United States District Court, S.D. Georgia, Brunswick Division
JERMAINE D. WILLIAMS, Plaintiff,
JEFFREY FRANKLIN, CARLA FUTCH, JOHN DOE No. ONE, and JOHN DOE No. TWO, in their Individual and Official Capacities as Officers of the Brunswick Police Department, and THE CITY OF BRUNSWICK, GEORGIA, Defendants.
LISA GODBEY WOOD, JUDGE
filed this action seeking damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Dkt. No. 1. Before the Court is Defendants
Jeffrey Franklin, in his individual and official capacities,
Carla Futch, in her individual and official capacities, and
the City of Brunswick's Motion for Summary Judgment, dkt.
no. 34, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. The
Motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for
review. For the reasons stated below,
Defendants' Motion is GRANTED.
material facts set forth in Defendants' Statement of
Undisputed Material Facts, dkt. no. 34-1, are deemed admitted
for the purpose of this Motion because Plaintiff has not
controverted them by filing his own statement of facts (or
any other materials in opposition of Defendants' Motion).
LR 56.1, S.D. Ga. ("All material facts set forth in the
statement required to be served by the moving party will be
deemed to be admitted unless, controverted by a statement
served by the opposing party.").
Brunswick Exchange Club (the "Exchange Club") is a
nonprofit, local, civic organization, that holds an annual
Brunswick Exchange Club Fair. Dkt. No. 34-1 ¶ 2. The
Exchange Club owns the real estate where the fair is
conducted-none of the property where the fair is conducted is
owned by the City of Brunswick-and the Exchange Club
determines who can and cannot enter the fair. Id.
¶¶ 6-8. Patrick Browning, as the "Fair
Manager," coordinates the Brunswick Exchange Club Fair
and has done so for approximately 22 years. Id.
¶ 1. Pursuant to these duties, Browning coordinates with
the City of Brunswick Police Department to have the
department's officers work the fair. Id. ¶
5. For the 2015 fair, the Exchange Club instructed the
officers working the fair that gang members, suspected gang
members, and persons associated with gang members were not
permitted to enter the fair. Id. ¶ 9.
October 30, 2015, Plaintiff and his minor daughter entered
the Exchange Club fairgrounds and attempted to get in the
ticket line to buy tickets to enter the fair itself but were
approached by Defendant Officers Franklin and Futch.
Id. ¶¶ 11, 12. In 2015, Defendant Officer
Franklin was the gang investigator for the City of Brunswick
Police Department. Id. ¶ 14. At that time,
Defendant Officer Futch was also an officer with the City of
Brunswick Police Department. Dkt. No. 31 at 4, 5. Officers
Franklin and Futch had arrested Plaintiff on a prior
occasion, and Plaintiff had been arrested on other prior
occasions by the City of Brunswick Police Department. Dkt.
No. 34-1 ¶¶ 13, 19. Further, Officer Franklin was
aware that Plaintiff was on a list as a known gang member.
Id. ¶ 15. In fact, Officer Franklin had created
that list and had surveilled Plaintiff prior to the October
30, 2015 encounter. Id. ¶ 16.
Officers Franklin and Futch approached Plaintiff, they told
him that he was a known "gang banger" and was not
allowed to enter the fair. Id. ¶ 28. The
officers then told Plaintiff to wait where he was, and the
officers went and talked to a third-person. Id. The
officers and the third-person then approached Plaintiff again
and told him that he could not enter the fair because he was
a gang member. Id. After that, Plaintiff was free to
go and left the Exchange Club fairgrounds. Id. At
that time, Plaintiff believed he could go anywhere in the
world other than the_Exchange Club fairgrounds. Id.
filed this action to recover damages and other compensation,
which Plaintiff claims is owed to him under 42 U.S.C. §
judgment is required where "the movant shows that there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A fact is "material" if it
"might affect the outcome of the suit under the
governing law." FindWhat Inv'r Grp. v.
FindWhat.com, 658 F.3d 1282, 1307 (11th Cir. 2011)
(quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 248 (1986)). A dispute is "genuine" if the
"evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. In making
this determination, the court is to view all of the evidence
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw
all reasonable inferences in that party's favor.
Johnson v. Booker T. Washington Broad. Serv., Inc.,
234 F.3d 501, 507 (11th Cir. 2000).
moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The movant
must show the court that there is an absence of evidence to
support the nonmoving party's case. Id. at 325.
If the moving party discharges this burden, the burden shifts
to the nonmovant to go beyond the pleadings and present
affirmative evidence to show that a genuine issue of fact
does exist. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257.
nonmovant may satisfy this burden in two ways. First, the
nonmovant "may show that the record in fact contains
supporting evidence, sufficient to withstand a directed
verdict motion, which was 'overlooked or ignored' by
the moving party, who has thus failed to meet the initial
burden of showing an absence of evidence."
Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1116
(11th Cir. 1993) (quoting Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at
332 (Brennan, J., dissenting)). Second, the nonmovant
"may come forward with additional evidence sufficient to
withstand a directed verdict motion at trial based on the
alleged evidentiary deficiency." Id. at 1117.
Where the nonmovant attempts to carry this burden instead
with nothing more "than a repetition of his conclusional
allegations, summary judgment for the [movant is] not only
proper but required." Morris v. Ross, 663 F.2d
1032, 1033-34 (11th Cir. 1981) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)).
though Defendants' Motion is unopposed, the Court must
address the Motion on its merits. See United States v.
5800 SW 74th Ave., 363 F.3d 1099, 1101 (11th Cir. 2004)
("[A] district court cannot base the entry of summary
judgment on the mere fact that the motion ...