United States District Court, M.D. Georgia, Macon Division
T. TREADWELL, JUDGE
States Magistrate Judge Charles H. Weigle recommends that the
Defendants' motion to dismiss be GRANTED
as to the Plaintiff's claims for equitable relief and
DENIED as to the Plaintiff's claims for
damages. Doc. 36 at 3-6. The Plaintiff has objected to the
Recommendation, and the Defendants have not objected.
See Doc. 39. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1),
the Court has reviewed de novo those portions of the
Recommendation to which the Plaintiff objects. The Court
accepts and adopts the findings, conclusions, and
recommendations of the Magistrate Judge. The Recommendation
(Doc. 36) is ADOPTED and made the order of
the Court. Accordingly, the Defendants' motion to dismiss
(Doc. 20) is GRANTED as to the
Plaintiff's claims for equitable relief, and those claims
are DISMISSED without prejudice. The
Defendant's motion to dismiss (Doc. 20) is
DENIED as to the Plaintiff's claims for
damages. Because the motion to dismiss has been resolved, the
stay on discovery is lifted.
the Plaintiff has moved for reconsideration of the
Court's Order (Doc. 19) adopting the Magistrate
Judge's earlier Recommendation (Doc. 8) to dismiss the
Plaintiff's habeas corpus claims and Georgia Open Records
Act claims. Doc. 26. For the following reasons, that motion
(Doc. 26) is DENIED.
to Local Rule 7.6, “Motions for Reconsideration shall
not be filed as a matter of routine practice.” M.D.
Ga., L.R. 7.6 (emphasis added). Indeed,
“[r]econsideration of a previous order is an
extraordinary remedy to be employed sparingly.”
Bingham v. Nelson, 2010 WL 339806, at *1 (M.D. Ga.
Jan. 21, 2010) (quotation marks and citation omitted). It
“is appropriate only if the movant demonstrates (1)
that there has been an intervening change in the law, (2)
that new evidence has been discovered which was not
previously available to the parties in the exercise of due
diligence, or (3) that the court made a clear error of
law.” Id. “In order to demonstrate clear
error, the party moving for reconsideration must do more than
simply restate [his] prior arguments, and any arguments which
the party inadvertently failed to raise earlier are deemed
waived.” McCoy v. Macon Water Authority, 966
F.Supp. 1209, 1222-23 (M.D. Ga. 1997).
the Plaintiff objects that the Court overlooked his claim for
conspiracy to deprive him of his civil rights secured by the
First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Doc. 26-1 at 4. As
the Magistrate Judge described those claims,
The present action arises out of an application for writ of
habeas corpus Plaintiff filed in the Superior Court of
Baldwin County in September 2013. According to Plaintiff, the
judges presiding over that action conspired with the
Assistant Attorneys General assigned to represent the state
of Georgia, his appellate attorney, his trial attorney, and
other individuals to deny his state habeas corpus
application. Plaintiff alleges that, motivated by a
discriminatory intent, the defendants deliberately impeded
his right to meaningful access to the courts, with the
specific intent to cause him actual injury.
Doc. 8 at 5 (citations omitted). After describing specific
allegations, such as the state court's granting of a
continuance and the Plaintiff's late receipt of subpoena
forms, the Magistrate Judge described the Plaintiff's
claim as “alleg[ing] that the actions described above
were done intentionally for the purpose of denying Plaintiff
due process in light of his pro se status.”
Id. at 7. Because the alleged constitutional claims
were “inextricably intertwined with the [state
court's] decision, in judicial proceedings, to deny
[Plaintiff's] [habeas] petition, ” the Magistrate
Judge recommended dismissing them as barred by the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Id. at 10
(quoting D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S.
462, 486 (1983)).
Magistrate Judge also noted that, in the alternative, the
Plaintiff's claims against Sims, Smith, Judge Wingfield,
and Judge Prior were barred by prosecutorial or judicial
immunity. Doc. 8 at 12-15. The claims against Defendants
Erickson, Lyon, and Haldi were also barred by the statute of
limitations. Id. at 15.
the Magistrate Judge's granting him a thirty-day
extension, the Plaintiff did not file an objection to the
Recommendation. Doc. 14. The Court adopted the Recommendation
on March 26, 2018, and the Plaintiff moved for
reconsideration on June 5, 2018.
Plaintiff has not pointed to any intervening change in law or
new evidence to support his motion for reconsideration. Nor
has the Plaintiff shown clear error: his claims have been
fully considered, and the Court continues to agree with the
Recommendation (Doc. 8) and the Order adopting it (Doc. 19).
Furthermore, if the Plaintiff did have any new, meritorious
arguments supporting his dismissed claims, which he does not,
those arguments should have been made as objections to the
Recommendation and have been waived. For the reasons above,
the Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration (Doc. 26) is