d 121) (2001), the Administrative Law Judge with
the trial division of the State Board of Workers'
Compensation ("ALJ") concluded, inter alia, that
Daniel was entitled to income benefits under the ingress and
egress rule on a scheduled lunch break. The ALJ also awarded
Daniel medical expenses, the ability to select her treating
physician, and attorney fees pursuant to OCGA §
34-9-108. The Employer appealed the ALJ's decision to the
appellate division of the State Board of Workers'
Compensation (the "Board"). The Board reversed the
ALJ's award, concluding that Daniel's injury did not
arise out of her employment because it occurred while she was
on a regularly scheduled break. The superior court affirmed
the Board's denial of benefits, and this Court granted
Daniel's application for discretionary review.
Daniel argues that the superior court erred by holding that
her trip and fall during a period of egress on a regular
lyscheduled lunch break did not arise in and out of the
course of her employment. We find no error.
the pertinent facts are not disputed, and because Daniel
argues that the Board and the superior court "applied an
erroneous theory of law to the facts, we applya de novo
standard of review." (Citation and punctuation omitted.)
Freeman v. Southwire Co., 269 Ga.App. 692,
693 (605 S.E.2d 95) (2004).
In the absence of legal error, the factual findings of the
State Board of Workers' Compensation must be affirmed by
the superior court and by the Court of Appeals when supported
by any evidence in the administrative record. However,
erroneous applications of law to undisputed facts, as well as
decisions based on erroneous theories of law, are subject to
the de novo standard of review.
(Citation omitted.) Hill v. Omni Hotel at CNN Ctr.,
268Ga.App. 144, 146(601 S.E.2d 472) (2004).
compensable under the Workers Compensation Act, an
"injury by accident" must arise "out of and in
the course of employment[.]" See OCGA §34-9-1 (4).
Both of these "independent and distinct criteria"
must be satisfied. Mayor &c. of Savannah v.
Stevens, 278 Ga. 166, 166 (1) (598 S.E.2d 456) (2004).
"in the course of the employment" relate to the
time, place, and circumstances under which the accident takes
place, and an accident arises in the course of employment
when it occurs within the period of employment at a place
where the employee may reasonably be in the performance of
his duties and while he is fulfilling those duties or engaged
in something incidental thereto.
(Citation omitted.) General Fire & Cas. Co. v.
Bellflower, 123 Ga.App. 864, 867 (3) (182 S.E.2d 678)
(1971). The words "arising out of the employment"
refer to the causal connection between the employment and the
injury. Id. at 868 (4).
parallel but separate lines of cases, Georgia courts have
fashion edaningress and egress rule and a scheduled break
exception to the Workers' Compensation Act. Under the
scheduled break exception, this Court has carved out an
exception to the Workers' Compensation Act "for
injuries occurring during a regularly scheduled lunch break
or rest break and at a time claimant is free to do as she
chooses." Miles v. Brown Transport Corp., 163
Ga.App. 563, 564 (294 S.E.2d 734) (1982). Under the in gress
and egress rule, this Court has concluded that the
Workers' Compensation Act applies "where an employee
is injured while still on the employer's
premises in the act of going to or coming from his or
her workplace." (Citation omitted. Hill,
268Ga.App. at 147.
srelies upon Rockwell v. Lockheed Martin Corp.,
248Ga.App.73 (545 S.E.2d 121) (2001), for the assertion that,
under the ingress and egress rule, where an employee is still
on her employer's premises in the act of egressing those
premises, even if on a regularly scheduled break, the
Workers' Compensation Act applies. Id. at 73.
However, during the pendency of the instant appeal, this
Court disapproved Rockwell, 248 Ga.App. at73, and
other cases, to hold that the ingress and egress rule does
note xtend coverage to cases in which the employee is injured
while leaving and returning to work on a regularly scheduled
lunch break. Frett v. State Farm Employee Workers'
Compensation, ___ Ga.App.___ (821 S.E.2d 132) (2018). In
Frett, this Court ...