United States District Court, S.D. Georgia, Augusta Division
MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND
K. EFPS, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
an inmate at Valdosta State Prison in Valdosta, Georgia,
commenced the above-captioned case pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 for events allegedly occurring at multiple
institutions, including Augusta State Medical Prison
(“ASMP”) in Grovetown, Georgia. He is proceeding
pro se and in forma pauperis (“IFP”).
December 12, 2018, the Court issued a Report and
Recommendation (“R&R”) recommending dismissal
of Plaintiff's original complaint for failure to state a
claim and denying his motion for emergency protective order.
(Doc. no. 12.) On December 26, 2018, Plaintiff objected to
the Court's R&R and filed a motion to amend, which
the Court granted. (Doc. nos. 14-16.) On January 22, 2019,
Plaintiff filed an amended complaint which included a new
motion to amend. (Doc. nos. 17; 17-4, p. 1.) However, because
the Court directed Plaintiff to file an amended complaint on
January 8, 2019, Plaintiff did not need to re-file his motion
to amend for the Court to consider his amended complaint.
Therefore, the Court shall construe the “motion to
amend” as part of Plaintiff's amended complaint,
and Plaintiff's motion to amend should be DENIED AS MOOT.
(Doc. no. 17-4, p. 1.) Plaintiff's amended complaint
supersedes his original complaint in its entirety. See Lowery
v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1219 (11th Cir. 2007)
(“an amended complaint supersedes the initial complaint
and becomes the operative pleading in the case”)).
Plaintiff's motion for emergency protection order, (doc.
no. 9), and amended complaint are before the Court for
screening. Phillips v. Mashburn, 746 F.2d 782, 785
(11th Cir. 1984); Al-Amin v. Donald, 165 Fed.Appx.
733, 736 (11th Cir. 2006).
SCREENING OF THE AMENDED COMPLAINT
names as Defendants: (1) Liz Roberts; (2) Warden Edward
Philbin; (3) Commissioner Gregory C. Dozier; (4) Donna Young;
(5) Lisa Mayo; (6) Alicia Robideau; (7) Ashleigh Lanza; (8)
Steven H. Rosenbaum; (9) Rita K. Lomio; (10) Sharon Lewis;
(11) Jame D. Smith; (12) Cindy L. Smith; (13) Stan Baker;
(14) Lisa Wood; (15) Nathan Deal; (16) Lynda Sewell Hutsey;
(17) Benita Freeman; (18) Lillie Faison; (19) Dexter Proyer;
(20) Officer CO II Jinkins; (21) Vance Laughlin, Warden; and
(22) Joseph Hutchinson; (23) Stanley William; (24) Dr.
William, Mental Health Counselor. (Doc. nos. 17; 17-4.)
Taking all of Plaintiff's allegations as true, as the
Court must for purposes of the present screening, the facts
are as follows.
Defendant has caused Plaintiff to suffer grievous harm and
cruel and unusual punishment. (Doc. no. 17, p. 4.) Over the
last eighteen years, unknown correctional officials have
cause Plaintiff to be tortured and abused. (Id.)
Specifically, Plaintiff complains of events starting at
Coffee Correctional Facility in June 2015. (Id. at
5.) On February 24, 2016, he was transferred to Roger State
Prison, and on May 2016, he was transferred to Wheeler
Correctional Facility. (Id.) On May 26, 2016 at
10:50 a.m., Plaintiff was set up at an unknown private prison
to be killed. (Id.) He was then transferred to
Reidsville State Prison and subsequently ASMP on unknown
Freeman and Faison, along with staff, set up an attack on
Plaintiff to have him killed at Wheeler Correctional
Facility. (Id.) Plaintiff has no personal knowledge
of the plan to have him killed. (Id.) The plot to
kill Plaintiff followed him all the way to ASMP.
Plaintiff alleges every Defendant caused him to suffer
grievous harm, were negligently deliberate indifference
towards him, falsely imprisoned him, or were a part of a plot
to kill him. (Doc. no. 17-4, pp. 1-6.) Further, he is a
hostage at ASMP and has been in solitary confinement for four
years. (Id. at 1.) Defendants are involved in a plot
to cover up and conceal the harm they have caused Plaintiff.
(Id. at 1-6.) Plaintiff claims unknown persons are
trying to use mental health treatment as a cover up.
(Id. at 1.) Plaintiff requests $50, 000, 000 in
money damages, $20, 000, 000 in punitive damages, $25, 000,
000 in compensatory damages, and $15, 000, 000 in nominal
damages. (Doc. no. 17, p. 5.)
Legal Standard for Screening
complaint or any portion thereof may be dismissed if it is
frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune to such relief. See 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b). A claim is
frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis either in law
or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319, 325 (1989). “Failure to state a claim under §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same standard as
dismissal for failure to state a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(b)(6).” Wilkerson v. H & S, Inc., 366
Fed.Appx. 49, 51 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Mitchell v.
Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997)).
avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, the allegations in the complaint must
“state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). That is,
“[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right
to relief above the speculative level.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. While Rule 8(a) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does not require detailed
factual allegations, “it demands more than an
accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A
complaint is insufficient if it “offers ‘labels
and conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action, '” or if it
“tenders ‘naked assertions' devoid of
‘further factual enhancement.'” Id.
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557). In short,
the complaint must provide a “‘plain
statement' possess[ing] enough heft to ‘sho[w] that
the pleader is entitled to relief.'”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P.
the Court affords a liberal construction to a pro se
litigant's pleadings, holding them to a more lenient
standard than those drafted by an attorney. Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). However, this liberal
construction does not mean that the Court has a duty ...