United States District Court, M.D. Georgia, Macon Division
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO VACATE AND MOTION TO
E. SELF, III, JUDGE
pending before the Court is pro se Plaintiff Waseem
Daker's 87-page "Rule 59(e) Motion to Vacate and
Reconsider" [Doc. 101');">101');">101');">101');">101');">101');">101');">101');">101');">101');">101');">101');">101');">101');">101');">101');">101');">101');">101');">101');">101');">101');">101');">101');">101');">101');">101');">101');">101');">101');">101');">101] the Court's July 18, 2018
Order and Judgment in this case. Plaintiff has also filed a
motion seeking to recuse both the undersigned and United
States Magistrate Judge Charles Weigle. [Doc. 102');">102]. For the
following reasons, the Court DENIES these
Motion for Recusal
has filed yet another motion seeking the recusal of the
magistrate judge in this case. Plaintiff's motion-the
fourth recusal motion he has filed in this case
alone - largely repeats his prior allegations
that the judges involved in his cases "display a
deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair
judgment impossible." See [Doc. 102');">102, p. 8].
Plaintiff additionally repeats, nearly verbatim, arguments
made in his objections and his motion for reconsideration and
contends that the Court's allegedly incorrect rulings
demonstrate its "bias, prejudice, hostility, and
antagonism against Mr. Daker." [Id. at p. 22].
bases his motion on 28 U.S.C. § 455. The statute
generally provides that a judge "shall disqualify
himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might
reasonably be questioned." 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). The
statute also enumerates certain other circumstances requiring
a judge to disqualify himself. Id. at §
455(b)(1)-(5). Plaintiff's primary complaint is that the
Court is biased towards him. Plaintiff may thus be relying on
either subsection (a) or subsection (b)(1).
standard under subsection (a) is objective and requires the
Court to ask "whether an objective, disinterested lay
observer fully informed of the facts underlying the grounds
on which recusal was sought would entertain significant doubt
about the judge's impartiality." United States
v. Patti, 337 F.3d 1317, 1321 (11th Cir. 2003) (internal
quotation marks omitted). In the Eleventh Circuit, "it
is well settled that the allegation of bias must show that
the bias is personal as distinguished from judicial in
nature." Bolin v. Story, Tib F.3d 1234, 1239
(11th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted) (per curiam). As a result, "a judge's
rulings in the same or a related case are not a sufficient
basis for recusal," except in rare circumstances where
the previous proceedings demonstrate pervasive bias and
prejudice. Id:, see also Liteky v. United States,
510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994) ("[J]udicial rulings alone
almost never constitute [a] valid basis for a bias or
partiality recusal motion."); McWhorter v. City of
Birmingham, 906 F.2d 674, 678 (11th Cir. 1990)
("[The bias] must derive from something other than that
which the judge learned by participating in the case.").
In this case, Plaintiff has not pointed to any specific facts
showing that any sort of extra] udicial bias existed, nor has
Plaintiff demonstrated that the Court's rulings exhibit
"such a high degree of . . . antagonism as to make fair
judgment impossible" or that any judge involved in his
cases in this district has a bias toward Plaintiff "so
extreme as to display clear inability to render fair
judgment." See Liteky, 510 U.S. at 551, 555. It
is clear that "[r]epeated rulings against a litigant, no
matter how erroneous and how vigorously and consistently
expressed, are not a basis for disqualification of a judge on
the grounds of bias and prejudice." See Maret v.
United States, 332 F.Supp. 324, 326 (E.D. Mo. 1971).
Plaintiffs theory that any judge who rules against him
exhibits pervasive bias and prejudice is simply incorrect.
U.S.C. § 455(b)(1) requires disqualification where the
judge "has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a
party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts
concerning the proceeding [.]" "Recusal under this
subsection is mandatory, because 'the potential for
conflicts of interest are readily apparent.'"
Patti, 337 F.3d at 1321 (quoting Murray v.
Scott, 253 F.3d 1308, 1312 (11th Cir. 2001)). Again,
Plaintiff has failed to establish any personal or pervasive
bias on the part of the undersigned or Judge Weigle, and
Plaintiff also fails to identify any specific "disputed
evidentiary facts" of which the Court might have
knowledge. Any knowledge gained through the course of a
judicial proceeding is not a "disputed evidentiary
fact" that requires recusal. United States v.
Bailey, 175 F.3d 966, 969 (11th Cir. 1999) (per curiam).
Instead, knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts must be
gained through an extrajudicial source to warrant recusal.
See Id. Plaintiff has not asserted that such
knowledge exists here.
Plaintiffs contentions that the undersigned and Judge Weigle
have not ruled in his favor are not alone sufficient to merit
recusal, and Plaintiff has also failed to show that the Court
harbors the type of pervasive bias or prejudice against
Plaintiff that would otherwise require recusal.
Plaintiff's motion for recusal [Doc. 102');">102] is therefore
Rule 59(e) Motion
Plaintiff has also filed a motion seeking reconsideration of
the Court's July 19, 2018 Order and Judgment, pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). [Doc. 101');">101');">101');">101');">101');">101');">101');">101');">101');">101');">101');">101');">101');">101');">101');">101');">101');">101');">101');">101');">101');">101');">101');">101');">101');">101');">101');">101');">101');">101');">101');">101]. As the
Court has previously advised Plaintiff, "'motions
for reconsideration are disfavored, '" and
"'relief under Rule 59(e) is an extraordinary remedy
to be employed sparingly.'" Mercer v. Perdue
Farms, Inc., No. 5:10-cv-324 (CAR), 2012 WL 1414321, at
*1 (M.D. Ga. Apr. 20, 2012) (quoting Krstic v. Princess
Cruise Lines, Ltd., 706 F.Supp.2d 1271, 1282 (S.D. Fla.
2010)); see also Baker v. Dozier, No. 5:17-cv-25
(CAR), 2017 WL 4797522 at ""1 (M.D. Ga. Oct. 24,
2017) (holding same). Furthermore, Rule 59(e) "cannot
serve as a vehicle to relitigate old matters or present the
case under a new legal theory . . . [or] give the moving
party another 'bite at the apple' by permitting the
arguing of issues and procedures that could and should have
been raised prior to judgment." Daker, 2017 WL
4797522, at ""1 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(alterations in original).
has blatantly ignored the Court's prior admonitions that
motions for reconsideration should not be filed as a matter
of routine practice and that they should not
"re-assert the same arguments and evidence this Court
previously considered in its original ruling." See
Id. (cautioning Plaintiff that the Court would impose
sanctions if Plaintiff continued to seek routine
consideration of the Court's orders). Approximately half
of Plaintiff's 87-page Rule 59(e) motion is copied,
seemingly verbatim, from the various objections, supplemental
objections, and other motions he has already filed in this
case. The Court already expended significant time and
resources in its careful review and consideration of those
documents, and Plaintiff's repackaging and refiling of
the same documents is abusive and perhaps worthy of the
sanctions the Court previously suggested would be
appropriate. To prevent this lawsuit from being further
prolonged by additional motions and appeals, however, the
Court will address Plaintiff's motion, although it will
decline to address any argument made in Plaintiff's Rule
59(e) motion that has already been presented to the Court.
Court recognizes three circumstances that warrant
reconsideration of a prior order under Rule 59(e): "(1)
an intervening change in controlling law; (2) the
availability of new evidence; and (3) the need to correct
clear error or manifest injustice." Daker v.
Humphrey, Civil Action No. 5.12-CV-461 (CAR), 2013 WL
1296501, at *2 n.1 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 27, 2013) (quoting Fla.
College of Osteopathic Med., Inc. v. Dean Witter, 12
F.Supp.2d 1306, 1308 (M.D. Fla. 1998)). Plaintiff has not
identified any intervening change in the law or new evidence
that affects his claims. The Court thus presumes that
Plaintiffs Rule 59(e) motion for reconsideration is based on
his belief that there is a need for the Court to correct
clear errors or manifest injustice in this case.
allegations in Plaintiffs motion to vacate do not demonstrate
that the Court clearly erred in rendering its decision or
that Plaintiff has suffered a manifest injustice as a result.
Instead, Plaintiffs Rule 59(e) motion misconstrues and
misapplies the facts of this case and the law and asks the
Court to ignore Plaintiffs litigation history and thus the
broader context in which the actions in this case occurred.
See, e.g., Daker v. Toole, 736 Fed.Appx. 234');">736 Fed.Appx. 234, 235-36
(11th Cir. 2018) (per curiarn) (noting that Plaintiff has
been "wreaking havoc wherever he goes" by
"flood[ing]" the court "with numerous
disputes"); Daker v. Commissioner, 820F.3d
1278, 1281 (11th Cir. 2016) (identifying Plaintiff as a
"serial litigator"); see also Daker v.
Toole, 138 S.Ct. 234, 234-35 (2017) (placing filing
restrictions on Plaintiff due to his "repeated
abuse" of the Supreme Court's process). For the
following reasons, the Court's conclusion that Plaintiffs
Amended Complaint was filed maliciously and in bad faith
The Court Properly Considered Plaintiff's Litigation
History in Determining that Plaintiff ...