United States District Court, M.D. Georgia, Valdosta Division
LAWSON HUGH LAWSON, SENIOR JUDGE.
Carstean Frazier filed this pro se lawsuit against Defendant
Michelle Collins alleging that she was discriminated against
in her employment on the basis of her race, color,
gender/sex, national origin, and age. (Doc. 1, p. 2).
Defendant moves the Court to dismiss Plaintiff's
Complaint, arguing that Plaintiff has failed to plead
sufficient facts to establish that Defendant was her employer
at any time and that Plaintiff has failed to exhaust her
administrative remedies and to satisfy the conditions
precedent to filing a discrimination lawsuit. The Court
notified Plaintiff that Defendant filed a motion seeking
dismissal of her claims and provided Plaintiff with the
opportunity to respond (Doc. 10), which she has now done.
(Doc. 11). For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 6).
filed her Complaint utilizing the Court's standard
Complaint for Employment Discrimination form. (Doc.
She additionally attached a brief statement of facts.
(Id. at p. 3-4). Plaintiff's factual allegations
are limited to the following:
previously worked as a volunteer. Plaintiff does not state
the exact dates of her volunteer work or for whom she was
volunteering, but a complete reading of Plaintiff's
allegations suggests that she was volunteering at Archbold
Medical Center sometime in 2006, which Plaintiff explains is
when she was “infect[ed] on the job.”
(Id. at p. 3). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant
Michelle Collins, an employee at Archbold Medical Center, did
not hire Plaintiff because Plaintiff is a black female.
Instead Defendant hired a man, who was married to a white
woman known to Defendant. Plaintiff contends that Defendant
discriminated against her on the basis of her race, color,
gender/sex, national origin, and age by failing to promote
her and by failing to accommodate her disability.
(Id. at p. 2).
MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD
reviewing a motion to dismiss, the court shall accept
“all well-pleaded facts . . . as true, and the
reasonable inferences therefrom are construed in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff.” Bryant v. Avado
Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1273 n.1 (11th Cir. 1999).
The court must dismiss the complaint if, “on the basis
of a dispositive issue of law, no construction of the factual
allegations will support the cause of action.”
Marshall Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Marshall Cnty. Gas
Dist., 992 F.2d 1171, 1174 (11th Cir. 1993) (citing
Executive 100, Inc. v. Martin County, 992 F.2d 1536,
1539 (11th Cir. 1991) and Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S.
678, 682 (1946)). Accordingly, to avoid dismissal under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), “a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim for relief that is plausible on its
face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). But a pro se complaint “is
to be liberally construed, ” and “however
inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson
v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). Nevertheless, a
district court is not required to exempt a pro se litigant
from complying with the relevant rules of procedure and
substantive law. Wayne v. Jarvis, 197 F.3d 1098,
1104 (11th Cir. 1999) (overruled on other grounds by
Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2003)).
attached to her motion to dismiss a number of documents,
including her personal affidavit (Doc. 6-10); several orders
from the State Board of Workers' Compensation (Docs.
6-2-6-9); and a deposition transcript from a February 11,
2012 deposition of Plaintiff in relation to a workers'
compensation claim (Doc. 8). A court “generally may not
look beyond the pleadings” to consider extrinsic
documents when ruling on a motion to dismiss. United
States ex rel. Osheroff v. Humana, Inc., 776 F.3d 805,
811 (11th Cir. 2015). However, “a district court may
consider an extrinsic document even on Rule 12(b)(6) review
if it is (1) central to the plaintiff's claim and (2) its
authenticity is not challenged.” Id. (citing
SFM Holdings, Ltd. V. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC, 600
F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2010)). A district court may also
“consider judicially noticed documents.”
Id. (citing Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc.,
187 F.3d 1271, 1278 (11th Cir. 1999)).
has not objected to the authenticity of any of the documents
submitted by Defendant. However, even though the Court finds
that it may consider the extrinsic documents provided by
Defendant, the Court concludes that reference to these
documents is not necessary to resolve the present motion to
dismiss, and the Court's analysis of the motion is not
based on any of these outside documents.
a black woman, alleges that Defendant discriminated against
her on the basis of her race and her sex. While Plaintiff
does not specifically invoke the protections of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e
et seq. (“Title VII”), both Defendant
and the Court interpret Plaintiff's allegations as
asserting a claim for employment discrimination under Title
VII. Defendant argues that Plaintiff's Complaint is
subject to dismissal because (1) Plaintiff has never been
employed by Defendant; and (2) even if Plaintiff was employed
by Defendant, Plaintiff did not properly exhaust her
administrative remedies prior to filing her
lawsuit. In response, Plaintiff states simply that
she does not wish for her case to be dismissed.
agues that Plaintiff's claims against her should be
dismissed because Plaintiff has not adequately pled that
Defendant was ever her employer. Perhaps the more pertinent
question, and one that can be answered by looking strictly at
Plaintiff's Complaint, is whether Plaintiff was ever an
VII prohibits an employer from “discharg[ing] any
individual, or otherwise [ ] discriminat[ing] against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(a)(1). While the “statute does not define
‘individual, '” the Eleventh Circuit has
“held that only those plaintiffs who are
‘employees' may bring” a discrimination
lawsuit. Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits, Lab, Inc., 163