United States District Court, N.D. Georgia, Newnan Division
Timothy C. Batten, Sr. United States District Judge
case comes before the Court on Defendant Dante Starks's
objections  to Magistrate Judge Russell G. Vineyard's
report and recommendation (the "R&R") ,
which recommends that Starks's motions [19, 25, 29, 30]
to suppress evidence be denied.
Legal Standard on Review of a Magistrate Judge's
district judge has a duty to conduct a "careful and
complete" review of a magistrate judge's R&R.
Williams v. Wainwright, 681 F.2d 732, 732 (11th Cir.
1982) (per curiam) (quoting Nettles v. Wainwright,
677 F.2d 404, 408 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982)). This review may
take different forms, however, depending on whether there are
objections to the R&R. The district judge must "make
a de novo determination of those portions of the [R&R] to
which objection is made." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).
In contrast, those portions of the R&R to which no
objection is made need only be reviewed for "clear
error." Macort v. Prem, Inc., 208 Fed.Appx.
781, 784 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (quoting Diamond
v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins., 416 F.3d 310, 315
(4th Cir. 2005)).
filing objections must specifically identify those findings I
objected to. Frivolous, conclusive or general objections need
not be considered by the district court."
Nettles, 677 F.2d at 410 n.8. "This rule
facilitates the opportunity for district judges to spend more
time on matters actually contested and produces a result
compatible with the purposes of the Magistrates Act."
Id. at 410.
conducting a complete and careful review of the R&R, the
district judge "may accept, reject, or modify" the
magistrate judge's findings and recommendations. 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Williams, 681 F.2d at
732. The district judge "may also receive further
evidence or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with
instructions." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).
objects to the magistrate judge's holdings that (1) he
lacked standing to challenge the search of the vehicle; (2)
even if he had standing, the search warrant was based upon
sufficient probable cause; and (3) even if the search warrant
lacked probable cause, the good faith exception applied. The
Court has conducted a careful, de novo review of the R&R
and Starks's objections thereto. Starks's objections
are taken in turn.
Standing to Challenge Search of the Rental Car
magistrate judge did not err in holding that Starks lacked
standing to challenge the search of the rental car. "An
individual has standing to challenge a search if '(1) he
has a subjective expectation of privacy, and (2) society is
prepared to recognize that expectation as objectively
reasonable."' United States v. Bushay, 859
F.Supp.2d 1335, 1361 (N.D.Ga. 2012) (quoting United
States v. Harris, 526 F.3d 1334, 1338 (11th Cir. 2008)).
The defendant carries the burden to establish both the
subjective and objective expectations of privacy. United
States v. Suarez-Blanca, No. 1:07-cr-0023-MHS/AJB, 2008
WL 4200156, at *6 (N.D.Ga. Apr. 21, 2008).
driver generally has an expectation of privacy in a rental
vehicle that he or she rents." United States v.
Alexis, 169 F.Supp.3d 1303, 1310 (S.D. Fla. 2016),
aff'd, 688 Fed.Appx. 656 (11th Cir. May 10,
2017) (per curiam). However, that general rule only applies
to "someone in otherwise lawful possession and
control of a rental car . . . ." Byrd v. United
States, 138 S.Ct. 1518, 1524 (2018) (emphasis added)
(finding that an unauthorized rental car driver may have
standing to challenge a search of the vehicle). Society would
not find reasonable an expectation of privacy in fraudulently
obtained or unlawfully possessed property. See United
States v. Wai-Keung, 845 F.Supp. 1548, 1563 (S.D. Fla.
1994), aff'd, 115 F.3d 874 (11th Cir. 1997)
("Society should not recognize an expectation of privacy
in a hotel room obtained fraudulently, and we do not believe
that such an expectation is legitimate or reasonable.");
Byrd, 138 S.Ct. at 1529 ("No matter the degree
of possession and control, the car thief would not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in a stolen car.").
even if Starks carried his burden to establish the subjective
prong,  he fraudulently obtained the rental car,
which means his possession of the vehicle was unlawful. 
at 3 (Starks "stated that he ihad used a counterfeit
identification card and credit card in the name of Timothy
Jones to rent the vehicle in Baltimore."). Therefore,
the Court finds that Starks lacks standing to challenge the
search of the rental car since he fraudulently obtained the