United States District Court, S.D. Georgia, Savannah Division
ORDER AND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
se plaintiff Michael Anthony Brown, detained at Chatham
County Jail, alleges in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Complaint
that he was subjected to excessive force and that his right
to due process was violated. Doc. 1 at 5-6. The Court granted
plaintiff's request to pursue his case in forma
pauperis (IFP), doc. 4, and he returned the necessary
forms. Docs. 5 & 6. The Court now screens the Complaint
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
alleges that he was ejected from his truck and lost
consciousness after crashing the vehicle while fleeing
Officer Denton in October 2018. Doc. 1 at 5. He regained
consciousness when Officer Denton tased him. Id. He
was cuffed and taken directly to Chatham County Jail for
booking, despite complaining of pain. Id. Once
there, Officer Denton told an on-duty nurse that Brown had
fallen, so that he received delayed treatment after being
ejected from the vehicle. Id. Several hours later,
he was taken to the hospital for assessment where he,
apparently, (he does not say) received some further treatment
for his injuries. Id. (noting that he was sent to
the hospital only because the jail doctor could not treat him
until he had been “cleared” by a hospital
clearly asserts an excessive force claim against Officer
Denton. To allege excessive force by an officer in the course
of executing an arrest, a plaintiff must assert that the
officer's conduct was objectively
“unreasonable.” Graham v. Connor, 490
U.S. 386, 395-97 (1989). Such a test looks not to the
motivation of the particular officer, but instead examines
whether a reasonable officer would have taken the same
action. Id. at 397. “Determining whether the
force used to effect a particular seizure is
‘reasonable' under the Fourth Amendment requires a
careful balancing of the nature and quality of the intrusion
on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against
the countervailing governmental interests at stake.”
Id. at 396 (quotes and cites omitted).
Because “[t]he test of reasonableness under the Fourth
Amendment is not capable of a precise definition or
mechanical application, ” . . . its proper application
requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of
each particular case, including the severity of the crime at
issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the
safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively
resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.
Id. (cites omitted). The Court examines “the
fact pattern from the perspective of a reasonable officer on
the scene with knowledge of the attendant circumstances and
facts, and balanc[ing] the risk of bodily harm to the suspect
against the gravity of the threat the officer sought to
eliminate.” McCullough v. Antolini, 559 F.3d
1201, 1206 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing Scott v. Harris,
550 U.S. 372, 383 (2007)). “Although some amount of
force is generally needed to subdue a suspect, the amount
used must be reasonably proportionate to the need for
force.” Smith v. LePage, 834 F.3d 1285, 1294
(11th Cir. 2016); see also Scott, 550 U.S. at 383
(observing that in determining whether the Fourth Amendment
was violated, “we must still slosh our way through the
factbound morass of ‘reasonableness.'”).
Here, Brown alleges that he was tased back to wakefulness
after losing consciousness following a car crash. Taken as
true,  as his allegations must be at this stage,
that is enough to warrant a response from Officer Denton.
Officer Denton's false statement to the responding
jailhouse nurse regarding the nature of Brown's injuries,
which apparently caused Brown to only be treated for
“minor injuries” (see doc. 1 at 5),
Brown does not allege that the false statement actually
harmed him in any way. At most he alleges that he
did receive medical treatment (albeit not the
treatment he desired) from the nurse, and that he
did receive the medical treatment he desired (albeit
delayed by a few hours) from the hospital. Id. But,
“[w]hen the claim turns on the quality of the treatment
provided, there is no constitutional violation as long as the
medical care provided to the inmate is ‘minimally
adequate.'” Blanchard v. White Cty. Det. Center
Staff, 262 Fed.Appx. 959, 964 (11th Cir. 2008) (internal
cite omitted). “Deliberate indifference is not
established where an inmate received care but desired
different modes of treatment.” Id. In other
words, mere differences of opinion between an inmate and
medical staff in how to treat an injury do not a
constitutional claim make. Neither does a delay in treatment
(of mere hours, it must be remembered) where no harm occurred
as a result of that delay. Because Brown has not alleged that
Officer Denton's “false statement [is] causally
connected to some discernible harm, ” see Harris v.
McKie, 2018 WL 3766687 at *3 (S.D. Ga. July 16, 2018),
his § 1983 for defendant's statement to the nurse
should be DISMISSED.
plaintiff's false statement claim should be
DISMISSED from the Complaint. His claims for
excessive force, however, is AUTHORIZED for
service and the Clerk is DIRECTED to forward
a copy of this Order, along with plaintiff's Complaint,
to the Marshal for service upon Officer Adam Denton (see
State v. Brown, RCCR18-33500 (Chatham Cty. Super. Ct.))
so that he may respond.
it is time for plaintiff to pay his filing fee. His PLRA
paperwork reflects $39.50 in average monthly deposits. Doc.
5. He therefore owes a $7.90 initial partial filing fee.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b) (1) (requiring an
initial fee assessment “when funds exist, ” under
a specific 20 percent formula). Plaintiff's custodian (or
designee) shall remit the $7.90 and shall set aside 20
percent of all future deposits to his account, then forward
those funds to the Clerk each time the set aside amount
reaches $10.00, until the balance of the Court's $350.00
filing fee has been paid in full.
Report and Recommendation (R&R) is submitted to the
district judge assigned to this action, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(B) and this Court's Local Rule 72.3.
Within 14 days of service, any party may file written
objections to this R&R with the Court and serve a copy on
all parties. The document should be captioned
“Objections to Magistrate Judge's Report and
Recommendations.” Any request for additional time to
file objections should be filed with the Clerk for
consideration by the assigned district judge.
the objections period has ended, the Clerk shall submit this
R&R together with any objections to the assigned district
judge. The district judge will review the magistrate
judge's findings and recommendations pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that
failure to timely file objections will result in the waiver
of rights on appeal. 11th Cir. R. 3-1; see Symonett v.
V.A. Leasing Corp., 648 Fed.Appx. 787, 790 (11th Cir.
2016); Mitchell v. United States, 612 Fed.Appx. 542,
545 (11th Cir. 2015).
ORDERED AND REPORTED AND RECOMMENDED
 During the early screening required by
§ 1915A, the Court must identify “cognizable
claims” in the prisoner's complaint and dismiss any
claim that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted, or seeks ...